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A steady stream of research describes rising income inequality in the U.S. since the 
1970s. Beneath this familiar story, however, are a variety of state experiences. In this 
dissertation, I develop and test a new theory to explain why income inequality varies in the states 
over time. My partisan political-economy theory for state inequality builds on political 
explanations for national inequality; but it takes a step further to recognize and incorporate 
variation in state governments, which do most of the governing and policymaking in our federal 
system. I demonstrate that shifts in state government party composition, and related policy shifts, 
are a fundamental determinant of over time changes in state-level inequality between 1970 and 
2005. First, controlling for economic and demographic factors, I find that increases in 
Democratic control of state government are significantly related to decreases, or diminished 
growth, of market inequality, while increases in Republican control coincide with increases in 
inequality. Second, I show how partisanship influences income disparity by identifying policy 
mechanisms that respond to changes in government partisanship and that also relate to changes 
in inequality: state public sector employment, minimum wages, and public welfare spending. My 
results for the former two policies suggest that the parties in state governments shape the 
distribution of income even before making adjustments with income taxes and transfers; 
however, those for the latter point to the relevance of state governments for changes in post-tax 
and transfer inequality as well. Together, the results of my research demonstrate that patterns in 
 income inequality are not simply a function of broader economic shifts, or even policies set by 
the national government. Rather, the parties or party members we elect to state governments, and 
their policy decisions, help determine the extent of income disparity in the United States. These 
findings allow us to say with more empirical certainty that there are political explanations for 
changes in income inequality in the U.S. throughout the past forty years.    
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 CHAPTER 1  
INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
Just minutes into his third State of the Union address, President Obama decried the 
concentration of income in the hands of a few and called it the “defining issue of our time” 
(Obama 2012). It was a bold statement to be sure, but there was nothing groundbreaking about 
this particular part of Obama’s speech.  That U.S. income disparity has increased in the past few 
decades has become a familiar refrain. A steady stream of research shows that incomes have 
grown more unequal in the U.S. since the 1970s, that this trend is largely driven by gains for the 
top of the income distribution, and that, compared with other advanced industrial democracies, 
income differences in the U.S. stand out as particularly large (Jacobs and Skocpol 2005, 
Smeeding 2004, Picketty and Saez 2003). Outside academic circles, the Occupy Wall Street 
movement vocally criticized “the 1%,” and income inequality is now a frequent subject in the 
news media and on the op-ed pages. For all this scholarly and popular attention and even 
outrage, however, income differences continue to grow. And while many speculate that our 
political system is at least partly to blame, we remain unable to say, with any real certainty, 
whether or how government drives changes in the distribution of income.  
While we struggle to understand the determinants of this phenomenon, one significant 
aspect of U.S. inequality – its startling heterogeneity at the state-level – has been a footnote at 
best. As the most common measure of income inequality, the Gini index, climbed to record 
highs, and the top 10% and top 1% of earners captured greater and greater shares of income – 
46% and 17% respectively by 2010 (Alverado et al) – the states were having radically different 
experiences. Indeed, the gap between the highest inequality and lowest inequality states in 2005 
– Florida and West Virginia (Frank 2008) - was even larger than the oft-studied increase in U.S. 
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 inequality between 1970 and 2005. Perhaps even more striking, this gap between states has 
increased over time; it was three times greater in 2005 than in 1970. This increasing range of 
inequality among the states is displayed by the solid line in Figure 1.1, and clearly rivals the 
increase in U.S. inequality during this time (dashed line), with both patterns charted on 
comparable 20 point scales.  
Figure 1.1 Increasing Variation in Inequality in the States and U.S. Inequality, Top Decile Income 
Shares, 1970-2005 
 
 The tendency to overlook this impressive growth of variation in inequality in the states is 
a critical mistake. In the first place, an aggregate focus on the national trend paints a misleading 
picture of what inequality looks like in the U.S., as well as how citizens experience it. Secondly, 
by viewing inequality only at the national level, we fumble the opportunity to peer into the 
mechanisms, especially the political mechanisms, at work. Nearly a decade ago, political 
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 scientists exclaimed that politics and policies were relevant for rising income inequality (Jacobs 
and Skocpol 2005). But when they took stock of what we knew about these relationships, they 
found that scholars had established few concrete empirical connections between the political 
system and distributional outcomes. Although some more recent research makes strides in this 
area (e.g. Volscho and Kelly 2012), our situation is the same today in two important and, I argue, 
related ways. First, while we know politics and inequality are relevant for each other, we 
continue to struggle to establish causal links, or to say how exactly the political system might 
shape distributional outcomes. Second, the most widely-cited research in this field, while touting 
the importance of government, stops at Washington’s edge, thereby ignoring the vast majority of 
our federal political system. With such an incomplete view of our political system, it is little 
wonder we are left with so many unanswered questions about whether or how government 
drives, or mitigates, income disparity in the U.S.   
This project exploits the variation in state political systems and in state-level inequality to 
provide new insights into how government and policies are a key determinant of inequality in the 
U.S. In particular, it zeros in on year-to-year changes in inequality among the states since 1970 
and shows how state governments, through the partisan policies they implement in office, 
explain a significant amount of this over time variation. By placing states front and center, and 
by breaking down the relationships between state political processes and shifts in the income 
distribution, I provide new answers to unresolved questions about inequality. My findings show 
us how the political system is emeshed with changes in the income disparity in the U.S. and give 
us new answers to questions about why and when inequality increases or declines.  
Why Study Inequality? 
At any given time, we expect some level of inequality between income groups. A whole 
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 category of public policies – redistributive policies, including progressive features of our income 
tax system and a list of transfer policies – has long functioned to reduce some of these income 
differences between groups in society. But the drastic increases in U.S. income inequality since 
the 1970s, especially gains concentrated at the very top of the income distribution, have attracted 
the attention of policymakers, academics, and ordinary citizens alike. Increasing inequality over 
time is, at a minimum, a signal that some are gaining relatively more than others. In the U.S. in 
particular, it is also the case that many citizens are falling behind in absolute terms, while just a 
few are prospering. For those on the losing side, this situation comes with real financial costs. It 
is difficult to improve or even maintain one’s economic situation when gains in income go 
disproportionately to those at the top (Gottschalk 1997; Jacobs and Skocpol 2004, 3). Indeed, 
past analyses suggest that there is a zero-sum element to income inequality; these gains for the 
top come “at least partially at the expense of those lower on the income ladder” (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010, 159, emphasis added).  
This pattern is not just about the size of bank accounts. A high level of income inequality 
also threatens other tangible outcomes like health, housing adequacy, and quality of education 
(McNichol et al 2012) and may contribute to social problems, including crime and poor 
educational performance (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Economic inequality is tied to political 
inequality. The financially well-off have more resources for political participation and 
organization, as well as disproportionate access to policymakers (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005, 
2011). When inequality increases and some citizens fall further behind economically, it also 
becomes more difficult for them to influence policy in their favor, creating a vicious cycle. In 
short, a significant number of people are worse off financially, socially, and politically, as a 
result of recent trends in U.S. income inequality. 
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 Why Study the States? 
Given these substantial consequences, it comes as no surprise that rising inequality has 
attracted considerable scholarly (and popular) scrutiny across disciplines. Many are eager to 
explain record-breaking levels of inequality and discover ways to mitigate it. I argue that there is 
much to be gained by studying inequality trends at the state level. For one, we more accurately 
depict U.S. inequality when we take state-level heterogeneity into account. For individual 
citizens, inequality within one’s state is more relevant than national trends. State context 
determines the degree to which inequality impacts financial and social well-being, with citizens 
in some states or at some points in time facing greater inequality than others. Higher state-level 
inequality is associated with greater personal bankruptcy filings (Bertrand and Morse 2013; 
Levine, Frank, and Dijk 2010), higher divorce rates, and even longer commute times (Levine, 
Frank, and Dijk 2010). And we know that levels of state inequality are perceptible to citizens; it 
shapes their views of national inequality (Xu and Garand 2010). Moreover, because states are the 
foundation for our national elections and representation, state-specific effects on political 
attitudes and behavior, including voter turnout (Galbraith and Hale 2008), can shape national-
level political outcomes. Variation in state-level inequality therefore holds economic and 
political significance within and beyond the states.  
State-level analyses also have methodological advantages. At the state level, we are in a 
better position to disentangle underlying factors that cause relatively greater inequality in some 
states and might be masked in national-level analyses. We can use the variation in state contexts 
to discover which characteristics or variables matter for the outcome of interest, while also 
holding many country-level factors constant. In other words, states are a good place to test 
theories.  
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 Why Study State Politics? Federalism and the Political Mechanisms of Inequality  
Much more than serving as “laboratories” for theory testing, however, I suggest that states 
themselves are part of the explanation for inequality. And they are particularly critical for our 
understanding of how political systems contribute to income differences. Owing to federalism, 
the states have distinct public policies and institutions. Students of federalism have noted that 
this feature of American government leaves U.S. policy “fragmented and varied” and warned 
that it promotes unequal outcomes between states, as well as groups of citizens (Robertson 2013, 
Wildavsky 1985).  For any number of policy areas in which states exercise control, citizens are 
treated differently depending on where they live. For example, Mettler (2000) noted that greater 
state authority over welfare policies meant that “poor single mothers and their children were 
subject to the vagaries of political geography” (26). And because states govern the “everyday 
life” of Americans (Robertson 2013) there are many such instances of unequal treatment. 
Similarly, federalism is linked to unequal treatment of groups across states, including by gender 
(Mettler 1998), race (Lieberman 1998, 2005), and sexual orientation (Knauer 2008).  
Such arguments about federalism and equality are not necessarily statements about 
income inequality. Nevertheless, I argue that federalism holds important implications for our 
understanding of how the concentration of income in the United States has changed during the 
past several decades, and particularly the role of government. Inequality has certainly become a 
popular subject among political scientists. Scholars examine rising inequality in relation to 
changes in political participation, mobilization, and organization (Hacker and Pierson 2010; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Skocpol 1999; Strolovitch 2006; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995), public policy (Hacker and Pierson 2010), representation and public opinion (Bartels 2008; 
Gilens 2005, 2011; Kelly and Enns 2010), and ideological and partisan features of government 
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 (Bartels 2008; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). In some of these cases, inequality serves 
mainly as a context in which to explore political equality or patterns of representation (e.g. 
Gilens 2005). Others tell us that income inequality relates to inequalities in political participation 
(e.g. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). A few suggest more explicitly that there are political 
causes for inequality. For example, as I will discuss further below, scholars like Bartels (2008) 
and Hacker and Pierson (2010) provide some evidence that features of our political system have 
contributed to rising inequality. Nevertheless, we have been limited in our ability to show how 
such political factors shape distributional outcomes. A related shortcoming – and one that is at 
the heart of this project - is that these explanations have left out a significant part of the political 
system: state government and policies. 
If we want to take political causes of inequality seriously – and this dissertation does –we 
must move beyond national government and break down the political processes which we 
believe shape income distributions. A thorough examination of these causes means 
acknowledging the impressive heterogeneity that categorizes U.S. inequality, examining the 50 
state governments, which do the vast majority of governing and policymaking in our federal 
system (Freeman and Rogers 2007), and tracing the specific political processes that connect 
these governments with distributional outcomes. In the following chapters, I will show that the 
characteristics and actions of state governments help explain the considerable variation in 
inequality observed across the states and over time. Federalism therefore fosters differences in 
income inequality between states while also shaping the extent of differences between income 
groups in the U.S. more broadly. We will see that understanding inequality in the states – and the 
political context that shapes this inequality – can help explain patterns of inequality in ways that 
previous national-level studies could not.   
7 
 
 State Political Processes and Income Disparity: An Overview  
As I will detail further in Chapter 2, political scientists have certainly helped moved us 
forward from often apolitical treatments of and explanations for rising income differences in the 
U.S; however, this work is far from conclusive. We learned from Bartels’ (2008) study of 
inequality that the partisanship of the President explains some over time patterns in income 
inequality at the national level. But in a political system with not only other national-level actors, 
but state-level governments and policymakers as well, the story Bartels offers about the partisan 
political-economy of U.S. inequality is incomplete. With state governments playing a vital 
policymaking role, and even taking on increasing policymaking responsibility over time, we are 
left to wonder about the relevance of partisanship for their inequality-related policy choices. 
Even more critically, Bartels leaves us with a one-size-fits-all theory, encompassing the entire 
country, to explain a phenomenon that varies widely from state to state and over time. 
Presidential partisanship cannot explain the extreme and increasing variation inequality we 
observe in the states during the past several decades. The shifting partisanship of this one 
national-level figure cannot tell us why, as I will show in the following section, the variation in 
U.S. inequality among the states rivals or surpasses the variation we observe between different 
countries. Neither can it show us empirically how partisanship matters. Although Bartels gives 
several examples of partisan policy differences that likely lead to different distributional 
outcomes under the different parties, these connections are generally not subject to empirical 
scrutiny.  
Similarly, theories that highlight important national policy changes as explanations for rising 
U.S. inequality, such as those offered by Hacker and Pierson (2010), would lead us to expect a 
uniform pattern of increasing inequality in the U.S. But if national policy changes are to blame 
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 for rising inequality, why do we see such stunning growth of inequality in some states, like 
Florida, and only modest increases in others? The answer may lie in the very real variation in 
policies set by the states in our federal system, but we have only begun to examine the effects of 
these policies.  
To explain inequality as it exists in the U.S. – as a phenomenon that differs dramatically 
across states and over time – we need a theory that predicts such variation, rather than one that 
suggests a uniform national pattern. We saw in Figure 1.1 above that increasing state-level 
variation surpasses the over time growth of US inequality, yet our current theories do not address 
and cannot explain this critical feature of U.S .inequality. This dissertation aims to provide such 
an explanation. It sets out to improve our understanding of inequality by focusing on state-level 
variation, specifically asking: what explains the considerable over time variation in income 
inequality among the American states since the 1970s? I answer this question by developing and 
testing a partisan political-economy theory for state inequality. This theory, presented in Chapter 
2, builds on some national-level political explanations for inequality to the extent that it pivots on 
partisanship and public policies; but it goes further to recognize, incorporate, and connect the 
diversity of these political factors across states and over time. I argue that changes in the partisan 
composition of state governments, and related policy shifts, are a fundamental determinant of 
changes in state-level inequality.  
After outlining this theory in Chapter 2, I turn to empirical tests in Chapter 3. Using a new 
panel dataset for the states from 1970-2005 and a set of time series error correction models, I 
establish a strong over time relationship between the partisan composition of state governments 
and changes in market inequality between 1970 and 2005. Controlling for economic and 
demographic factors, I find that changes in income shares for the top 10% and top 1% and the 
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 Gini coefficient are significantly and negatively related to increases in Democratic control of 
state government, while increases in Republican control are positively and significantly related. 
Governors and state legislatures each have significant, independent effects, and they matter in 
combination; the results suggest that inequality decreases, or rises by relatively less, under 
unified Democratic government and increases when Republicans gain control of both the 
Governorship and legislature. Overall, my findings in Chapter 3 demonstrate that state-level 
government partisanship is a key explanation for over time patterns of inequality in the states. 
Further, because the dependent variable is market or pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality, states 
influence the distribution of incomes even before redistribution. Building on the work of Kelly 
and Witko (2012), I also find that higher union membership consistently relates to decreasing 
inequality, suggesting that, like government partisanship, unions are an important institution for 
inequality. Additionally, increases in per capita income and per capita investment income, as 
well as in the percent of the population with college degrees, relate to increasing income 
disparity at the state level.  
In Chapter 4, I further scrutinize my theory by identifying policy mechanisms which connect 
the party in power with market inequality outcomes. If changes in market inequality really are a 
function of who is in power, we should also see shifts in relevant policies when government 
partisanship changes, and these policy shifts should have significant effects on inequality. 
Indeed, I find that increases in Democratic control are associated with increases in state public 
sector employment, as well as state minimum wages. Increases in both of these policy variables, 
in turn, significantly relate to declining or diminished growth of inequality. These findings 
provide further support for my theory that the parties’ different policy approaches are 
consequential for pre-tax and transfer income inequality.  
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 In Chapter 5, I reconsider the role of redistributive policies, which were previously shown to 
have little relevance for state-level outcomes (e.g. Barrilleux and Davis 2003). In contrast to 
these previous findings, I find that state public welfare spending is an additional mechanism by 
which state governments affect inequality, in this case post-tax and transfer inequality. To be 
sure, the effect is quite small, which further suggests that we focus on the ways that governments 
influence income inequality besides income transfers and taxes. Still, the combined findings of 
Chapters 4 and 5 shows that the policy decisions of the parties in state government significantly 
impact pre- and post-redistribution income inequality. I conclude in Chapter 6 by discussing the 
implications of these findings and suggest avenues for further research.  
The overall findings of this dissertation contribute to literatures with explicit state-level 
emphases. In general terms, I provide additional evidence that partisanship is a meaningful 
predictor of policy and outcomes, even across diverse states, which is relevant for a variety of 
studies of state policy choices and outcomes. In terms of state-level inequality specifically, I add 
to a small body of state-level inequality studies which points to political, not just economic and 
demographic, explanations for such differences (e.g. Freund and Morris 2005, Langer 2001, 
Kelly and Witko 2012). More specifically, I believe I am the first in this subfield to connect 
state-level partisanship, policies, and inequality, and I study these relationships over a longer 
period of time.  
Although the states are at the core of this project, my findings hold implications for our 
understanding of U.S. inequality more broadly. This dissertation demonstrates that U.S. 
inequality is not simply a function of broader national or global economic trends, or even 
political decisions made at the national-level. Rather, I show that state governments and state 
policies play a critical role in the story of U.S. inequality. By taking a state-level view, I 
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 acknowledge the substantial heterogeneity in U.S. inequality that has been largely overlooked, 
and provide an explanation that matches this variation we observe in the states and over time. 
This approach illuminates relationships that cannot be accurately captured with an aggregate 
national focus, highlighting important and consequential policy differences between states that 
take us beyond the typical focus on the White House or Washington, DC. My analyses point to 
new political features – state government party control and several state-legislated policies – that 
are absent from national-level studies but are clearly integral to the distribution of income in the 
U.S. Further, I show how these features relate to one another, establishing empirical connections 
between partisanship and policy changes, and between policy changes in shifts in inequality. 
With empirical evidence to support this causal chain, I shed new light on the specific political 
mechanisms which make government so important to the story of U.S. income inequality. We 
see how partisanship matters and can say with some more empirical certainty that changes in our 
political system are fundamental determinants of changes in inequality throughout the past four 
decades. In more specific terms, the increasing presence of Republicans in state governments, 
and accompanying declines in Democratic control, have had significant consequences for income 
disparity.  
U.S. Income Inequality: A View from the States  
The significant and increasing variation in inequality, depicted above in Figure 1.1, is, of 
course, the central concern of this project. Before turning to my attention to explanations for this 
variation in Chapters 2 and 3, I devote the remainder of this chapter to describing patterns in 
state inequality during the past several decades, specifically the concentration of income at the 
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 top of the income distribution.1 This discussion provides further evidence that state-level 
differences during this time are considerable, while also giving us a better sense of the nature of 
the variation to be explained.  
Variation in the Rise of Income Inequality across States  
Figure 1.2 below charts the percentage change in the states’ top decile income shares 
between 1970 and 2005.2 The states are ordered from largest to smallest increase. During this 
time, each state experienced an increase in the concentration of income, but the extent of these 
increases differs markedly between states. At the lower end, North Dakota and Iowa’s top decile 
gained by 23% and 30% respectively, while Nevada’s gained by 88% and Wyoming’s by 73%. 
Put another way, the top 10% of earners in North Dakota captured about 32% of income in 1970 
and 39% in 2005. While this is a significant increase, it is dwarfed by gains in Nevada, where the 
top decile increased their share from about 28% in 1970 to 53% of total state income in 2005. 
Even considerable increases like Nevada’s, however, seem small compared with the enormous 
gains for the top 1%. Their shares increased by between 101% (in Delaware) and 253% (in 
Wyoming) during this time.  
1 The data in this section come from Frank (2008, 2009) and will be discussed further in chapter three. Future 
chapters will also consider the Gini coefficient along with these top share measures of inequality. 
2 Similar patterns are observable for the Gini coefficient – which increased by between 20% and 48% during this 
period - and top 1% percent income share. See Appendix A, Figures A1 and A2.  
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 Figure 1.2 Percentage Increase in State Top Deciles' Income Shares, 1970-2005 
 
 
One way to make the significance of state differences clearer is to compare them to 
differences between countries. Figure 1.3 below shows the percentage change in the top decile’s 
income share between 1970 and 2005 again, but this time for select states along with several 
countries. Notice that state variation is comparable to cross-national variation, and in some cases 
the differences between states are much larger than those between countries. Michigan and the 
UK both experienced about a 44% increase – from about 28% shares to 41% shares - in the top 
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 decile’s income share between 1970 and 2005 (as did Georgia, not pictured). North Dakota and 
Norway had smaller increases of just around 23%, with their top decile shares shifting from 32% 
and 31% to 39% and 38% respectively.   
Figure 1.3 Percentage Change in Top Deciles' Income Shares, 1970-2005 
 
 
Differences in the Levels of Inequality across States  
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show that the extent to which inequality has increased over the past 
several decades clearly varies significantly in the states. Accordingly, the levels of inequality 
also look increasingly different in the states over time. For example, when we compare top decile 
income shares in 1965, 1980, and 2005 in Figure 1.4 below, we see that while states tended to 
cluster together in 1965 and 1980, there is noticeably more variation between the states by 2005. 
In 1980, there was about a six percentage point difference between the most unequal and most 
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 equal states. But, as displayed previously in Figure 1.1, the difference between the most unequal 
and most equal state increased over time and by 2005 it was about 16 percentage points.  
Figure 1.4 State Top Deciles' Income Shares: 1965, 1980, and 2005 
 
 
 Not only is this 2005 range between states greater than the difference between U.S. 
inequality in 1965 and in 2005, which was about 12 percentage points, it is also larger than the 
differences between the United States and many other countries, including the UK, Japan, 
Canada, Portugal, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Italy, France, and Australia. Moreover, this 16 
percentage point range between states is just shy of the 17.4 percentage point difference between 
the U.S. and Sweden, which is the greatest cross-national inequality gap in the available data. 
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
Al
as
ka
W
as
hi
ng
to
n
In
di
an
a
O
hi
o
W
isc
on
sin
U
ta
h
M
on
ta
na
M
ic
hi
ga
n
Pe
nn
sy
lv
an
ia
Co
lo
ra
do
O
re
go
n
W
es
t V
irg
in
ia
So
ut
h 
Ca
ro
lin
a
Ill
in
oi
s
M
ai
ne
M
in
ne
so
ta
N
ew
 H
am
ps
hi
re
Rh
od
e 
Is
la
nd
W
yo
m
in
g
Io
w
a
Id
ah
o
N
ew
 Je
rs
ey
N
ev
ad
a
N
or
th
 D
ak
ot
a
N
ew
 M
ex
ic
o
So
ut
h 
Da
ko
ta
M
ar
yl
an
d
Ca
lif
or
ni
a
Ha
w
ai
i
M
iss
ou
ri
Al
ab
am
a
Ke
nt
uc
ky
Ka
ns
as
Vi
rg
in
ia
M
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
Ar
izo
na
N
eb
ra
sk
a
Lo
ui
sia
na
N
or
th
 C
ar
ol
in
a
Te
xa
s
Co
nn
ec
tic
ut
O
kl
ah
om
a
G
eo
rg
ia
Ve
rm
on
t
Te
nn
es
se
e
M
iss
iss
ip
pi
Fl
or
id
a
N
ew
 Y
or
k
Ar
ka
ns
as
De
la
w
ar
e
To
p 
10
 %
 In
co
m
e 
Sh
ar
e
1965 1980 2005
2005 high (FL .54)
2005 low (WV  .38)
1980 low (WV .29)
1980 high (FL .35)
1965 low (AK .27)
1965 high (DE.41)
16 
 
 Figure 1.5 displays these differences in the top decile’s income share between the U.S. and other 
countries and between select U.S. states for 2005. On the right, notice that the difference 
between Florida and West Virginia surpasses nearly all cross-national comparisons and rivals 
that between the U.S. and Sweden. Moreover, other state differences, depicted with solid black 
bars, are comparable to cross-national differences as well.  
Figure 1.5 Differences in Top Deciles' Income Shares between US and Other Countries and between 
States, 2005 
 
Geographic Trends in Inequality  
When it comes to explaining these inequality differences between states, one of the first 
explanations we might look to is region. If we map state top decile income share in 1970 and 
2005, some regional trends do emerge. For example, notice in the top half of Figure 1.6 that the 
top decile’s share in 1970 is generally lower in Midwestern states and somewhat higher in the 
South. But there are differences within regions too, and these are somewhat more pronounced in 
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 2005. Neighboring Southern states, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, fall into different categories 
in both of the maps below. And between 1970 and 2005, Illinois pulls away from its neighboring 
Midwestern states.  It appears from looking at these snapshots that differences in inequality 
between states, as well as over time changes, are not simply a function of region.  
If we narrow the scope of states, we can compare annual trends in inequality for the full 
time period and see the extent of intra-regional differences. Figure 1.7 charts the rise in the 
concentration of income for four pairs of states, one in each Census region, between 1970 and 
2005. For each pair, inequality for states within the same region – Connecticut and Pennsylvania 
in the Northeast, Nevada and New Mexico in the West, Illinois and Indiana in the Midwest, 
Virginia and West Virginia in the South– increased by significantly different amounts. While 
Nevada’s top decile’s share in 1970 was lower than that of New Mexico, as well as the top share 
for the U.S. as a whole (gray line), note that it far surpassed both of these by 2005.  Similarly, in 
the Midwest, Illinois and Indiana has lower inequality than the overall U.S. in 1970, yet, by 
2005, Illinois’ top decile’s share was greater than the U.S. share, and Indiana’s was noticeably 
lower. These patterns further suggest that over time changes in state-level inequality cannot be 
explained away by region.  
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 Figure 1.6 Geography of State Top Decile Income Shares, 1970 and 2005 
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 Figure 1.7 Annual Increases in Top Decile's Income Share, 1970-2005, by Regional Pairs 
 
Conclusion 
It should by now be clear that there is substantial variation in states’ experiences with 
income inequality.  The magnitudes of these state-level differences are on par with differences 
between the U.S. and many other countries, as well as the growth of U.S. inequality over the past 
40 years. Moreover, we find that even states in the same region have taken different paths. What, 
then, explains differences in inequality in the states over time? This is, of course, the primary 
question addressed in the following chapters. I begin by presenting my theory in Chapter 2.   
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 CHAPTER 2  
THE PARTISAN POLITICAL-ECONOMY IN THE STATES:  A THEORY OF STATE 
INEQUALITY 
 
In Chapter 1, we saw that by a number of measures, there are significant differences in 
income inequality in and among the states since 1970. State-level differences in income 
inequality are comparable to cross-national differences, and they are not simply explained by 
region.  Several decades ago, many scholars argued that variation in state-level inequality was 
explained by demographic and economic patterns (Aigner and Heins 1967, Al-Sammarie and 
Miller 1967, Bishop et al 1992, Conlisk 1967, Nelson 1984, Nord 1984, Sale 1974). But there is 
more to state variation than that. Along with sorting citizens such that the demographic and 
economic profiles of states vary, federalism also divides citizens into separate political entities, 
where they are subject to different policies and politics (Mettler 1998, 2000; Peterson 1995; Soss 
2001).  The central argument of this dissertation is that these political factors in the states are 
consequential for income inequality. 
In this chapter, I develop a theory for inequality grounded in state political 
characteristics. I argue that the partisan composition of state governments explains a substantial 
amount of over time variation in income inequality in the states.  This theory rests on the 
different economic approaches of the Republican and Democratic Parties, which should have 
different effects on the distribution of income. In general, Democratic policies are more likely to 
target lower and middle income groups and involve more government intervention in the 
economy. We expect such policies to reduce income differences. Republican policies, on the 
other hand, typically appeal to higher income groups and business and favor less economic 
intervention or regulations. In view of these approaches, I theorize that, controlling for economic 
and demographic characteristics, we should observe decreasing or relatively smaller increases in 
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 inequality under Democratic state governments and increasing inequality under Republicans.  
This state-level argument builds on political explanations offered for national inequality. 
In an extensive literature on income inequality, some scholars argue that growing income 
differences are a function of political or policy decisions (Bartels 2008, Hacker and Pierson 
2010, Kelly 2009), not just the inevitable outcome of economic restructuring. Within this 
politically-oriented literature, some have established a relationship between the partisanship of 
the President (Bartels 2008, Kelly 2009) or Congress (Volscho and Kelly 2012) and patterns of 
inequality.  Up to this point, these explanations have not discussed the role of party control at the 
state level.  Similarly, even though there is considerable political variation across states, politics 
is absent from the older state-level studies of inequality referenced above, and some more recent 
state-level analyses (e.g. Fruend and Morris 2005; Langer 2001) do not address parties. This is a 
critical oversight. States set many more policies than the federal government and they have 
acquired additional authority over time, beginning with “New Federalism” under Nixon and 
continuing in the 1990s with the “devolution revolution” (Nathan 1996, 2006). At the same time, 
the parties have polarized along economic lines (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), making 
partisanship even more relevant for economic approaches and outcomes. In sum, during the 
period of interest, state governments have considerable control over policy and economic 
outcomes and their political decisions are likely to reflect the economic approach of the party in 
power. We have good reason to extend our consideration of partisanship and inequality to the 
state level.  
By incorporating state-level party control, I offer a more complete picture of the 
mechanisms which produce inequality. As discussed in Chapter 1, understanding the 
mechanisms of inequality is important because it is one of the most pressing economic issues in 
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 the U.S. today. Understanding political causes of inequality is particularly important because 
these mechanisms, unlike economic ones, are not “automatic” or “inevitable” (Bartels 2008). 
Political decisions are made by individuals and parties in power.  By studying these political 
factors, we can learn more about what actions – or lack thereof - influence inequality, rather than 
just being subject to demographic and economic chance.  
A full consideration of political factors cannot end with Presidents or Congress. Such a 
national focus “reflects an unreal vision of the nature of modern government and politics” 
(Freeman and Rogers 2008, 205). There are 50 state governments with thousands of legislators 
making policy decisions that can affect economic outcomes within states and on a national scale. 
My theory considers the partisanship of these governments and, by doing so, expands what we 
know about state and national inequality. To this end, I will show in this chapter that over time 
patterns in state-level government partisanship track with inequality trends in several states and 
with national inequality trends, arguably better than national party control does.  
In the following section, I begin by discussing the relationship between politics and 
inequality established at the national level. I then turn my attention to state politics literature to 
explain the significance of political variation in the states. My partisan theory for state inequality 
incorporates both of these literatures. In this theory section, I explain how and why we should 
expect differences in the partisan composition of state governments to affect inequality in the 
states over time. This theory is grounded in economic differences between the parties, and I 
discuss this partisan model and the related historical context. I conclude this chapter with a 
descriptive overview of state government partisanship and some empirical analysis of how these 
patterns relate to income inequality during the period of interest. 
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 Politics and the Distribution of Income: National-Level Connections 
Although many studies of U.S. inequality emphasize economic factors, there is evidence 
that politics play an important role as well. Some scholars point to specific policy changes which 
underlie larger economic trends. In the policy-oriented accounts by Hacker and Pierson (2007, 
2010) and Levy and Temin (2007), for example, the economic trends related to inequality, like 
the relative rise of the financial industry, shifts in technology, and the decline of labor unions, are 
intertwined with actions taken, or not taken, by government. And there are more explicit 
statements about the importance of politics as well. Students of politics argue that rising U.S. 
inequality is not “simply a ‘natural’ economic phenomenon” (Hacker and Pierson 2007, 2) or “an 
economic reality” tied to “market forces” (Bartels 2008, 30); it is influenced by what government 
does or does not do (Hacker and Pierson 2007, 2).  
Perhaps the most visible or obvious relationship between the government and the income 
distribution is through redistributive policies. The distribution of income can be made more equal 
through progressive taxation and income transfer policies, like social assistance or even tax 
credits. However, government also plays an important role before taxes and transfers. Jacobs and 
Soss (2010) explain that, even prior to these adjustments, “government policies structure labor 
markets and labor bargaining, corporate governance and executive compensation, and the 
operation of financial markets” (346). Similarly, Hacker and Pierson (2007) argue that, 
“government actually has an enormous range of tools for affecting the distribution of earnings 
before taxes and benefits take effect” (170). Rather than “simply redistribute what labor and 
financial markets produce” government policies affect economic outcomes by actually 
“structure[ing] those markets” in the first place (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 169-170).  Kelly 
(2009) refers to government’s pre-tax and transfer role as “market conditioning,” or situations in 
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 which private market decisions that can be readily observed are influenced by government 
action” (18).  
We can find numerous examples of government’s market conditioning role. Volscho and 
Kelly (2012) explain: “Firms’ decisions in hiring and compensating their employees are 
influenced by many government activities—from payroll taxes, to government contracts, tax 
credits, workplace safety rules, and environmental regulation” (681-2). Similarly, public 
education and job training programs affect workforce skills and employability (Kelly 2009, 19; 
Volscho and Kelly 2012).  Through these various market policies, “programs that are not 
explicitly redistributive can nonetheless influence distributional outcomes” (Kelly 2009, 41). 
Indeed, Kelly’s (2009) analysis shows that U.S. market or pre-tax and transfer inequality is 
affected by government. What’s more, he concludes that while redistribution is “clearly the most 
explicit mechanism that the government uses to reduce inequality….political dynamics have a 
greater impact on distributional outcomes” through the market conditioning mechanism (Kelly 
2009, 161, emphasis added).  
Some scholars of politics and inequality have focused on the role of partisanship in 
particular. Both Bartels (2008) and Kelly (2009) find that partisan control of government, 
specifically the President’s party, affects inequality outcomes. Kelly (2009) finds that inequality, 
measured by the aggregate income ratio of the top quintile to the bottom two quintiles, declined 
by .16 during Democratic presidencies and increased by .30 under Republicans (99). Similarly, 
Bartels (2008) shows that the incomes of the bottom 80% of families grew more rapidly under 
Democratic presidents than under Republican presidents. Under Republican Presidents, on the 
other hand, lower and middle income families’ incomes lagged behind those of the rich. He 
argues that these differences stem from different macroeconomic policies of the parties. I will 
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 return to these underlying policy differences later in this chapter.   
Others have connected inequality outcomes with partisanship in Congress. Somewhat 
anecdotally, a 2012 study by the Institute for Policy Studies shows that the party affiliation of 
Senators and members of Congress partly explains their voting records on a list of recent 
inequality-related bills (Anderson et al 2012). Volscho and Kelly (2012) show that there is a 
significant relationship between the percentage of Democrats in Congress and the share of 
income captured by the top 1% of the income distribution. They conclude that shifts in Congress 
to the Republican Party between 1949 and 2008 contributed to increases in top share inequality.  
In summary, government and policies affect the income distribution, even before overt 
redistribution through taxes and transfers. As well, there is evidence that partisanship explains 
inequality outcomes at the national level. Explanations for inequality at the state level should 
also address the role of politics and especially partisanship. Indeed, the considerable 
policymaking jurisdiction of state governments, discussed further below, give us reason to 
believe politics will have an even greater effect in the states.  With this in mind, I turn to state 
politics and policy.  
Variation in State Policies  
The state politics literature provides the foundation we need to connect political 
characteristics with inequality in the states. As will become clear below, while there is extensive 
research on the causes and effects of state policy choices, few have addressed these in relation to 
income inequality. Still, this literature provides three important premises: 1. State policies vary 
significantly; 2. Political variables can help explain these different policy choices; 3. Different 
state policies lead to different distributional outcomes.   Each of these will be explained below. I 
will use this foundation, along with what we know from the national level inequality literature, to 
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 build a partisan political explanation for state inequality.  
It is not difficult to find policy differences between the states. States vary in their policies 
toward labor (Freeman and Rogers 2007); tax codes, including whether or not they even have a 
state income tax; criminal laws (e.g. death penalty); restrictions on abortion and reproductive 
health care; environmental regulations; health policies, including expansions of Medicaid for 
certain groups or universal plans like in Massachusetts; and even their policies regarding voting 
(e.g. voter ID laws, felony voting rights), to name just a few.   
These differences are, of course, a function of federalism – indeed, of a “strongly 
decentralized” brand of federalism that gives American states significant governing and 
policymaking power (Freeman and Rogers 2007, 207). While states have always had jurisdiction 
over the vast majority of governing or policy areas, per the Constitution and the 10th 
Amendment, the balance of power between the national and state governments shifts in different 
historical periods. Of particular interest for this study is the period since the late 1970s, when the 
“pendulum of national social policy swung away from Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society,” 
towards the states (Nathan 2008, 17). Beginning with Nixon’s New Federalism, a concerted 
effort was made to devolve more control to the states, such as through revenue sharing and block 
grants (Nathan 2006). This trend accelerated under Reagan, when states responded to domestic 
spending cuts by “increasing the funding of programs in areas in which the federal government 
had become less active” (Nathan 2008, 17). Although his emphasis is on eventual outcomes, 
rather than policy, Brace (1991) found that between 1968 and 1985, state political characteristics 
played an increasingly important role in state economic outcomes in each of three successive 
time periods (1968-1973, 1974-79, 1980-1985).  This suggests that during the period when 
variation in inequality was increasing, states were also becoming increasingly autonomous 
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 entities, able to influence their own economic outcomes through political factors. Under Clinton, 
the “Devolution Revolution” – exemplified by the 1996 welfare reform that replaced AFDC with 
state-run Temporary Assistance to Needy Families - brought more discretion to the states in the 
mid-1990s. Even more recently, Freeman and Rogers (2007) emphasize that we are witnessing 
an era of “progressive federalism” in which states are the primary innovators in a variety of 
policy areas, such as environmental regulations, education reforms, health care, and election and 
voting reform. Again, such state-lead innovation has produced a range of policy outcomes across 
states (Freeman and Rogers 2007).   
A broad literature considers the variation in state policy choices that accompanies U.S. 
federalism (Grey 1996). Scholars seek to explain different policy choices with demographic 
factors like race and ethnicity (Hero and Tolbert 1996); economic resources, such as state 
income or revenues (Fellowes and Rowe 2004, Tweedie 1994); and political variables, including 
political culture (Elazar 1984), public opinion (Berry et al 1998, 2007, 2010; Erikson, Wright, 
and McIver 1993; Lax and Phillips 2009; Schneider and Jacoby 2006; Wright, Erikson, and 
McIver 1987), and policy diffusion across or within states (Karch 2007, Shipan and Volden 
2006). For example, following the devolution of welfare programs to the state-level, 
explanations such as these were applied to state welfare (TANF) policy choices (Fellowes and 
Rowe 2004; Soss et al 2001; Lieberman and Shaw 2000).  Studies which show that political 
variables explain state policy choices are, of course, especially significant for this project. These 
findings push back against earlier arguments that state policies are explained only by 
socioeconomic differences in the states (e.g. Dye 1966). Most importantly, along with the 
political variables listed above, this literature provides evidence that partisanship affects state 
policy outcomes.  This characteristic will be discussed in detail in the next section.  
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 So far, it is clear that state policies vary significantly and that political characteristics can 
explain some of these different policy choices. It is also the case that policy variation is 
consequential for outcomes in the states, including economic ones. That is, when states adopt 
different policies, there are visibly different outcomes. For example, Newman and O’Brien 
(2011) show that state taxes have a significant effect on state mortality rates, property and violent 
crime rates, high school completion, and births to unmarried mothers (Newman and O’Brien 
2011, 102). Others show the effects of state policy choices on state outcomes ranging from 
abortion rates (Blank et al 1996), to poverty (McKernan and Ratcliffe 2006), to pay and 
employment rates (Card and Krueger 1994, 1995, 2000; Neumark and Wascher 2000). In short, 
the policies that states make have significant effects, intended or otherwise.  
There is reason to think that state policies also influence inequality outcomes, but there 
are few instances of this relationship being tested. Some recent state politics literature that does 
consider inequality uses it primarily as the context in which to explore political representation of 
income groups (Gilens, Lax, and Phillips 2011; Flavin 2010; Rigby and Wright 2011). These 
representation scholars suggest that there may be variation in government responsiveness to 
different incomes groups by state.  For example, Flavin (2010) shows that the 
underrepresentation of lower income groups varies from state to state. Rigby and Wright (2011) 
also find different patterns of representation of income groups in rich states compared with poor 
states. Income differences, then, explain political inequality.  Others show the effects of income 
inequality on political variables like state turnout and votes (Xu and Garand 2010; Galbraith and 
Hale 2008).  
These are important facets of state-level inequality which point to significant 
relationships between income differences and political outcomes, but they do not directly address 
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 how politics or policies can explain inequality in the first place. And, again, early studies of state 
inequality pivoted on demographic and economic differences in the states, not political ones 
(Aigner and Heins 1967, Al-Sammarie and Miller 1967, Bishop et al 1992, Conlisk 1967, Nelson 
1984, Nord 1984, Sale 1974). Since these earlier studies, a few scholars have investigated the 
relationship between state policies and inequality, with mixed results. On the one hand, Freund 
and Morris (2005) find a positive relationship between state lotteries and the concentration of 
income in the states for 1976-1995. Over a similar time period, Langer (2001) shows that states 
with more “demand-side” economic development policies -  defined as promoting research and 
development, technology, and exportation - have lower income inequality compared with those 
which adopt “supply-side” policies, which consist of offering tax abatements and capital 
subsidies.  
On the other hand, Barrilleaux and Davis (2003) found that state welfare policies did not 
generally influence the concentration of income, at least during the period of study, the 1980s. 
Barrilleaux and Davis’s examination of redistributive policies echoes some previous state-level 
arguments about politics and inequality that focused on explaining redistribution (Fry and 
Winters 1970; Plotnick and Winters 1985, 1990). However, as discussed above, there are many 
ways the government influences the income distribution besides redistribution, and evidence that 
these policies have an even greater effect on U.S. inequality than redistributive ones (Kelly 
2009). When Kelly and Witko (2012) take this “market conditioning” role of government into 
account, they find that left party power, unions, and the minimum wage are associated with 
lower market inequality in the states. These findings show that political arguments regarding 
national or cross-national inequality – in their case Power Resources Theory - can be applicable 
at the state level. They also show that, in the face of some mixed findings for the effect of state 
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 redistribution on inequality, state policies can directly influence the distribution of income in the 
first place. This gives us further reason to investigate the relationship between state politics and 
market inequality. I suggest we can learn more about this relationship by incorporating state 
government party composition.    
A New Explanation: The Partisan Political-Economy and Inequality in the States  
As reviewed above, national inequality literature establishes a relationship between the 
President’s (Bartels 2008, Kelly 2009) and Congress’s (Volscho and Kelly 2012) partisanship 
and levels of inequality. In Bartels’ (2008) work in particular, this finding is informed by the 
partisan model (Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1978).  According to the partisan model, “the macroeconomic 
policies pursued by left- and right-wing governments are broadly in accordance with the 
objective economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political 
constituencies” (Hibbs 1977, 1468). This, of course, means that the parties have distinct policy 
positions or platforms, which align with their constituencies’ interests. Bartels’ (2008) argument 
is grounded in the association of Democratic administrations with policies to reduce 
unemployment and promote income growth for the lower and middle classes and, by contrast, 
the association of Republican administrations with a limited government role in the economy and 
a focus on inflation over unemployment (Hibbs 1977; Tufte 1978; Bartels 2008). It follows that 
these economic policy differences translated into different income growth patterns under 
Democratic versus Republican Presidents, and more unequal incomes under Republicans 
(Bartels 2008). 
Our consideration of the role of parties need not be limited to the national level or to 
Presidential macroeconomic policies. Cusack (1997) explains economic differences between 
parties in broader terms:   
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 Lower income groups and labor in general are seen as favoring a large and active state. 
This is a state heavily engaged in regulating the market and using public finances to 
equalize the outcomes of market operations. Upper income groups and capital in general 
are depicted as aiming to minimize the role of the state in shaping market operations and 
outcomes. These latter groups are particularly concerned to limit the size of the state and 
its control over society’s financial resources. Parties competing for votes orient their 
programs to serve these different interests; they will act to implement these programs if 
and when they come into government (375-6).  
 
In American politics, “The Republican Party is viewed as a coalition of business and upper-
income voters, who favor lower taxes, less government spending and minimal economic 
regulation. The Democratic Party is viewed as the party of labor, favoring economic 
redistribution via higher taxes, social welfare spending and regulation” (Ansolabehere et al 2006, 
98). We expect government to play a more limited role in the economy under Republicans – 
aligning with the party’s economic conservatism - and a more active role under Democrats.  This 
economic cleavage is traceable to the New Deal era (Sundquist 1983) and, as I will explain 
further below, has become increasingly relevant since the 1970s.3  
Importantly, partisan economic policy differences are applicable and observable at the 
state level. In his 1949 study of Southern politics, V.O. Key posited that party control was an 
important factor in government provision of services. Some initial tests by Dye (1966) suggested 
that party control did not impact state policy outputs, socioeconomic differences did; however, 
research since then indicates that partisanship often matters. For a variety of policy areas, studies 
show that partisanship of Governors and in state legislatures have significant effects on state 
policy choices (e.g. Boushey and Leudtke 2011; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; McFarlane and Meier 
3 In recent years, there is some debate about the relevance of this economic model for voting behavior (see 
Ansolabehere et al 2006 and Appendix C); however, even if some groups vote according to moral or cultural rather 
than economic positions (Frank 2004, Gelman 2008), it remains the case that the parties’ actions still represent these 
different economic constituencies and approaches. Indeed, cultural arguments emphasize that these voters may act 
against their economic interests because “the two major parties really do stand for different economic policies” 
(Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010, 1213). These different approaches to economic policy are my main concern. I 
suggest these partisan policy differences are what lead to different inequality outcomes, depending on the party in 
power.  
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 2001; Medoff et al 2011; Shipan and Volden 2006). From a different angle, Cox, Kousser, and 
McCubbins (2010) show that majority parties in state legislatures influence legislative outcomes 
by controlling the agenda. The relevant implication is that party control often matters for policy 
outputs. 
Within this state literature, scholars find that party affects state economic policies and 
outcomes in particular. Alt and Lowry (1994, 2000) identify “systematic partisan differences” in 
state spending under Democrats and Republicans (Alt and Lowry 1994, 812). Similarly, Garand 
(1985, 1993) found consistent differences between state party control and state spending 
priorities. Several others show that partisanship influences redistributive policies in the states 
(Dye 1984, Plotnick and Winters 1990, Rom 1996). Caplan (2001) and Reed (2006) establish a 
connection between state parties and tax burdens. For instance, the latter shows that, between 
1960 and 2000, tax burdens were higher when Democrats controlled the state legislature (Reed 
2006). There is also evidence that voters also have different policy expectations for the two 
parties at the state level; they expect more government services and spending under Democrats 
(Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998).   
These findings regarding party differences at the state level are helpful for a few reasons. 
First, they show that, like at the national level, partisanship affects state policy choices. Second, 
they show that party matters in a similar way in the states. The economic policy choices of the 
Democratic and Republican parties at the state level are consistent with their traditional 
economic policy positions outlined in the partisan model above. In general, Democrats take a 
more active government role in the economy and Republicans favor a smaller public sector.  
We can apply this understanding to state policies that affect the income distribution. 
While Presidents set macroeconomic policies, it is clear from the state policy literature that states 
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 are policymakers too. Indeed, “for every law passed by Congress, state legislatures pass several 
hundred” (Freeman and Rogers 2007, 209). And state governments set many policies which can 
impact inequality, including a variety of so-called “market conditioning” policies (Kelly 2009) 
that should affect the pre-tax and transfer income distribution. Such policies include job training 
programs, (Freeman and Rogers 2007), economic development policies (Langer 2001, Witko and 
Newmark 2010), and education assistance or spending (Goodspeed 2000), each of which falls 
under state jurisdiction and can impact incomes within states. Many policies that have been 
linked with rising U.S. inequality have state-level counterparts. National-level literature argues 
that the erosion of collective bargaining rights and unions contributed to rising inequality 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010; Levy and Temin 2007). State policies, like “right-to-work” laws, can 
weaken or strengthen unions or collective bargaining rights within states. National literature also 
points to the declining real value of the federal minimum wage (Bartels 2008, Levy and Temin 
2007). Most states also set minimum wages (Kelly and Witko 2012) and these vary from state to 
state and over time. Hacker and Pierson (2010) in particular point to the increasing power of 
organized business interests as a critical contributor to rising U.S. inequality.  Historically, the 
states are responsible for most of the important laws and regulations that governed corporations, 
banks, and insurers (Robertson 2013, 7; Bashevkin 1996). In terms of redistribution, states have 
their own tax systems, with vary degrees of progressivity (Davis et al 2009), and discretion over 
many transfer policies, like welfare (TANF). 
These state policy choices should reflect the party composition in state government, 
specifically the different economic approaches of the two parties, and lead to different income 
distributions depending on who is in office. Under Democratic government, we expect a more 
active government role in the economy, and the implementation of policies that represent labor 
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 and the lower and middle classes should tend to reduce income differences.  By contrast, when 
Republicans have greater control, we expect less government intervention in the economy or 
fewer regulations. This more conservative approach - and related policies which appeal to higher 
income individuals and business interests – should tend to increase income differences, or at 
least allow them to go unmitigated. Furthermore, the effects of these different economic 
approaches should matter even before redistribution through the market-oriented policies like 
those listed above. In summary, we should observe decreasing or diminished growth of 
inequality under Democratic state government and increasing inequality under Republican state 
government.  
Figure 2.1 diagrams this explanation and its place in the literature. As discussed above, 
the state politics literature establishes relationships between demographic, economic, and 
political variables, including party control, and state policies in general. These relationships are 
shown with dashed arrows in the figure below. Earlier state inequality literature established 
relationships between demographic and economic variables, like state income and racial 
composition, and variation in inequality between the states in particular. These connections, also 
shown with dashed arrows from the far left to far right of the figure, will be tested and updated in 
the next chapter. We know that certain policies affect inequality in the states (e.g. Fruend and 
Morris 2005, Kelly and Witko 2012, Langer 2001), but, again, some tests of these relationships 
have produced mixed findings, leading to some uncertainty about the existence or direction of 
relationship between policy and state inequality, particularly where state redistribution is 
concerned (e.g. Barrilleux and Davis 2003). The role of government party control in increasing 
or mitigating inequality has only been studied at the national level (Bartels 2008, Kelly 2009, 
Volscho and Kelly 2012). My contribution, shown with the sets of bold arrows in Figure 2.1, is 
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 not only to bring tests of government party control to the state level, but also to establish 
relationships between factors that were previously considered separately: party control, public 
policies, and state-level inequality. And while I will primarily focus on market policies and 
inequality, depicted towards the top of the figure and covered in chapters 3 and 4, I will also 
consider state redistribution in chapter 5. This unifying approach sheds new light on earlier 
mixed findings about the relationship between political factors and state inequality. Through 
these analyses, I will show that state government party control, operating through both market 
policies and redistributive policies, is a key explanation for changes in inequality at the state 
level.  
Figure 2.1 Factors that Influence Inequality: Situating the Partisan Theory of State Inequality 
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 the U.S. My analyses will extend to 2005, based on the available data, which are discussed 
further in the next chapter. The longitudinal nature of this work requires that we consider some 
historical context. In particular, given their primary role in this theory, we should take note of 
some changes in the parties during this time period: the realignment of the South and ideological 
polarization of the parties.  
The theory I have outlined pivots on economic policy positions of the Democratic and 
Republican parties.  In general, these economic positions were established during the Great 
Depression and New Deal, with FDR and Democrats promoting government intervention in the 
economy and redistribution (Sundquist 1983). It was also during this time that “tight bonds were 
formed between organized labor and the Democratic party” and business organizations aligned 
with the Republicans (Sundquist 1983, 217).  
However, there were some important shifts in the parties after the New Deal, most 
substantially in the South. Through the 1950s and into the late 1960s, the South was effectively a 
one party state with Democrats holding the vast majority of state and local offices (Key 1949). 
During this time, elections in the South, in particular support for the Democratic Party, were 
driven by racial attitudes (Black 1971). Poole and Rosenthal (2008) show that, in Congress, race 
and economic issues occupied separate dimensions through the New Deal into the 1960s (140). 
As such, there was some heterogeneity within the parties on economic issues, particularly 
between Southern and Northern Democrats (Poole and Rosenthal 2008). 
Realignment in the South began in the 1960s and 1970s as Republicans gained among 
conservative white voters, who disagreed with the Democratic Party’s positions on civil rights. 
And with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the number of registered African-
American voters increased dramatically in the South. These gains went predominantly to the 
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 Democratic Party (Sundquist 1983, Poole and Rosenthal 2008, 315-16). 1968 is generally 
regarded as the end of the “Solid South” and the beginning of the two- party state in the South 
(Frederickson 2001).  
With this shift, the economic division between the parties became even more relevant and 
continued to grow in importance.  Early in the 1970s, class voting was evident in rim states, 
especially Texas and Tennessee, as well as in the Deep South, in the election of Jimmy Carter as 
Governor of Georgia, Dale Bumpers as Governor of Arkansas (1970) and Edwin W. Edwards as 
Governor of Louisiana (1972). These Democratic candidates were elected by a combination of 
support from African-Americans and lower-income whites (Sundquist 1983, 373-4). Jewett 
(2001) finds that a positive, significant effect of state per capita personal income on the 
percentage of Republicans in Southern state houses between 1946 and 1995. In fact, income is 
“the most important predictor” of state legislative partisanship in that study (Jewett 2001, 473). 
Brewer and Stonecash (2001) find that the class cleavage became an increasingly important 
predictor of voting behavior in the South since 1952, with affluent whites moving to the 
Republican Party. Overall, economic interests came to have greater relevance than racial ones. 
By about 1980, racial and economic issues had converged to the same dimension in the public 
(Carmines and Stimson 1989). Similarly, these two dimensions converged in Congressional 
voting, and differences between Northern and Southern Democrats on economic issues 
diminished (Poole and Rosenthal 2008, 142, 315-316). To the extent that such differences 
between states or regions remain, it is also the case that within states, we can expect the 
Democratic Party to have a more liberal program than the Republicans in that state.  
A second and related trend is the ideological polarization of the parties. Indeed, Southern 
realignment is regarded as a contributing factor to polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
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 2006; Poole and Rosenthal 2008), as the differences between the parties became unidimensional. 
Since about 1970, the parties have grown more ideologically uniform and polarized, particularly 
along the economic dimension (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Layman et al 2006).  The 
ideological shift of the Republican Party towards a more economic libertarian position (Hacker 
and Pierson 2005) contributed to the increasing polarization of the parties on economic or class 
lines (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Stonecash and Mariani 2000; Stonecash 2000). This 
shift is especially important because it exacerbated economic policy differences between the 
parties, along with the economic differences between the parties’ constituencies.  
These trends are applicable at the state level too, as “state parties are increasingly 
organizational and ideological franchises of the national parties” (Shor, Berry, and McCarty 
2010).  While data on polarization of the parties in the states is relatively scarce, especially for 
earlier years, Shor and McCarty (2011) were able to create ideological measures of state 
legislatures since the mid-1990s. With these data, they show that, like Congress, the vast 
majority of voting in state legislatures falls along a single dimension (Shor and McCarty 2011, 
533), at least in recent years. Moreover, just as the parties have polarized in national politics, 
there is evidence that polarization also exists at the state level (Shor, Berry, and McCarty 2010; 
Shor and McCarty 2011), although with some variation from state to state.  
In the context of the South’s realignment and ideological polarization of the parties, 
partisanship is a more meaningful indicator of economic positions. Whereas previous economic 
policy decisions or coalitions may have cut across party lines – uniting progressive Republicans 
with liberal Democrats in the New Deal, or dividing liberal and conservative Southern 
Democrats – we expect increasingly clear party division on such issues from about 1970 onward. 
This makes party an important explanation or indicator of economic policy positions during the 
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 time period of interest. We have good reason to expect Democrats and Republicans to make 
distinct economic policy choices. Furthermore, recall that states also acquired greater 
policymaking responsibility (Nathan 1996, 2006) and became increasingly “autonomous 
economic domains” (Brace 1991) with the ability to shape their own economies. That is, not only 
did party positions polarize, parties in state government became better able to make and 
implement policies. Thus, we expect the different policy choices made by Democrats and 
Republicans in office to have observable effects on distributional outcomes. We expect changes 
to Democratic party control to coincide with decreasing or diminished growth of inequality and 
increasing power of Republicans to relate to increasing inequality.   
Variation in Party Composition of State Governments   
 My argument predicts that shifts in party control or composition of state government 
influence patterns of inequality in the states. As such, it is helpful to get a sense of how this 
feature of state governments varies during the relevant period, 1970-2005. This overview shows 
that there is considerable variation in partisan composition of state legislatures and 
Governorships between the states and in the states over time. We will also see that, on the whole, 
Democratic control of state governments has diminished over time, while unified Republican and 
divided government have become more prevalent. According to my theory, these descriptive 
patterns hold important implications for state inequality, which I will begin to explore in the next 
section. The partisanship data utilized here and in subsequent chapters are provided by Klarner 
(2013).  
Looking first at state legislatures, the percent of Democrats ranged from just 13% to 
100% in the lower house and from 9% to 100% in the upper house.4 The series of maps in 
4 This analysis excludes Nebraska, which has a unicameral, nonpartisan legislature. 
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 Figures 2.2 - 2.4 below shows the percent of Democratic legislators in the lower house for the 
first, last, and middle time points (1970, 1987, and 2005).5 The strongly Democratic South is 
clear in Figure 2.2. Southern states like South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana 
were solidly Democratic in 1970, but Republicans made considerable gains in these states over 
time with the realignment of the South, as displayed in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Other Southern states 
outside the Deep South, however, break with this trend; Delaware, Tennessee, and West Virginia 
had a greater percent of Democratic legislators in some recent periods. 
Outside the South, Democrats held similar percentages of seats in most states in 1970, in 
the 26-50% range (Figure 2.2). Unlike the overall weakening of the Democratic Party in the 
Deep South, states within these other regions display some different over time trends. In 1987 
(Figure 2.3) and 2005 (Figure 2.4), we see both gains and losses for Democrats in states within 
the same region compared with 1970; although states where Democrats gained seats tended to be 
Northeastern and Western (Pacific) states, while Republican gains were concentrated in Western 
Rocky Mountain and Plains states. By 2005, Massachusetts had the most Democratic lower 
house followed by Hawaii and Rhode Island, while Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, and the Dakotas had 
the fewest Democrats in office.  
 
 
5 See Appendix B, Figure B1 for a dot plot of the percent of Democratic legislators in state lower houses for 1970, 
1987, and 2005.  
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 Figure 2.2 Percent of Democratic State Legislators, Lower House, 1970 
 
Figure 2.3 Percent of Democratic State Legislators, Lower House, 1987 
 
Figure 2.4 Percent of Democratic State Legislators, Lower House, 2005 
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 Many states, especially outside the Deep South, did not experience steady gains for one 
party or another during this time. From election to election, party control often shifts between the 
Democrats and Republicans. For example, if we look at Democratic House control in the 
Northeast at 10-year points – 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 - only one state, New York, became 
more Democratic at each time point, and fluctuating party control is especially prevalent if we 
look at the Midwestern states.6  Overall, we observe considerable variation in partisan 
composition of state legislatures between the states and in the states over time.  
Such variation is observable for party control of Governors’ offices as well. Figure 2.5 
maps the average score for Democratic Governors for each state between 1970 and 2005.7 
During this time, Illinois and Iowa were the least Democratic, having a Democratic Governor 
less than 20% of the time. At the other extreme, Maryland had a Democratic Governor for 33 of 
the 35 years covered. Across states, the median number of years for Democratic control of the 
Governorship during this period was about 20 years. Notice that states which we typically think 
of as “blue states” in national politics today - like California and Massachusetts – have relatively 
low means in terms of Democratic control of the Governorship. Each of these states had a 
Republican Governor for more than half of this period. In fact, California ranks seventh with just 
13 years of Democratic control, or 36%. This observation serves as a useful reminder that party 
control or composition at the state-level can differ from our expectations based on recent national 
elections or representation. The tendency to think of states as solidly “red” or “blue” ignores 
heterogeneity within states in any given year, as well as over time variation. According to my 
argument, party composition influences distributional outcomes through the partisan economic 
6 See Appendix B, Figures B2 to B5 for the percent of Democratic legislators in each state’s lower house for 1970, 
1980, 1990, and 2000, grouped by region.   
7 The Democratic Governor variable is a dummy (1=Democrat). I simply took the average by state to get the 
statistics for Figure 2.5. See Appendix B, Figure B6 to see the Democratic Governor average by state as a dot plot. 
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 policy choices made by Democrats and Republicans in office. Thus, when we consider these 
patterns over time, rather than with cross-sectional snapshots, we should expect to see a 
relationship between changes in partisan composition and inequality, even in the same state.  
Figure 2.5 Democratic Governors by State, Average for 1970-2005 
 
 
Even with this heterogeneity, though, it is worth noting some aggregate trends. In 
particular, while party control of Governorships and state legislatures certainly fluctuates from 
election year to election year, it has become much less common to see overwhelming 
Democratic control of state governments, especially since the mid-1970s. This is at least partly 
because of the South’s realignment and accompanying Republican gains. Along with this 
Southern trend, notice that in Figures 2.2 through 2.4, there are fewer states in the top category - 
76 or more percent Democratic legislators –in later years, indicating a decline of solidly 
Democratic state legislatures.  Similarly, the number of unified Democratic governments, in 
which the party controls the Governorship as well as both legislative houses, has declined. The 
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 Democratic Party’s diminishing control is clear in Figure 2.6, which displays the over time 
trends in partisan control of state governments for 1970-2005.  
Figure 2.6 Proportions of Unified Democratic and Unified Republican Governments, 1970-2005 
 
 
The proportion of state governments under total Democratic control generally decreases 
over time, while Republican control becomes more common, although a majority of states have 
had divided government since about 1985. In sum, there are noticeable fluctuations in 
government party composition over time in the states, but, in the broadest sense, the overall trend 
is of decreasing Democratic and increasing Republican presence in state governments. If 
Republican control and economic policies tend to increase inequality, while Democratic control 
mitigates it, as my argument suggests, we should observe an overall trend of increasing 
inequality. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, there are expected over time fluctuations in 
both party control and inequality, but the overall trends of increasing Republican control and 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Unified Democratic States Divided Control Unified Republican States
45 
 
 increasing inequality are also clear.   
Over Time Party and Inequality Trends 
According to the theory outlined in this chapter, the over time changes in state-level party 
composition highlighted in the previous section have implications for income inequality. 
Because of their different economic positions and policies enacted, we expect income inequality 
to increase under Republican governments and decrease or increase by relatively less under 
Democratic control. As a first cut, I plot over time trends in inequality and partisanship for four 
states, one in each Census region. Figure 2.7 below shows the top decile’s income share in 
Florida, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and New Mexico along with the percent of Republican state 
legislators in the lower house for each year from 1970 to 2005. I follow many previous state-
level studies by focusing on the lower house of the legislature in these analyses and will explore 
additional measures in future chapters.8  
8 Lower houses are relatively large compared with upper houses and they nearly all have two-year terms (Folke et al 
2011).  This means we can expect changes in legislators and party control around the same time across states. 
Because of their smaller size and typical staggered four-year terms – only half the seats are up for election every two 
years – party percentages in the upper house are a relatively “noisy” measure (Folke et al 2011). 
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 Figure 2.7 Inequality and Republican Legislators in Four States 
 
The states depicted in Figure 2.7 have the expected positive correlations between the 
percent of Republican legislators in the lower house and the percentage of income going to the 
top 10%, with a higher percentage indicating a more unequal distribution of income.9 Notice that 
the percent of Republican legislators in Florida about doubled between 1970 and 2005 and the 
state experienced some of the largest gains for the top decile, about a 60% increase. Gains for 
Republicans and for the top decile were much less drastic in Wisconsin; Republican legislators 
picked up about 15% more seats and the top decile increased their income share by 4%, a 
9 Correlations are r=.57 for Pennsylvania, r=.90 for Florida, r=.86 for Wisconsin, and r=.21 for New Mexico.  
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 considerable gain but still much less than in Florida. In all four states, Republican losses tend to 
coincide with decreases or a leveling off of the top decile’s share. The correlations between these 
trends are, of course, not perfect, but we should not expect party to be the only explanation for 
trends in inequality. The general patterns for these states suggest that party is among those 
explanations and deserves further consideration.  Subsequent chapters will move beyond these 
four optimal states and apply empirical scrutiny to the relationship changes in between state 
partisan composition and inequality.  
In Figure 2.8 below I also consider how partisan composition in state governments may 
relate to national inequality trends. Bartels (2008) argues that policy differences between 
Republican and Democratic Presidents help explain rising income inequality in the U.S. over 
time. He shows (in his Figure 2.2) that income inequality, measured with the ratio of the 80th 
income percentile to the 20th income percentile, increased more under Republican Presidents 
than Democrats. But we can also observe a strong over time relationship between state partisan 
control and U.S. inequality. Figure 2.8 replicates Bartels’ figure of the national 80:20 ratio trend, 
adding state data for the percent of Republicans in state legislatures for 1970-2005. The state 
legislators trend is the percent of state legislators that are Republican in each state for each year, 
weighted by state population share, and aggregated. To display Bartels’ argument, the 80:20 ratio 
line is solid when there is a Republican President in office and dashed under Democratic 
Presidents.  As in the state figures above, there is an overall positive relationship between the 
80:20 ratio and Republican legislators. The 80:20 ratio tends to increase – denoting greater 
income inequality - when Republicans gain seats and decrease when Republicans lose seats to 
Democrats. The correlation between inequality and Republican state governments is strong at 
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 r=.77.10 In addition, the overall increase in inequality is what we would expect to observe in 
view of the decrease in Democratic control of state governments and accompanying increase in 
Republican presence in state governments displayed in this and the previous descriptive section.  
Figure 2.8 National 80:20 Percentile Income Ratio and Republican State Legislators, 1970-2005 
 
 The patterns in these figures are consistent with our expectations of increasing inequality 
under Republican government and decreasing or diminished growth of inequality under 
Democratic government. This is true for the individual states above and for the comparisons 
between state partisanship and national income inequality trends in Figure 2.8. Of course, these 
analyses are just a first step. We have 46 more states to consider, as well as alternative 
10 I use the 80-20 ratio for income inequality here to be comparable with Bartels’ work. To be consistent with my 
state figures, and because U.S. income inequality is marked especially by a pulling away of top earners and some 
argue that the 80:20 ratio does not capture these considerable gains at the very top of the income distribution 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010), I also plot the relationship between Republican state government and the percent of 
income capture by the top ten and top one percent nationally (data from Alvaredo et al Top Shares Database). The 
patterns and correlations are similar. Indeed the relationship between inequality and Republican government is even 
stronger for the top one percent measure (and r=.82). See Appendix B for these figures, as well as for the 
relationship between Republican Governors (weighted aggregate) and top 10% and top 1% percent income shares, 
and for discussion of the South. 
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 explanations and control variables to incorporate. Nevertheless, the correlations do give us 
further reason to think that state partisanship matters for inequality, and to investigate the 
partisan theory presented in this chapter. In Chapter 3, I turn to a more systematic and rigorous 
testing of the relationship between changes in state party control and inequality.  
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 CHAPTER 3  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN STATE-LEVEL 
INEQUALITY 
  
The attention paid to rising U.S. inequality by media, academics, policymakers, and even 
popular movements like Occupy Wall Street can obscure the fact that this trend is not uniform 
throughout the country. While some states and localities are facing noticeably high and rising 
concentrations of income among the rich, for others, inequality is less remarkable. As shown in 
Chapter 1, these state differences are on par with those between the U.S. and other countries. To 
cite just one recent example, while the Gini index for the entire country increased significantly 
between 2010 and 2011, sub-nationally just 20 states experienced significant increases in 
inequality during this time (Noss 2012). This is not by chance; I argue that we can systematically 
explain the significant variation in income inequality in the states over time.   
In Chapter 2, I proposed that differences in the partisan composition of state governments 
are an important, and previously overlooked, determinant of state-level variation in inequality. 
According to my partisan argument, the different sets of policies implemented by the two parties 
lead to different income distributions, depending on who is in office. This argument accepts that 
there are exogenous factors that increase inequality – several economic shifts, for example, will 
be discussed below - yet, it is also reasonable to expect that the party in power, through their 
policies, moderate this effect.  Given the economic liberalism of the Democratic Party and 
conservatism of the Republicans, we should expect the concentration of income to decrease or 
increase by relatively less under Democratic state government and to increase under 
Republicans. Some preliminary analyses in Chapter 2 were consistent with this theory. In this 
chapter, I more rigorously test this theory, exploring multiple measures of partisanship and 
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 inequality and controlling for additional explanations.  
I begin by discussing some of these alternative explanations for inequality in the states, 
including demographic differences and economic and policy shifts at the national level. In the 
latter case, I explain how national-level trends that underlie inequality may have different effects 
in different states. I present a series of hypotheses to capture these trends. Next, I discuss the data 
and models needed to test my partisan theory and additional hypotheses. In the analysis sections, 
I model the determinants of three separate inequality measures for the states between 1970 and 
2005. The chapter concludes with a discussion of these results, which show that political, 
economic, and demographic factors explain variation in inequality at the state level over the 
period of interest. Most importantly, these results are consistent with my partisan theory. I find a 
significant, negative relationship between increases in Democratic control and changes in 
inequality and a significant, positive relationship between increases in Republican control and 
changes in inequality, suggesting that income inequality decreases, or its growth diminished, 
when Democrats gain power and increases with Republican control. These findings apply to both 
top income shares and the Gini coefficient and are present if we consider the independent effects 
of Governors and state legislators, or the influence of unified Democratic or unified Republican 
government. In sum, changes in the partisan composition of state help explain over time patterns 
of inequality in the states.  
Previous Explanations: Economic and Demographic Patterns  
Before I turn to the more recent literature on U.S. inequality, it is helpful to review how 
earlier studies explained differences in inequality in the states. Previous state-level work 
identified a number of demographic and economic factors that explained variation in pre-tax 
income inequality across states, including family income (Bishop, Formy, and Thistle 1992; Sale 
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 1974), educational attainment (Al-Sammarie and Miller 1967; Bishop, Formy, and Thistle 1992; 
Conlisk 1967; Sale 1974), the proportion of non-white population (Aigner and Heins 1967; Al-
Sammarie and Miller 1967; Conlisk 1967; Sale 1974), mean state income, the percent of the 
population over age 65, the percent urban (Nelson 1984), and the percent unemployed (Al-
Sammarie and Miller 1967; Conlisk 1967). In general, higher inequality was associated with 
states with older populations (percent over 65), larger non-white populations, lower state income, 
higher percent urban, and lower educational attainment. These variables explained differences 
between states at certain points in time, but these studies generally did not speak to changes in 
inequality over time.  
In my analyses below, I follow these earlier studies by including several demographic 
control variables; however, to build a more complete set of explanations for state inequality, I 
also incorporate research from the national level. Rising U.S. inequality has received 
considerable attention by political scientists (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Jacobs and 
Skocpol 2004; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) sociologists (Morris and Western 1999) and 
economists (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995; Gottschalk and Danziger 2005; Levy and Temin 
2007; Picketty and Saez 2003, 2006). This literature does not offer one explanation for 
increasing inequality over the past 30 to 40 years, but there are some common themes. In 
particular, at least some of the blame is attributed to larger economic shifts. Levy and Temin 
(2007) explain that “for over a decade, the economist’s primary explanation for income 
inequality has been skill-biased technological change” (7). The core of this argument is that 
“technology, perhaps augmented by international trade, is shifting demand toward more skilled 
workers faster than labor supply can adjust” (Levy and Temin 2007, 7). Market forces reward 
high skill workers, while those with fewer skills will have fewer opportunities; this results in 
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 increased inequality in earnings (Levy and Temin 2007, 7).  
Some scholars emphasize related policy actions (or inactions) that underlie these 
economic trends. Levy and Temin (2007) argue that the effects of globalization and 
technological change on inequality are amplified by an institutional shift from the “Treaty of 
Detroit,” based on a high minimum wage, progressive taxes, and collective bargaining, to the 
“Washington Consensus,” which is characterized by deregulation and tax cuts. Similarly, Hacker 
and Pierson (2010) explain that policy changes like the decline of tax progressivity at the top of 
the income distribution, including favorable tax treatment of hedge funds (carried interest 
loophole); a failure to update industrial relations policy, which contributed to declining unions; a 
failure to monitor and impose limits on executive pay; and financial deregulation have shifted 
power from labor towards organized business interests and employers and contributed to greater 
inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010). These policy-focused arguments are an important 
reminder that, even when we discuss these broad economic trends, government plays an 
important role. They also point to some national policy changes that, along with economic 
changes, may be relevant for state inequality: financial deregulation, weakening unions, and 
reduced tax progressivity. 
To translate these national economic and policy arguments about inequality at the 
national level to the state level we need to consider that states have different structural and 
demographic profiles. Because of the related economic advantages (Porter 2000), states tend to 
have concentrations of employment in certain industries. For instance, about 4% of jobs in 
Nevada and Wyoming are classified as manufacturing jobs (in 2005) while nearly 20% are 
classified as manufacturing jobs in Indiana. New York has a high concentration of financial jobs. 
And the characteristics of state workforces vary accordingly, such as in terms of education 
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 (Berube 2012) or skill level and union membership. Instead of assuming that economic and 
policy shifts that are linked to U.S. inequality will have a homogenous effect across states, then, 
we should expect that they will actually affect states differently. To this end, I propose several 
specific hypotheses which explore these trends and related characteristics at the state level.11   
De-industrialization  
The share of employment in the manufacturing sector has declined markedly and steadily 
since 1950 (Morris and Western 1999) and there is evidence that this de-industrialization 
contributes to higher income inequality. De-industrialization is marked by a shift from 
manufacturing jobs, which are typically middle class, to the service sector, where there are some 
high paying and several low paying jobs (Gustaffson and Johansson 1997; Levy and Murnane 
1992; Morris and Western 1999, 638). The implication is that this widening gap between jobs 
and compensation – the movement from many jobs in the middle of the distribution to some 
closer to the top and some closer to the bottom - contributes to income inequality.  The de-
industrialization hypothesis predicts that states experiencing greater de-industrialization, or 
losses in manufacturing employment, will have greater increases in inequality. 
Financial Deregulation  
While manufacturing jobs have declined, inequality literature also highlights changes in 
the finance industry. According to arguments by Levy and Temin (2007) and Hacker and Pierson 
(2010) in particular, the growth and deregulation of the finance industry is a key contributor to 
rising U.S. inequality. Levy and Temin (2007) show that compensation per full time employee in 
the finance, insurance, and real estate industry grew at similar rates to other industries 
11 Some argue that along with the trends I discuss here, immigration has contributed to the increase in income 
inequality in the U.S. See Appendix E for further discussion of this issue, as well as unemployment. In both cases, 
the results presented in this chapter are equivalent to those which include controls for immigration and 
unemployment.  
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 (manufacturing, services, retail trade and automobile) before 1970, but accelerated beginning in 
the mid-1980s (35). They relate this sector’s growth to reduced tax rates and a lack of 
government oversight or regulation (37). Hacker and Pierson (2010) argue that the “gradual 
shredding of the post-New Deal rulebook for financial markets” is one reason for increasing 
inequality. The authors cite Philippon and Reshef’s (2009) work, which establishes a relationship 
between deregulation and the rise of wages in the financial sector.  Overall, these arguments 
suggest that the rise of earnings in the financial sector relative to other sectors, aided by 
deregulation, has contributed to greater income differences in the U.S. The financial 
deregulation hypothesis predicts that as wages in this industry pull away from others, we will 
observe greater increases in state-level inequality where there are greater increases in financial 
employment.   
Labor Unions 
Along with shifts in employment and wage patterns in these specific industries, changes 
in employment relations, namely the strength of labor unions and collective bargaining rights, 
are commonly included among the top explanations for rising inequality. The general economic 
argument is that labor unions compress the wage distribution (Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen & 
Stephens 2003; Hicks 1999; Huber & Stephens 2001, Moller, Bradley, Huber, Nielsen & 
Stephens 2003; Morris and Western 1999). Therefore, as unions have become weaker, income 
inequality has increased. Levy and Temin (2007) and Hacker and Pierson (2010) suggest that the 
decline of unions is a function of certain policy changes that have undermined labor and their 
bargaining power. Further, Hacker and Pierson (2010) stress the political role of organized labor 
– they impact the development of social policies - beyond their economic wage bargaining role. 
Research by Freeman (1993) attributed about 21% of the rise in wage inequality to declining 
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 union density.  Similarly, Kelly (2009), building on power resources theory, establishes a 
relationship between the strength of labor unions and lower market inequality in the U.S. 
Recently, Kelly and Witko (2012) established a relationship between unions and inequality at the 
state level as well. According to the union hypothesis, we should see increasing inequality in 
states where union density is relatively low or declining.  
Education and Skill-Biased Technological Change  
As mentioned above, one of the main economic arguments about rising inequality is that 
it results from skill-biased technological change (Berman et al 1994; Krueger 1993; Levy and 
Temin 2007). In such accounts, inequality results when the market rewards those with higher 
skill levels. Lower skill workers, on the other hand, fall behind. Related research on education 
shows that increased returns to post-secondary education in particular contribute to higher 
inequality (Lemieux 2006). In this scenario, the benefits of post-secondary education have 
increased and the earnings of those with a college degree pull further ahead of those without a 
college education. Educational attainment is of course among the demographic characteristics 
that vary between state populations. The returns to education hypothesis predicts a positive 
relationship between higher concentrations of college degree holders and state inequality.   
Capital Income 
While many of the above explanations focus on changes in earnings from salaries and 
wages, there is also evidence that changes to another type of income – capital income, including 
dividends, capital gains, and business income – explain a significant amount of U.S. income 
inequality (Hungerford 2011). In fact, Hungerford (2011) shows that between 1996 and 2006, 
changes in capital gains and dividends were the largest contributor to increasing income 
inequality. Capital income makes up a much larger share of total income for higher income 
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 groups than lower income groups. For instance, in 2006, capital income accounted for less than 
1% of total income for the bottom 80% of the income distribution. By contrast, the top 5% of the 
income distribution made 28% of their income from capital and the top .1% made 52% of theirs 
from capital income (Hungerford 2011, 5). In other words, the distribution of this type of income 
is very unequal and it has also become more unequal over time as “the income of tax filers at the 
top of the income distribution pulled away from those at the bottom” (Hungerford 2011, 5). 
 It is also worth noting that the tax treatment of capital income became increasingly 
preferential compared with rates for ordinary income. For instance, under the rates established 
under Bush, capital gains and dividends income was taxed at a 15% rate compared with the top 
rate of 35% for other (wage and salary) income. Even considering pre-tax and transfer inequality, 
tax policies are still relevant because they can affect individual behavior (e.g. Feenberg and 
Poterba 1993). Scholars of national inequality like Hacker and Pierson (2010), Picketty and 
Saez (2003), and Levy and Temlin (2007) point to reductions in the progressivity of the tax code, 
including provisions affecting investment income (e.g. capital gains and dividends rates), as 
among the top contributors to rising national inequality. Finally, capital income also relates to 
other trends and policies which are highlighted by inequality scholars, including CEO 
compensation,  which has increased dramatically compared with worker compensation (Mishel 
and Sabadish 2012; Mishel, Bivens, Gould, and Shierholz 2012), and failures to enact stock 
option regulations and update securities regulations (Hacker and Pierson 2010). The relationship 
between capital income and national inequality suggests we will observe a positive relationship 
between higher concentrations of investment income and state-level inequality, particularly in 
view of the dramatic variation in capital income across states (Hodge 2003). This capital income 
hypothesis, along with the four previous hypotheses derived from the inequality literature guide 
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 the statistical models developed and tested in this chapter. First, I turn to the dependent variable.  
Measuring State-Level Inequality  
The way we measure income inequality as a dependent variable may have implications 
for the conclusions we draw about its causes. One important distinction to make is between pre-
tax and transfer inequality, or market inequality, and post-tax and transfer inequality. While the 
most obvious relationship between government and income inequality may be through 
redistributive politics like income transfers and taxation, which is measured by post-tax and 
transfer income inequality, I consider how government affects the income distribution prior to 
such actions.  In doing so, I follow arguments by Hacker and Pierson (2010) and Kelly (2009), 
outlined in the previous chapter, that government impacts the income distribution by affecting 
the market itself, for example through labor market policies and regulatory policies, not just by 
redistributing income after the fact. Again, Kelly (2009) finds that these market mechanisms 
have a greater impact on inequality than redistributive ones. As well, Hicks and Swank (1992) 
find that redistribution through taxes and transfers has a relatively small effect on the income 
distribution in the U.S. compared with other advanced democracies. And we have some reason to 
think that redistribution matters even less for states. For instance, Barrilleux and Davis (2003) 
found no connection between state redistributive policies and inequality and Peterson (1995) 
emphasizes the limited redistributive capacity of states, due to the mobility of labor and capital.  
In sum, because of the relatively small impact of redistribution in the U.S. and the 
countless ways government and policies can impact the market before redistribution, I am first 
and foremost interested in explaining variation in pre-tax and transfer income inequality in this 
chapter. Post-tax and transfer inequality, however, is not completely overlooked; I will turn to a 
discussion and analysis of this measure of inequality in Chapter 5. Pre-tax and transfer inequality 
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 data, utilized in this chapter and in Chapter 4 are available in a panel of annual state-level income 
inequality measures created by economist Mark Frank from IRS Statistics of Income data (Frank 
2008, 2009). The inequality measures are based on pre-tax adjusted gross income – including 
wages and salaries, capital income (dividends, interest, rents, royalties), and entrepreneurial 
income (self-employment, small business, partnerships) - by tax unit.  
Even narrowing the dependent variable to market inequality, there are a variety of 
measures and some disagreement about which is most appropriate. For instance, Hacker and 
Pierson (2007, 2010) and Bartels (2008) characterize and measure inequality differently. Hacker 
and Pierson emphasize gains at the very top. The U.S., they argue, has experienced a particular 
type of increasing inequality - “winner-take-all inequality” – which is marked especially by the 
pulling away of the top 1% (or even .01%) of earners. Indeed, they are explicitly critical of 
Bartels’ measure of inequality, the eighty-twenty ratio - the ratio of income at the eightieth and 
twentieth income percentiles - because it “leaves out most of the story of rising inequality” 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010, 162).  
The empirical evidence in support of “winner-take-all” inequality is quite convincing. 
Still, in this chapter I rely on multiple measures of market inequality for the dependent variable. 
This allows for the possibility that different explanations are more or less relevant, depending on 
the type of inequality considered.  A primary advantage of the Frank dataset is that it includes 
several measures of inequality.  In the analyses below, I first consider the percent of income 
captured by top shares, which is consistent with “winner-take-all” inequality, or the pulling away 
of the top of the income distribution (Hacker and Pierson 2010, Jacobs and Skocpol 2005, 
Picketty and Saez 2003) 12 Specifically, I use the shares of pre-tax and transfer income captured 
12 In addition, Frank emphasizes that due to “truncation of individuals at the low-end of the income distribution” in 
the IRS income data, like Picketty and Saez (2003), top income shares are the primary indicators of inequality in his 
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 by top 10% and the top 1% of the income distribution.  These shares range from zero to one, and 
a larger income share indicates greater inequality. A related advantage of these data is that they 
include several types of income, including capital income, which has been shown to be a major 
component in U.S. inequality (Hungerford 2011), rather than just wage and salary income. This 
is, of course, especially important for testing my capital income hypothesis. In addition, because 
they are based on income tax returns, rather than Census income data, we avoid the problems 
with top-coding of high incomes, which hides variation at the top of the distribution (Hacker and 
Pierson 2007). 
I also use a more general measure of income inequality: the Gini coefficient. The Gini 
coefficient ranges from zero to one, with zero being perfect equality – everyone has the same 
income - and one being perfect inequality, with all income being held by one person or 
household (Cowell 2009; Langer 2001).13  The Gini coefficient is produced by ranking each unit 
(e.g. tax unit, household, family) and calculating the cumulative share of income received from 
lowest to highest income (Langer 2001, 401). The Gini therefore captures the overall degree of 
income concentration. I include the Gini here in addition to the top shares measures because it is 
the most popularly used measure of inequality and may be more relevant for certain types of 
explanations. For instance, we may expect a relationship between capital income and top share 
inequality, but the effect of variables like de-industrialization, which concerns employment shifts 
for low and middle income workers, may be better captured by a broader measure like the Gini.   
State Panel Data  
Building from these income inequality data, I constructed a new panel dataset for all 50 
dataset (6).  
13 I multiply these variables by 100 – changing them from proportions to percentages - for ease of interpreting. 
Rather than range from 0-1, then, both the percent of income captured by top incomes and the Gini coefficient range 
from 0-100.  
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 states from 1970 to 2005, which includes demographic, political, and economic variables from 
several different sources. In order to test my partisan theory for state inequality, I need measures 
of the party composition and control of state government. I use several such variables. First, I use 
a dummy variable for whether the Governor is a Democrat or not (1=Democrat). Second, I rely 
on several measures of legislative partisanship, including the percent of Democrats in the lower 
House of the state legislature and a dummy variable for whether the House is controlled by the 
Democrats.14  Analysis of these separate variables can tell us about the effects of changes within 
the legislature and allow us to differentiate between the effects of the two branches. After 
considering Governors and legislatures independently, I use variables for unified Democratic and 
unified Republican government, which are dummy variables coded as “1” when the party 
controls the Governorship and both legislative houses, and “0” otherwise.15 These unified 
government variables are more consistent with some state party control literature that measures 
party control with a dichotomous variable (e.g. Alt and Lowry 2000; Garand 1985; Plotnick and 
Winters 1990), or similarly, a trichotomous variable (e.g. Medoff et al 2011). These measures 
better capture the party’s overall control of the government, which is clearly important because 
each of these branches is involved in policymaking, but we lose some of the variation and 
specificity compared with using the separate Governor and legislature variables. The party 
control variables are provided by Klarner’s (2013) Partisan Balance dataset. 
Economic and demographic variables are included to test the other hypotheses. The 
financial deregulation hypothesis predicts that we will observe a positive relationship between 
inequality and the finance industry, due to its growth relative to others. To capture the strength or 
activity of the financial sector, I use employment in the financial industry as a percent of total 
14 Nebraska has a unicameral nonpartisan legislature, so it is excluded from these models.  
15 Appendix F includes some additional specifications of the partisan control variables. The results from models with 
these specifications lead us to the same substantive conclusions presented in this chapter.  
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 jobs in the state.16 The de-industrialization hypothesis predicts that states experiencing greater 
de-industrialization will experience increases in inequality, as middle class manufacturing jobs 
are replaced with some high and some low paying ones, mainly in the service sector. I use the 
percent of manufacturing jobs of total jobs in the state to measure de-industrialization. Both the 
financial and manufacturing employment variables are constructed using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics State and Metro Area database.  
According to the union hypothesis we should see higher inequality when unions, which 
have been shown to compress the income distribution and promote more generous social 
programs, are weaker. Union strength is measured by the percent of union membership in each 
state in each year from Hirsch and Macpherson’s Union Membership and Coverage database. 
The returns to education hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between a high concentration 
of college degree holders and inequality.  The percent of the population with a college degree is 
constructed with decennial Census data with linear interpolation between Census years.17 
Individual year data were available and used for 1998-2005. Finally, to test the capital income 
hypothesis – which predicts a positive relationship between increases in inequality and capital 
income - I use per capita dividends income, adjusted for inflation, from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis regional database. While capital income technically includes dividends as well as 
capital gains, and business income, I rely on dividends income only to capture this concept 
16 The category of jobs used is “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate” through 2001 and “Financial Activities” for 
2002-2005 because of change in BLS industry classifications from Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). While “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate” is broader than one 
might hope for a measure of the financial sector, it is the narrowest classification I found over the time period of 
interest.  
17 By using linear interpolation we lose some information about over time variation. This procedure assumes that 
change over time is uniform. Still, where individual-level data are not available, interpolation is our best option to 
captures overall trends for the states, especially because the average change in the interpolated variables from one 
year to the next is quite small. For instance, the mean increase in college degree rates for a state between 1998 and 
1999 was less than one percentage point, compared with the range between states in 1999, which was 21.4 
percentage points. Given the small year-to-year change observed where we have individual-year data, it is not likely 
we lose significant information by interpolating between decennial censuses where it is our only option.   
63 
 
                                                 
 because of data limitations. I include several other demographic variables - percent age 65 and 
older, African-American population (percent), and Latino population (percent) –as control 
variables based on previous state inequality literature. 18  Per capita income in constant 2005 
dollars is also added for consistency with previous state studies and to addresses Kuznets’ (1955) 
hypothesis that income growth eventually reduces income inequality in developed economies 
(Nelson 1984, Kim et al 2011). Summary statistics for the variables included in this and 
subsequent chapters are provided in Appendix A.  
Error Correction Models 
With the full collection of panel data, I am able to analyze the variation in inequality in 
states and over thirty-five years (1970-2005). I use a set of time series error correction models 
with fixed effects to examine the determinants of changes in state inequality. Fixed effects 
control for unobserved differences between the states. Error correction models (ECM) are 
appropriate here for a few reasons. First, in general, ECMs impose few restrictions compared 
with other time series models (De Boef and Keele 2008). Second, with respect to these particular 
data, ECMs are appropriate because the dependent variables are nonstationary and ECMs reduce 
the possibility of spurious results (De Boef and Keele 2008).19  Third, the dependent variables in 
these models – in this case, the measures of inequality – capture changes. This feature of the 
models is particularly important because my interest is in explaining over time shifts in 
18 Per capita personal income is available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional data. Percent age 65 and 
older is available from historical census population estimates (by age group), including decennial censuses and 
intercensal estimates. Percent African-American, and percent Latino are decennial Census data with interpolation 
between census years and individual Census data for years 2000 and later. Again, we do lose some precision with 
interpolation, but since these are mainly control variables and since these variables should not change drastically 
from year to year and we are most interested in controlling for differences in levels between states, it is a reasonable 
approach. See Appendix A and references for complete source information.  
19 Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test results show that we cannot reject the null that the panels have unit roots (p-
value = 1.000), which indicates that the dependent variables are non-stationary. A significant p-value indicates 
(.000) we should reject the null hypothesis from the Hausman test that the coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. Fixed effects 
are therefore appropriate.  
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 inequality in the states. Finally, an ECM is particularly useful for studying the effects of different 
parties and their policies over time. Such effects may not be felt immediately upon a party 
coming to power, but rather realized over time as policies are made and implemented. With an 
ECM, we can examine both the short term, or contemporaneous, and long term impact of each 
independent variable. Some recent state-level inequality analyses by Kelly and Witko (2012) 
make use of ECMs for similar reasons.  
 For the error correction models presented throughout this dissertation, each independent 
variable has two parameter estimates: the short-term coefficient (differenced variable) and the 
long-term coefficient (lagged level). A significant coefficient for either estimate suggests that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable of interest and the 
dependent variable (Kelly and Witko 2012, 421). The short-term coefficient gives us the 
immediate or contemporaneous effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  
The long-term coefficient is used to determine the total effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, which begins the next year and is fully realized over time.   To calculate the 
magnitude of the total effect - or long term multiplier effect - the long term coefficient is divided 
by the error correction rate. The error correction rate is given by the coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable and indicates how long it takes for the dependent variable to return to 
equilibrium after a “disturbance” from an independent variable (Pacheco 2010, 164). The lagged 
dependent variable also accounts for the effects of time. If the long term (lagged level) estimate 
is not significant, it can be dropped from the model (De Boef and Keele 2008), and the results 
reported in the following sections reflect this. 
Results: Overview  
 I begin by analyzing top shares, or the shares of income captured by the top 10% and the 
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 top 1% of earners. These measures are consistent with accounts of inequality which emphasize 
gains at the top as the defining attribute of U.S. inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Picketty 
and Saez 2003). Larger shares for top earners, of course, indicate a greater concentration of 
wealth, or greater income inequality. Following discussion of the top 10% and top 1% shares, I 
will turn to the third dependent variable, the Gini coefficient. Throughout the results in this and 
the following chapters, I report traditional standard errors. Because there is some debate that 
traditional standard errors may lead to overconfidence with panel data (Beck and Katz 1995), I 
also estimated the models using panel corrected standard errors, advocated by Beck and Katz 
(1995), and utilized in other panel studies (e.g. Kelly and Witko 2012; Rueda 2005). In most 
cases, these results are the same as those reported in the tables below. In those cases where the 
results differ, it is noted in the discussion and the related results with panel corrected standard 
errors are included in Appendix H. 
Each dependent variable or measure of inequality has three model versions. The three 
versions of the models differ according to which measure of government partisanship is utilized. 
Throughout this chapter, version 1 models, located in column 1, include separate variables for 
the percent of Democratic representatives in the lower house and a dummy variable for 
Democratic Governors. Version 2 models, located in column 2, include a dummy variable for 
whether the lower house is controlled by the Democrats, as well as the Democratic Governor 
dummy. Finally, version 3 of the models, located in column 3, include dummy variables for 
unified Democratic and unified Republican government. I will discuss the results for each 
dependent variable in turn in the following sections. 
Results: State Top Deciles’ Income Shares  
Table 3.1 reports the results for the determinants of changes in the share of income held 
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 by the top 10% of earners.20 I will begin by discussing the main variables of interest, state 
government partisan composition, which are included across the top of the table, and then move 
on to the control variables below. Before turning to the magnitude of these effects, a cursory 
examination of all three versions of the top decile model suggests that the partisan composition 
of state governments is an important determinant of changes in state inequality. As expected, I 
find a significant negative relationship between Democratic Governors and state top decile 
income share, as well as between the percent of Democratic representatives in the lower house 
and inequality, both reported in column 1 of Table 3.1. Notice in the second version of the model 
(column 2) that there is also a significant negative relationship between Democratic control of 
the lower house and the top decile’s share. Finally, in the third model version (column 3), I find 
that having unified Democratic government – a Democratic Governor and a Democratic majority 
in both houses of the state legislature – significantly decreases the top decile’s income share. 
Similarly, having unified Republican government (column 3) is significantly related to increases 
in inequality. Together, these findings provide substantial support for my theory that the party 
composition of state government helps explain variation in state inequality.   
20 See Appendix D for robustness checks with national-level government partisanship variables, Appendix E for 
discussion and results regarding the South, Appendix F for additional specifications of state government party 
control, and Appendix G for model versions with additional independent variables.  In nearly all cases, the results 
are robust to these additional tests. There were some changes in the results when I included national-level 
government partisanship variables (Appendix D). In these models (Table D1), the relationship between Democratic 
state legislators and the top 1%  income share is significant at p<.10 rather than p<.05 and results for Democratic 
Governors, which are significant in several instances in this chapter, are no longer significant. Overall, however, 
partisan composition, particularly of state legislatures, remains a significant determinant of measures of inequality 
throughout these checks.  
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 Table 3.1 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Top Deciles' Income Shares,  
1970-2005 
 
The specific coefficients reported in Table 3.1 indicate that these partisan variables relate 
to state inequality levels in the long term. This is what we would expect, considering that the 
effects of policies enacted by different parties should take some time to be realized. Beginning 
again with column 1, a change to a Democratic Governor corresponds with a reduction in the 
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.25* (0.02) -0.25* (0.02) -0.25* (0.02)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.08 (0.08) -0.08 (0.08)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.13* (0.06) -0.18* (0.06)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.17 (0.53)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -1.97* (0.32)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.02 (0.12)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.27* (0.09)
∆ Unified Democratic -0.06 (0.09)
Unified Democratic t-1 -0.25* (0.07)
∆ Unified Republican 0.17 (0.12)
Unified Republican t-1 0.26* (0.09)
∆ Union -0.05* (0.02) -0.05* (0.02) -0.05* (0.02)
Union t-1 -0.08* (0.01) -0.07* (0.01) -0.07* (0.01)
∆ African-American -2.18* (0.29) -2.05* (0.30) -2.12* (0.30)
∆  Latino -0.02 (0.30) 0.26 (0.30) 0.21 (0.30)
Latino t-1 0.13* (0.02) 0.13* (0.02) 0.13* (0.02)
∆ Over Age 65 0.452 (0.26) 0.53* (0.27) 0.55* (0.26)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) 0.24* (0.04) 0.242* (0.04) 0.26*** (0.04)
Per Capita Income ($1000s) t-1 0.11* (0.02) 0.12* (0.02) 0.12* (0.02)
∆ Dividends Income ($1,000s) 0.62* (0.13) 0.62* (0.13) 0.63* (0.13)
Dividends Income ($1,000s) t-1 0.13* (0.05) 0.16* (0.05) 0.16* (0.05)
∆ College Grads -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
∆ Manufacturing 0.0932 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)
∆ Finance -0.91* (0.18) -0.92* (0.18) -0.89* (0.18)
Constant 7.54* (0.64) 6.08* (0.59) 5.82* (0.57)
Observations 1,691 1,691 1,715
R-squared 0.24 0.23 0.23
States 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3)
Percent Dem. Legis. Dem. House Unified Dem./Rep.
68 
 
 share of income held by the top decile by -.13 on a scale of 100 with an observed range of 25% 
to 54% of income. To put the magnitude of this relationship into context, it is helpful to know 
that the average change in the top decile’s share from one year to the next is only about .30, 
which makes a decline of -.13 in year one substantively important. But to fully interpret this 
effect we also need to calculate the long run multiplier, which is done by dividing the long term 
coefficient (-.13) by the error correction rate (.25), given by the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. When we incorporate this effect, a change to a Democratic Governor reduces 
the top decile’s income share by -.54, or about half a percentage point.  The error correction rate 
of .25 also tells us how quickly this total effect occurs; about a quarter or -.13, will occur in the 
next year. The year following that, about a quarter of that remaining effect will occur, such that 
the effect on the top share is -.10, and bringing the total effect in the first two years to .23 (or 
about 40 percent) of the total .54 effect. This process continues according to the error correction 
rate until the full -.54 effect is realized. Figure 3.1 below plots this cumulative effect of a shift to 
a Democratic Governor, as well as to a Democratic lower house, on the top decile’s share.  
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 Figure 3.1 Cumulative Effects of Government Party Control on State Top Deciles' Income Shares 
 
Along with a significant relationship between Democratic Governors and this measure of 
inequality, version 1 of the model (column 1) also includes a significant long term coefficient for 
the percent of Democrats in the state legislatures. The results indicate that a one unit increase in 
Democratic legislators relates to a decline of -1.97 in the top 10%’s share. With the long run 
multiplier, the total effect is -7.91 (1.97/ the error correction rate of .25), again on an observed 
scale of 25 to 54% of income. Because a one unit shift in the Democratic legislators variable 
represents a change from no Democrats to all Democrats – the range is zero to one – this very 
large full effect is not typical. A shift by an average standard deviation for Democratic legislators 
relates to reduction in the top decile’s share by .86.21 Another way to examine the magnitude of 
relationship between legislative party control and inequality is to interpret the effects of 
21 The average standard deviation for the Democratic legislators variable is about .11. This is divided by the error 
correction rate of .25 given by the model to calculate the expected reduction in the top decile’s share of .86.  
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 Democratic control of the House, rather than the proportion of Democrats, on the top decile’s 
share. In this model, reported in column 2 of Table 3.1, when Democrats gain control of the 
House, we should expect inequality to decrease by a total of about one percentage point in the 
long term, given by the long-term coefficient of .27 divided by the error correction rate of .25. 
This effect is larger than what we see from a shift to a Democratic Governor and also charted 
above in Figure 3.1.22 
Finally, if we look at the combined effect of the Governorship and legislatures, included 
in column 3 of Table 3.1, having a unified Democratic government is associated with a decrease 
of the top decile’s income share by about .25, or a total effect of just over one percentage point 
with the long run multiplier (.25/ error correction rate of .25). When the Governor and both 
houses of the state legislature are controlled by the Republican Party, we should expect an 
increase of the top share by more than one percentage point (.26/ error correction rate of .25) in 
the long term. Again, considering that the average annual change for the top decile’s share is .30, 
the magnitude of these effects are substantively significant. It is interesting to note, though, that 
the effect of unified control is not much larger than that of party control of the House. It may be 
that Democratic legislatures or Democratic governors are each more likely to make policy 
choices that mitigate inequality, but there is no great increase in the number or extent of such 
policies under unified government that would lead to a greater inequality effect.  This makes 
sense if we consider that governors and state legislatures have different degrees of budgetary 
control across states and, within states, may have different policy priorities (Dometrius and 
Wright 2010). As such, legislatures may matter more in some states and governors more in 
others and we may not necessarily observe a much larger effect by combining the two. The 
22 Democratic control of the house is significant at only the p<.10 level if this model is estimates with panel 
corrected standard errors, rather than traditional standard errors. See Appendix H for these results. The results for 
the remaining partisan variables are unchanged with panel corrected standard errors.  
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 magnitudes of the relationships between the partisanship variables and top decile shares, along 
with select other variables from version 1 of the top decile model, are plotted for comparison in 
Figure 3.2 below. Magnitudes correspond to a shift from 0 to 1 for dummy variables and a one 
standard deviation increase for continuous variables, denoted with (sd) in the figure.  
Figure 3.2 Magnitudes of Effects of Select Variables on State Top Deciles' Income Shares 
 
Along with significant findings for party composition, we also observe a significant 
negative relationship between union membership rates and inequality across model versions, 
which supports the union hypothesis.  An increase in union density is significantly related to a 
decrease in the concentration of income at the top. As discussed earlier, economic literature 
suggests that unions contribute to lower inequality by increasing the average wage and 
compressing the distribution of income, and that declining union density partly explains why 
U.S. income inequality has climbed higher. Political arguments, such as by Hacker and Pierson 
(2010), also suggest unions reduce inequality because they have a positive impact on social 
programs or social policy generosity. The results here show that this relationship carries over to 
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Union Density (sd)
Unified Democratic Government
Democratic  House Control
Percent House Democrats (sd)
Democratic Governor
Dividends Income (per capita $1000s) (sd)
Unified Republican Government
Total Change in Top Decile Income Share, Percentage Points 
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 the state-level, and they are also consistent with other state-level findings from Kelly and Witko 
(2012).  Because I am looking at top income shares here, this effect may be the result of union 
strength decreasing CEO and top management compensation, or an indirect effect from changes 
to lower and middle incomes (Volscho and Kelly 2012, 692). Notice in Table 3.1 that union rates 
have both short and long term effects across model specifications. In terms of the 
contemporaneous relationship, a one percentage point increase in union membership is related to 
a decrease of about -.05 for the top share. Using the results from model version 1 in column 1 of 
Table 3.1, the total effect is given by the long term coefficient (.08) divided by the error 
correction rate (.25). A one percentage point shift in union membership therefore corresponds 
with a total decrease of the top decile’s share by about -.32 percentage point. A one standard 
deviation shift, depicted above in Figure 3.2, corresponds with a decrease of the top decile’s 
share by a substantial 2.77 percentage points.  
The results of this first set of models also support the capital income hypothesis. Because 
of the increasingly unequal distribution of capital income, specifically the pulling away of the 
top of the distribution, I expected higher concentrations of capital income at the state level to 
contribute to increases in inequality.  Indeed, we observe a positive, significant relationship 
between per capita dividends income and the top decile’s income share in the state. Based on 
these results from model version 1, we expect a one unit increase in per capita dividends income 
– equivalent to an increase of $1,000 per capita – to increase the top decile’s share by about .6 
percentage point immediately and another .5 over the next several years. 
The de-industrialization hypothesis predicts that a decrease in manufacturing jobs in a 
state would be linked to higher inequality, the rationale being that these middle class 
manufacturing jobs are replaced with a combination of some high paying and several low paying 
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 service sector jobs (Gustaffson and Johansson 1997; Levy and Murnane 1992). However, the 
results show that the relationship between the percent of manufacturing jobs in the state and the 
top 10%’s income share is not significant. This differs from previous findings, which show that a 
loss of manufacturing jobs correlates with higher inequality (Bernard and Jensen 2000). This 
difference in results may stem from different measures of inequality. While Bernard and Jensen 
study wage inequality in particular, my measure includes multiple sources of income.  
The results for financial employment are also surprising. Because wages in this industry 
have grown faster and higher than in others, I expected that states with a high concentration of 
these jobs would experience increases in inequality, especially in terms of a higher concentration 
of income at the top. However, the results show a negative relationship, which suggests that an 
increase in the percent of finance jobs relates to declines in inequality. 23  One possible 
explanation for this surprising results is that we need a narrower measure of the top financial 
industry positions, one that better captures the highest paying positions or executive 
compensation in particular (Eissa and Giertz 2009; Kaplan and Rauh 2010; Picketty and Saez 
2006). Another possibility is that the growth and deregulation of the finance industry is only 
relevant for a few states and therefore we fail to see a positive relationship with inequality when 
we look at all states.24   
Finally, there are some significant results among the demographic control variables.  I 
find a positive relationship between the percent of the population over age 65 and inequality. 
23 I try two other variable specifications to capture activity in the finance industry as well. The first variable 
substituted is finance employment in the state as a percent of total U.S. financial employment (rather than as a 
percent of total employment in the state). The results do not change; finance employment is negatively related to 
inequality. The second variable is the GDP from the finance industry as a percent of total state GDP. The 
relationship between finance GDP and inequality is often positive, but this variable is not consistently significant, so 
these findings are only suggestive.  
24 For example, I estimate a reduced model for just New York. The model includes very few observations, but there 
is a positive and significant result for the percent of finance jobs. In this particular case, then, more financial sector 
employment correlates with a higher income share for the top 1% and top 10%, but the negative relationship in the 
model for all states indicates that this does not hold more broadly.    
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 Increases in the concentration of elderly residents tend to relate to increasing inequality, likely 
because this population has relatively lower incomes, particularly if we do not include Social 
Security benefits. This finding is consistent with some previous literature (Aigner and Heins 
1967; Al-Sammarie and Miller 1967; Conlisk 1967; Nelson 1984; Sale 1974).  
Unlike this previous literature, however, we actually observe a negative relationship 
between the percent of population that is African-American and top share inequality. This is a 
surprising finding, as many previous (cross-sectional) models find a positive relationship.25 
However, because the relative size of the African-American population has likely not changed 
much in or between the states over time, it makes sense that this variable does not explain 
changes in inequality over time in my model, even if income differences remain. Indeed, the 
inclusion of state fixed effects in these models would mask any cross-sectional relationship 
between state African-American population and income inequality. However, we do see the 
importance of ethnicity as a predictor of inequality; an increasing Latino population is associated 
with increasing inequality (in the long term). This is what we would expect if the Latino 
population is overrepresented in lower income categories.   
Per capita income is positively related to increases in top decile shares, suggesting that 
income growth contributes to higher levels of inequality. This contrasts with some older studies, 
which found that higher state incomes related to lower inequality (e.g. Al-Sammarie and Miller 
1967; Conslick 1967). The positive relationship found here suggests that higher state income 
reflects a “concentration of opportunities for high-income workers…offsetting opportunities for 
the lower strata” (Nelson 1984, 855). It is also consistent with the overall account of U.S. 
inequality in the past several decades, in which gains in income go disproportionately to the top. 
25 Levernier et al (1995) is an exception. They find no significant relationship between the size of the black 
population and state inequality when including regional effects. 
75 
 
                                                 
 Increases in income are not spread evenly throughout the distribution; rather, they are 
concentrated at the top of the distribution and contribute to increasing inequality. Based on 
model version 1 in column 1, each $1,000 increase in per capita income corresponds with an 
immediate increase in the top decile’s share by .24 and a total increase by .44 (.11/error 
correction rate of .25).  
Results: State Top 1% Income Shares  
If we want to look at “winner-take-all” (Hacker and Pierson 2010) or top share (Picketty and 
Saez 2003) income inequality, the percent of state income going to the top 1% is an even more 
appropriate dependent variable. Results for changes in the top 1% share are reported in Table 3.2 
and are similar to those for the top decile. Most importantly, we see that the partisan control 
variables have significant long term effects on the top 1%’s share of income, with Democratic 
control negatively related to changes in the concentration of income across model versions.  
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 Table 3.2 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Top 1% Income Shares, 1970-2005 
 
Beginning with model version 1 in Table 3.2, we see that an increase in the percentage of 
Democrats in the state legislature significantly and negatively relates to changes in the top share. 
For an average standard deviation increase in Democratic legislators, we expect a total effect of 
about -.86 on the top 1%’s share. In the next column, model version 2, the results suggest that 
Top One Percent Share t-1 -0.31* (0.02) -0.30* (0.02) -0.31* (0.02)
∆ Democratic Governor 0.01 (0.11) -0.01 (0.11)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.09 (0.08) -0.15 (0.08)
∆ Lower House Democrats -0.63 (0.68)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -2.43* (0.42)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House -0.23 (0.15)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.36* (0.11)
∆ Unified Democratic -0.08 (0.12)
Unified Democratic t-1 -0.24* (0.10)
∆ Unified Republican 0.22 (0.16)
Unified Republican t-1 0.36* (0.12)
∆ Union -0.06* (0.02) -0.06* (0.02) -0.06* (0.02)
Union t-1 -0.08* (0.01) -0.08* (0.01) -0.08* (0.01)
∆ African-American -1.41* (0.39) -1.25* (0.39) -1.49* (0.40)
∆  Latino 0.20 (0.39) 0.53 (0.39) 0.53 (0.39)
Latino t-1 0.12* (0.02) 0.11* (0.02) 0.11* (0.02)
∆ Over Age 65 1.26* (0.33) 1.38* (0.34) 1.39* (0.34)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) 0.35* (0.05) 0.36* (0.05) 0.37* (0.05)
Per Capita Income ($1000s)  t-1 0.09* (0.02) 0.10* (0.02) 0.11* (0.02)
∆ Dividends Income ($1000s) 0.64* (0.16) 0.64* (0.16) 0.65* (0.16)
∆ College Grads 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.026 (0.03)
College Grads t-1 0.05* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02)
∆ Manufacturing -0.13* (0.06) -0.16* (0.06) -0.15* (0.06)
∆ Finance -0.88* (0.23) -0.89* (0.23) -0.86* (0.22)
Constant 2.35* (0.65) 0.71 (0.57) 1.20 (0.68)
N 1,689 1,689 1,713
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.21
States 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3)
Percent Dem. Legis. Dem. House Unified Dem./Rep.
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 Democratic control of the House relates to a reduction in the top 1%’s share of about 1.2 
percentage points on the 100 point scale with an observed range of 5% to 28% of income. This 
magnitude is given by dividing the long term coefficient of .36 by the error correction rate of .30. 
Note that this relationship is comparable in magnitude to the results in the top decile model, and 
the speed of the effect, which can be calculated with the error correction rate, is also similar. This 
cumulative over time change in the top share from a switch to Democratic control of the House 
is plotted in Figure 3.3. As for the effect of partisanship on the top decile’s share (Figure 3.2), it 
takes several years for the full effect to be realized, but again the majority of this effect occurs in 
these first several years. The effect begins with a -.36 decrease in the top 1%’s share the year 
after a change to a Democratic house (year one), given by the long-term coefficient, and 
continues at the error correction rate of .30 in subsequent years.26  
26 Democratic control of the house is significant at only the p<.10 variable if this model is estimates with panel 
corrected standard errors, rather than traditional standard errors. See Appendix H for these results. The results for 
the remaining partisan variables are unchanged with panel corrected standard errors.  
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 Figure 3.3 Cumulative Effect of Government Partisanship on State Top 1% Income Shares 
 
The partisanship results also hold for unified Democratic and unified Republican 
governments, reported in column 3. Full Democratic control is significantly and negatively 
associated with changes in the top share, while Republican government is positively and 
significantly related to inequality. Specifically, we expect a change to a unified Democratic 
government to correspond to a decrease in the top 1%’s  share by about .9, while unified 
Republican government relates to an increase of about 1.24 percentage points. As above, these 
total effects are given by the significant long term coefficients for the unified government 
variables, divided by the error correction rate for the model. The magnitudes of these effects and 
select other variables from Table 3.2, provided by model version 1, are plotted for comparison in 
Figure 3.4. For dummy variables, the magnitudes correspond to a shift from 0 to 1, while those 
for continuous variables correspond to a one standard deviation shift (sd).   
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 Figure 3.4 Magnitudes of Effects of Select Variables on State Top 1% Income Shares 
 
 Moving to our control hypotheses, note that across the top 1% models, higher union rates are 
again negatively and significantly related to changes in inequality, and this relationship exists 
both contemporaneously and in the long term. Each percentage point increase in union 
membership corresponds with a total decrease of the top 1%’s share by.26 (-.08/error correction 
term of .31). Unlike in the top decile models, the results for manufacturing employment here 
match our expectations; an increase in manufacturing jobs – a movement counter to de-
industrialization - is related to decreasing inequality in terms of the top 1%’s income share. 
Specifically, for each percentage point increase in manufacturing employment, we expect the top 
1%’s share to decline by .13 to .16, depending on the specification.  
Although union rates and manufacturing employment, along with party control, conform to 
expectations, we continue to observe a surprising positive relationship between financial 
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80 
 
 employment and top share inequality in this set of models.27 This result is perhaps even more 
unexpected here given the popular association of Wall Street with the concentration of wealth 
held by “the 1%.” However, summary statistics on the occupations of the national top 1% shed 
some light on this negative result. Bakija et al (2012, 22) find that while top earning finance 
professionals have experienced the fastest income growth compared with top earners in other 
occupations, the finance industry is not the only one represented in the top 1%. According to 
these findings, for 2005, just about 14% of the top one percent were employed in finance-related 
occupations, while the largest percentage – 31% – were non-finance executives, managers, and 
supervisors. Medical professions account for more nearly 16% of the top one percent 
occupations and lawyers also made up a significant percentage (8.4%) (Bakija et al 2012, 35). 
This heterogeneity of occupations of top earners may partly explain why we do not see the 
expected relationship between finance employment and inequality at the state level.  
Many of the remaining control results for the top 1% models in the lower half of Table 3.2 
are consistent with those in the top decile models. The percent of African-Americans is 
negatively related to changes in the top 1%’s income share, as it was for the top decile’s share. 
Similarly, there is a positive relationship between the percent Latino and the top 1%’s share. And 
we also see positive effects for the percent of the population over 65 and per capita personal 
income. One significant difference between these findings and the top decile models is a positive 
and significant relationship between the percent of people with college degrees and changes in 
the top 1%’s share. This finding supports the returns to education hypothesis and will be 
discussed further in the following section.  
27 This surprising result does not appear to be a function of multicollinearity in the model. Correlations between the 
financial employment are other independent variables are low, typically less than r=.10. The correation between 
changes in financial employment and changes in manufacturing employment is somewhat higher than others at r=-
.29, but the results do not change if I omit manufacturing employment.  
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 Results: State Gini Coefficients  
My third set of models explores the determinants of changes in the Gini coefficient, the 
most common measure of inequality.  The Gini is a broader measure of inequality than the top 
income share variables above; nevertheless, the results displayed in Table 3.3 are similar to those 
for the previous models. Like in those models, the results of the Gini models, listed in the top 
rows of Table 3.3, are consistent with my partisan theory. Shifts to Democratic officeholders are 
significantly and negatively related to changes in inequality, while increases in Republican 
power coincide with increasing inequality. Beginning with model version 1, a full unit increase 
in the percent of Democratic legislators is associated with a decrease in the Gini by about eight 
percentage points (2.21/.27) on an observed scale of 40 to 72 out of 100. Put another way, for an 
average standard deviation increase in Democratic legislators, we expect the Gini to decrease by 
about .9.  
Similarly, in the second model specification, listed in column 2, a shift to Democratic 
control of the House is associated with a reduction of the Gini by nearly a percentage point as 
well (.24/.27).28  In both models that include the Democratic Governor dummy – versions 1 and 
2 – a change to a Democratic Governor is significantly associated with a reduction of the Gini by 
more than half a percentage point; we expect reduction by .59 percentage point (.16/error 
correction rate of .27) according to the first specification and .81 percentage point reduction 
(.22/error correction rate of .27) in the second. As in previous models, when we consider them 
separately, the effect of partisanship of the legislature is greater than that for the Governor. The 
cumulative effects for both of these partisanship variables on changes in the Gini are plotted by 
28 Democratic control of the house is not significant if this model is estimates with panel corrected standard errors, 
rather than traditional standard errors. See Appendix H for these results. The results for the remaining partisan 
variables are unchanged with panel corrected standard errors.  
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 year in Figure 3.5. Once again, these partisanship effects take several years to be fully realized, 
but note that vast majority of the negative effect on the Gini occurs in the first several years. 
Table 3.3 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes State Gini Coefficients, 1970-2005 
 
Gini t-1 -0.27* (0.02) -0.27* (0.02) -0.27* (0.02)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.08 (0.11) -0.11 (0.11)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.16* (0.08) -0.22* (0.08)
∆ Lower House Democrats -0.73 (0.69)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -2.21* (0.42)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.04 (0.15)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.24* (0.11)
∆ Unified Democratic -0.05 (0.12)
Unified Democratic t-1 -0.25* (0.10)
∆ Unified Republican 0.34* (0.16)
Unified Republican t-1 0.42* (0.12)
∆ Union -0.05* (0.02) -0.05* (0.02) -0.05* (0.02)
Union t-1 -0.08* (0.02) -0.07* (0.02) -0.07* (0.02)
∆ African-American -1.24* (0.40) -1.13* (0.40) -1.18* (0.40)
African-American t-1 -0.14* (0.05) -0.17* (0.05) -0.16* (0.05)
∆  Latino -0.28 (0.40) 0.08 (0.39) 0.05 (0.39)
Latino t-1 0.07* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02)
∆ Over Age 65 0.86* (0.34) 0.91* (0.34) 0.93* (0.34)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) -0.14* (0.05) -0.14* (0.05) -0.14* (0.05)
Per Capita Income ($1000s) t-1 0.09* (0.02) 0.09* (0.02) 0.09* (0.02)
∆ Dividends Income ($1000s) 1.03* (0.16) 1.06* (0.16) 1.05* (0.16)
Dividends Income ($1000s) t-1 0.31* (0.07) 0.35* (0.07) 0.35* (0.07)
∆ College Grads 0.15* (0.03) 0.15* (0.03) 0.15* (0.03)
∆ Manufacturing 0.20* (0.07) 0.18* (0.07) 0.19* (0.06)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.03* (0.02) -0.05* (0.02) -0.05* (0.02)
∆ Finance -0.90* (0.23) -0.91* (0.23) -0.88* (0.23)
Constant 15.18* (1.29) 14.12* (1.28) 13.89* (1.25)
N 1,691 1,691 1,715
R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.20
States 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3)
Percent Dem. Legis. Dem. House Unified Dem./Rep.
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 Figure 3.5 Cumulative Effects of Government Partisanship on State Gini Coefficients 
 
 
 Model version 3 of Table 3.3 reports the results if we consider the partisanship of the 
Governor and legislature together, in terms of instances of unified Democratic or Republican 
governments. In this third column, we see that a change to a unified Democratic government is 
associated with the Gini decreasing by just over one percentage point, as indicated by the long 
term coefficient (-.25) and error correction term (.27). Shifting to unified Republican government 
relates to an increase in the Gini by about 1.5 percentage points (.42/.27). The magnitudes of the 
relationships between these party variables and changes in state Gini coefficients are graphed in 
Figure 3.6. Also included are the coefficients for several other variables from the first version of 
the Gini model from Table 3.3. For dummy variables, the magnitudes correspond to a shift from 
0 to 1, while those for continuous variables correspond to a one standard deviation shift (sd).   
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 Figure 3.6 Magnitudes of Effects of Select Variables on Gini Coefficient 
 
The results for the demographic control variables in the Gini models are also similar to 
those in the top share models, with positive, significant relationships for Latino and elderly 
populations and per capita income and a negative relationship for the percent of African-
Americans in the state. Union rates are also related to decreases in the Gini coefficient. In this 
case, using the results of model version 1, the long term coefficient (-.08), divided by the error 
correction rate of .27 suggests we can expect a total decrease of the Gini by about .30 for each 
percentage point increase in union membership. This finding supports the union hypothesis once 
again. And we continue to see a negative contemporaneous relationship between finance jobs 
and inequality, contrary to expectations. 
The results for manufacturing employment are somewhat difficult to interpret in the Gini 
models. Manufacturing employment did not generally have a significant relationship with 
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 changes in the top decile’s income share, but we saw in the previous section that an increase in 
manufacturing employment related to decreases in the top 1%’s income share. This was what I 
expected based on the relationship between de-industrialization and inequality (de-
industrialization hypothesis). Similarly, in Table 3.3 above, manufacturing employment 
negatively and significantly relates to changes in the Gini coefficient in the long term. However, 
there is also a contemporaneous positive relationship, which suggests that an increase in the 
percentage of manufacturing employment relates to an increase in inequality. Given the 
conflicting results, we cannot draw any firm conclusions about the relationship between 
manufacturing employment and these measures of inequality. This relationship is perhaps better 
captured in narrower studies of wage inequality. 
Although many of the other results besides manufacturing employment are consistent 
across the three dependent variables, one other notable difference is the relationship between the 
percent of college degree holders and changes in inequality. This variable did not have a 
significant effect in the top decile model, but we saw that an increase in the percentage of college 
degree holders significantly related to increases the top 1%’s income share. Similarly, the 
coefficient for college degree holders is positive and significant for all three of the Gini models 
in Table 3.3.29 These latter findings support the returns to education hypothesis. Others have 
argued that inequality has increased because changes in technology lead to a market that rewards 
those with certain skills and levels of education and penalizes those with lower skill levels.  In 
these accounts, those better equipped for the changing economy are able to pull ahead of others, 
thereby increasing inequality (Berman et al 1994; Krueger 1993; Levy and Temin 2007); With 
29 Because of a very high correlation between per capita personal income and the percent of the population with 
college degrees (r=.84), as well as between dividends income and the college educated population, I omit these 
income variables and re-examine the top decile model. When doing so, a higher concentration of college degree 
holders relates to higher inequality in this model as well.   
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 respect to education in particular, Lemieux (2006) finds that the returns to post-secondary 
education have “increased sharply while returns to lower levels of education remained relatively 
unchanged” (2). Those with college degrees have a greater advantage and their earnings further 
outpace those without degrees. The positive relationship I find between concentrations of college 
degree holders and inequality in the states is what we would expect based on these findings, and 
is consistent with some other state studies (Levernier et al 1995; Volscho 2005). My results 
suggest that each percentage point increase in college graduates in the state population coincides 
with a .15 increase in the Gini.  
It is interesting to note that this finding contrasts with those about the relationship 
between education and income inequality in the 1950s-1970s. For example, Sale (1974) found 
that higher educational attainment in states related to lower inequality. Here we see that focusing 
on post-secondary education and considering more recent data leads us to a different conclusion: 
that increases in educational attainment promote inequality. Golden and Katz (2010) provide a 
somewhat different perspective on this relationship. They argue that slowdowns in educational 
attainment contribute to an increase in the college wage premium after 1980 – a greater wage gap 
between those with and without a college degree - and thereby to rising inequality. From this 
perspective, the problem is not that there are more people with college degrees, it is that there are 
too few with college degrees. Their work suggests that expanding college education will reduce 
inequality. Still, as it stands now, it appears that the college wage premium fosters a positive 
relationship between college degree rates and higher inequality.  
Conclusion   
Using data for the states from 1970 to 2005, this chapter improves upon previous studies 
of variation in state inequality by examining new variables, as well as over time changes in state 
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 inequality, and draws some new conclusions. First, the findings above provide some additional 
support for some existing explanations for inequality. Consistently, I find a negative relationship 
between union rates and inequality in the states. Stronger unions appear to keep wages and 
income more equal at the state level. This relationship holds across dependent variables and 
matters in both the short and long term. Similarly, increases in college degree rates related to 
increases in the Gini coefficient and top 1% share. These findings lend support to arguments that 
higher returns to college education help explain rising inequality (e.g. Lemieux 2006).  
Individuals with college degrees are rewarded while those without degrees fall further behind. 
The positive relationship between changes in dividends income and changes in state-level 
inequality is consistent with analyses that show that trends in capital income (Hungerford 2011), 
and related policy changes (e.g. Hacker and Pierson 2010) can explain rising U.S. inequality in 
recent years. In sum, these several national-level explanations for inequality do extend to or have 
implications for the states.  
While some of my findings support these national-level arguments, testing these 
relationships at the state level also reveals the importance of considering sub-national patterns. 
When the factors which help explain inequality like unions or college degree holders or 
investment income are unevenly distributed throughout the U.S., we will also observe 
differences in inequality. Still, other state-level findings conflict with the national-level 
inequality story. For instance, I found that increases in the concentration of finance jobs in the 
states did not related to increases in inequality. At this point, we can only conclude that while the 
deregulation and growth of the financial industry may be an important explanation for inequality 
in the U.S. more generally, or even for particular states, this explanation does not extend to the 
state level, at least with respect to employment patterns. The results for manufacturing 
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 employment did not consistently support the argument that de-industrialization or a loss of 
manufacturing jobs contributes to a lower Gini coefficient or top decile income share, although 
there was evidence that an increase in manufacturing employment relates to decreases in the top 
1%’s share.  
These findings regarding employment variables bring up an important point about 
income inequality in the U.S. In the first part of this chapter, I argued that the concentrations of 
employment in the finance and manufacturing industries in the states were important because of 
some broader economic shifts in these areas. In the case of the financial industry, this was the 
increase in these wages relative to those in other industries, a trend that some argue was aided by 
deregulation.  In the case of manufacturing, the argument was that middle class manufacturing 
jobs were replaced with some high-paying jobs and many low-paying jobs, likely in the service 
sector. Notice that both of these trends deal with changes to wages and salaries or labor income. 
However, we have evidence that other types of income, namely capital income, play a greater 
role than labor income in income inequality in the U.S. (Hungerford 2011). Indeed, in the models 
in this chapter, dividends income was consistently and positively related to increases in state-
level inequality, while the results of the employment variables were opposite of expectations or 
unreliable. These findings lend further support to the argument that trends in U.S. income 
inequality are largely driven by changes to non-wage and salary income. This also suggests that 
tax and regulatory policies which affect capital income deserve our attention.   
Although many economic (and demographic) variables are significant determinants of 
state-level inequality, this is certainly not just an economic story. After all, even variables 
categorized as economic or demographic controls or explanations, like unions and educational 
attainment (college degrees) are affected by national and state policies. The federal government 
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 provides assistance for higher education through grants, loans, and tax credits (Mettler 2011) and 
states play an even larger role by funding public universities. States also make policies which 
promote or hinder unions and collective bargaining, such as “right-to-work” laws, which I will 
discuss further in Chapter 4. We might also expect the employment variables to be a function of 
state political characteristics. For example, Grant and Wallace (1994) found that between 1970 
and 1985, manufacturing growth in the states was related to social wage policies and the state 
political context. A recent study by Gordon and Herzenberg (2012) found that between 1948 and 
2011, manufacturing jobs were gained under Democratic Presidents and lost under Republican 
Presidents. It is possible that my results for manufacturing, which sometimes differed from the 
expected negative relationship with inequality, are a function of a relationship between 
(Democratic) partisanship and the manufacturing industry.  
Beyond these underlying political factors, I have also established a direct connection 
between government and inequality by showing that state government partisan composition 
explains a significant amount of variation in market inequality in the states. My findings suggest 
that both the concentrations of income at the top of the distribution and the Gini coefficient 
significantly decrease under Democratic governments and increase under Republicans. This 
relationship is observable when we examine Governors and state legislatures separately, or the 
effects of having a unified Democratic or unified Republican government. These findings are 
consistent with my theory that the different sets of policies pursued by the two parties in state 
government - with Democrats representing lower and middle income groups and favoring more 
government activity in the economy and Republicans representing higher income groups and 
business interests and less government intervention – help explain over time differences in 
income inequality in the states. In the next chapter, I turn to some policy mechanisms which 
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 connect the parties in government to inequality outcomes.  
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 CHAPTER 4  
PARTISANSHIP, POLICY MECHANISMS, AND MARKET INEQUALITY 
 
The primary argument advanced in this dissertation is that political factors help explain 
trends in U.S. income inequality. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that there is a strong 
over time relationship between the party composition of state governments and changes in levels 
of inequality in the states. This is an important finding that shows that inequality is not only a 
function of economic or demographic patterns; however, it does not tell us how parties influence 
inequality. For differences in government partisanship to systematically lead to different 
inequality outcomes, the parties must act differently in office. In Chapter 2, I theorized that this 
relationship pivots on the parties’ distinct economic approaches. After all, governments cannot 
“legislate a particular amount of inequality… they must rely on the design and implementation of 
policy to accomplish any degree of redistribution” (Rueda 2008, 351). Now that I have 
established the empirical relationship between partisanship and inequality, I further scrutinize my 
theory by identifying policy mechanisms which make this relationship possible. In doing so, I 
follow Rueda’s (2008) strategy for examining the relationship between partisanship and 
inequality in OECD countries in two steps.  
Identifying which policy actions systematically vary between the parties and also explain 
differences in inequality is a large task. Party platforms by their nature bundle many policies, and 
a common theme of this project is that states are active policymakers with considerable cross-
state and over time policy variation. Still, if the relationship I have established between party and 
inequality is a function of who is in power, we should observe shifts in certain policies when the 
partisan balance changes, and these shifts should also influence the level of inequality. Two such 
policies are public sector employment and minimum wage laws. Following statistical analysis of 
92 
 
 these policy mechanisms, I turn to a case study of a third policy area: collective bargaining 
legislation, namely state right-to-work laws. 
Public sector employment and minimum wage laws deserve our attention for a few 
reasons. First, through both public employment and minimum wage laws, governments have the 
capacity to affect market inequality. This is because these policy tools influence pre-tax and pre-
transfer incomes. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000) argue that public employment can be 
viewed as a type of “redistributive device” through which politicians can affect the income 
distribution without explicit tax or transfer policies. Although they refer to public employment as 
“redistributive,” there is a clear distinction between this policy and traditional redistributive 
techniques like income-based social assistance programs. Similarly, Kelly (2009) and Kelly and 
Witko (2012) include the minimum wage among a set of “market-conditioning” policies, or 
policies through which “government influences the distribution of incomes…by affecting a 
variety of decisions made in a market context, prior to redistribution” (Kelly and Witko 2012, 
415).  
It is important to examine market policies because, based on previous empirical findings 
(Barrilleux and Davis 2003, Kelly 2009, Kelly and Witko 2012, Langer 2001) and states’ limited 
capacities for redistribution compared with the national government (Peterson 1995), I argued 
that market conditioning is likely to be the primary mechanism by which states affect inequality. 
In line with this argument, the analyses in chapter three established a relationship between party 
in government and market inequality. Therefore, any possible policy mechanisms must also 
influence market inequality. Although market conditioning may be the primary tool for states, 
we should not rule out redistributive tools. These policies, while not appropriate for the design of 
this chapter, will be explored in Chapter 5 in conjunction with post-tax and transfer inequality.  
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 Of course, there are many policies and government actions which affect the labor market 
and incomes. Government regulations and economic development policies like tax incentives 
(Langer 2001) impact firm hiring, compensation, and location decisions; public education and 
job training programs influence workforce skill-levels and earnings (Kelly 2009, Volscho and 
Kelly 2012); and legislation can weaken or strengthen unions or bargaining rights (Kelly and 
Witko 2012). I investigate public employment and minimum wages for three main reasons. 
First, public employment and state minimum wage policies are two of the most direct 
ways state governments affect pre-tax and pre-transfer incomes. In the first case, government 
sets wages and conditions for public employment (Rueda 2008).  In the second, the government 
actively shapes the income distribution when it sets or raises the minimum wage, in effect 
establishing or raising the wage floor or guaranteeing a minimum income. In both cases, the path 
to influencing the distribution of incomes is straightforward. By contrast, policies which 
influence workforce skills, such as education or job training, or regulations that influence firm 
decisions are relatively indirect. Especially in the case of education, there may be a considerable 
time lag between the policy and economic outcomes. As such, it would be difficult to observe or 
measure the effects of these policies on inequality. In the same vein, to be consistent with 
previous analyses, we need to choose policies for which state data are available from the 1970s 
to present. Public employment and state minimum wages meet this critical requirement.   
Second, the parties’ distinct economic approaches are reflected in both of these policies. 
Democrats are associated with larger public sectors and (higher) minimum wage laws, while the 
Republican Party traditionally favors a smaller public sector and fewer regulations on the market 
or businesses. Obviously the parties must have different positions on these policies if they are to 
serve as mechanisms that lead to different inequality outcomes depending on the party in power. 
94 
 
 Moreover, it is important that these policies capture the broader economic approaches of the 
parties, as I argue that is the distinction driving inequality differences. 
Finally, in the U.S., significant actions in these policy areas take place at the state level. 
As I will elaborate below, state public employment vastly outnumbers that of the federal 
government. States enacted minimum wage laws before the federal government set a national 
standard and, in more recent years, they have responded to federal inaction by enacting or 
amending their own laws (Freeman and Rogers 2007; Kelly and Witko 2012). There is also 
significant variation in these policies across states and over time.  In other words, to fully 
understand the effects of public employment and minimum wage laws on U.S. inequality, we 
cannot rely on federal data or laws, which give an incomplete picture. States are the proper unit 
of analysis for these policies. 
  This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing how public sector employment 
and minimum wages each relate to government partisanship and to inequality. This review 
establishes the framework for each policy to serve as a mechanism between government and 
inequality. Based on these theoretical considerations and existing literature, I present two 
hypotheses for each policy. The first set of hypotheses posits that party composition will affect 
these policies, while the second connects policies to inequality. If both sets of hypotheses are 
supported, I will have additional evidence for my theory of partisan inequality in the states. In 
the analysis section, I examine each of the hypotheses in turn. I find that public employment and 
state minimum wages depend on the presence of Democrats in government; both increase when 
Democrats gain control of additional seats in the lower House, majority control of the House, 
control of the full legislature, and additional branches of the state government. And increases in 
public sector jobs and minimum wages significantly relate to decreases in inequality. Together, 
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 these findings suggest that these policies serve as mechanisms connecting partisanship with 
inequality in the states. Similarly, a brief case study of state right-to-work legislation suggests 
that state union policies are influenced by partisanship and relate to distributional outcomes. 
While this is not meant to be an exhaustive study of all such policies, these findings give 
additional support to my theory that the parties and their policies are consequential for 
inequality.  
The Public Sector 
The first policy mechanism I investigate is public sector employment in the states. Public 
sector jobs include education services (teachers, staff), “protective services (including police 
officers, fire fighters, and correctional officers), higher education, health care (including nurses 
and other workers at public hospitals and clinics), and transportation (including road 
maintenance workers and bus drivers)” (McNichol 2012). More important than the types of jobs, 
however, is the sheer number of public sector jobs under the purview of states. The majority of 
public sector jobs in the U.S. are at the state (and local) level, and therefore influenced by state 
government budgets.30 Between 1970 and 2011, the average number of civilian federal 
government employees was 2,919,524, while state and local public employees averaged 
15,344,881, meaning that state and local government accounts for an average of 84% of total 
public employment in the U.S. during this time (BEA). State and local public employment is also 
significant in comparison with other industries.  In 2011, for example, it was 11% of total 
employment in the U.S., roughly equal with the health care industry, and larger than 
manufacturing (7%), retail trade (10%), and finance and insurance (5%) (BEA). Federal public 
employment was just about 1%. The dominance of state-level public employment compared with 
30 For example, state governments provide grants to localities for public schools, thereby influencing educational 
services employment.  
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 federal public employment clearly shows that the relationship between the public sector and 
inequality is best studied at the state level. Notice also that state public employment is greater 
than employment in the two industries on which inequality literature often focuses - 
manufacturing and finance. As such, it is reasonable to expect this industry to play a significant 
role.     
Within states, public employment is a significant feature of state budgets and total 
employment. About a third of state and local general spending goes to salary and wages for 
public employees, and compensation costs are higher once other benefits like pensions and 
health insurance are taken into account (McNichol 2012). During the 1969-2006 period for 
which these data are available, public employment as a percent of total state employment ranged 
from about 8% to 17% of total jobs in the state (BEA). In all states, then, public sector 
employment makes up a considerable amount of spending and employment, but there is also a 
substantial amount of variation between the states over time.  
We have good reason to think that variation in public employment relates to the 
partisanship of state government. The economic policy approaches of the Democratic and 
Republican parties include clear positions on the proper size of the public sector, with the 
Republicans favoring smaller government and privatization. We expect the public sector to be 
larger under the Democratic Party than the Republican Party. Some recent trends support this. 
For example, in 2011, 11 states that went Republican in the 2010 midterm elections were 
responsible for 40.5 of public job losses (Covert and Konczal 2012).31 As well, the comparative 
literature provides some evidence of this relationship. For instance, Cusack’s (1997) analysis of 
16 OECD countries over three decades shows that the strength of left parties increases the size of 
31 These states were Alabama, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
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 the public sector while the strength of the right reduces it (392).   
 If public employment is to serve as a mechanism, the relationship between party and the 
size of the public sector is just one half of the explanation. We also have to consider how public 
employment relates to inequality. Public employment can serve a “redistributive” (Alesina et al 
2000) or “social equity function” (Hill 1998, Lobao and Hooks 2003). In general, wages in the 
public sector tend to be more equal (Starr 1989), with many government employers capping 
salaries for senior workers and paying lower-skilled workers more than they would earn in the 
private sector (Peters 1985; Volscho and Fullerton 2005, 1327). As such, we expect areas with 
greater public employment to also have lower income inequality. In addition, some argue that the 
government may actively seek to “shelter residents from private market forces” through public 
employment (Lobao and Hooks 2003, 520). This further suggests public employment can be a 
tool for inequality reduction (Volscho and Fullerton 2005). Similarly, the greater equality of 
wages in the public sector also underlies arguments that privatization – reducing the size of the 
public sector by contracting to private providers – will increase inequality (Starr 1989). In the 
U.S., state and local governments are responsible for the vast majority of privatization efforts 
(Gerber, Hall, and Hines 2004, 3). Once again, changes to public sector employment – here in 
the form of declines due to privatization – and the effects on inequality are most relevant sub-
nationally.  
Although scholars have not examined the state level, findings from cross-national and the 
city and county levels are in line with these theoretical considerations; public sector employment 
contributes to lower inequality. Rueda (2008) finds more equality when there are higher levels of 
government employment in OECD countries (378). Lee (2005) finds that public sector 
explanations are associated with better distributional outcomes in democratic countries. In the 
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 American context, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000) show that public employment is higher in 
cities that have more income inequality using data for 1990 and 1991. And Volscho and 
Fullerton (2005) find that metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with greater government sector 
employment had lower earnings inequality in 2000. Several others have shown that this 
relationship exists historically or over time. Lobao (1990) establishes it in the 1970s and Sheets, 
Nord, and Phelps (1987) for the 1980s.  Lobao and Hooks (2003) show that larger public sectors 
reduced inequality in U.S. counties for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Similarly, Moller et al (2009) 
found that between 1970 and 2000 inequality at the county level was relatively low when public 
employment is expansive (1091).  Overall, we have a strong foundation for the two relationships 
required for this two-step theory: 1. between partisanship and state public sector employment and 
2. between public sector employment and inequality. 
State Minimum Wages  
The state minimum wage is the second labor market policy I expect to serve as a 
mechanism between government partisanship and state inequality. The federal minimum wage 
was first set by the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, but several states enacted minimum wage 
laws even earlier. Massachusetts was the first state to enact a state minimum wage in 1912 and, 
although they were enforced to varying degrees, 16 states had passed minimum wage laws by 
1920 (Theis 1991). More recently, as the federal minimum wage has declined in real value and 
devolution has increased state policymaking power, states have been more active in this policy 
area (Freeman and Rogers 2007). As of January 1, 2013, in addition to being subject to the 
federal minimum wage, 45 states have state minimum wage laws. These laws divide into several 
categories: five states have no state minimum wage, four have minimum wages that are lower 
than the federal minimum wage, 22 have state minimum wages equal to the federal minimum 
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 wage, and 19 (plus DC) have wages set higher than the federal minimum (DOL 2013a). 32 State 
minimum wages in 2013 range from $5.15/hour in Georgia and Wyoming to $9.19/hour in 
Washington. Among the 19 states with wages above the federal minimum, the average rate is 
about $8.00, compared with the federal minimum of $7.25. Rates for these states range from just 
above the federal law of $7.25 in Colorado ($7.50) to the highest state minimum wage of 
$9.19/hour in Washington, nearly $2.00 above the federal minimum. States with minimum 
wages below the federal minimum include Wyoming ($5.15), Minnesota ($5.25 for small 
employers, $6.15 for larger employers), Arkansas ($6.25), and Georgia ($5.15) (DOL 2013a). In 
these four states, and in the five states without their own minimum wages, the federal minimum 
wage applies to employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 33   
Because the federal minimum wage law prevails when state minimum wages are lower or 
do not exist, in effect, the primary difference between states is whether the minimum wage is 
equal to or higher than that set by the federal government. However, we can use the full range of 
minimum wage laws in the states, even those that are unenforced because they are lower than 
federal standards, to study states’ policy choices. It is the law on the books, whether used in 
practice or not, that we expect to reflect the states’ political characteristics, as I will discuss 
below. In addition, even among the 19 states with wages above the federal minimum, there is 
considerable variation in their current rates, as well as over time changes to examine. We can 
exploit this variation over time and between states, to more fully assess how this policy relates to 
32 The 19 states with higher state minimum wages are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. There is no state minimum wage in Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, or Tennessee. State and federal minimum wages are equivalent in Delaware, Iowa, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
Wyoming, Minnesota, Arkansas, and Georgia have rates below the federal minimum (DOL 2013a). 
33 In Georgia, the lower state wage applies to any employment that is not covered by the Federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act (DOL 2013a). 
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 inequality in the U.S.  
The minimum wage is, “above all else,” a political issue (Levin-Walderman 1998, 774) 
and we have clear partisan expectations for state minimum wage policies. Setting or raising a 
minimum wage involves government intervention in business decisions and the economy. This 
clearly aligns with the Democratic Party’s economic approach and conflicts with the economic 
conservatism of the Republican Party.  Moreover, the primary beneficiaries of minimum wage 
policies, labor, are part of the Democratic Party’s coalition, while its primary opponents, 
businesses, are affiliated with Republicans.  
At the national level, legislative actions of the two parties – and voting behavior of their 
members (Bloch 1980, 1993) – align with these theoretical predictions. In general, the minimum 
wage has expanded when Democrats controlled the White House and Congress, while 
Republican presidents and legislators have typically blocked increases (Bartels 2008, 245).  After 
several increases in the 1960s and 70s, the minimum wage was not increased once during 
Reagan’s two terms (DOL 2013b). Reagan was strongly opposed to the minimum wage, citing it 
as causing “more misery and unemployment than anything since the Great Depression” 
(Waltman 2000, 44). In the 1990s, Clinton faced Republican opposition when trying to raise the 
federal minimum wage. He succeeded in 1996 by offering some concessions “to soften 
opposition from small business and Republicans, who had battled the wage increase and argued 
that it would kill jobs” (Richter and Gerstenzang 1996). More recently, the Federal minimum 
wage was raised under a Democratic controlled Congress. The 2007 Fair Minimum Wage Act of 
2007 was proposed by Democratic Representative Miller and supported by every Democratic 
member (with four not voting) (Library of Congress). And in the 2012 Presidential election, 
Obama campaigned on increasing the federal minimum wage (Obama 2012).  
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 We also observe partisan division over the minimum wage at the state level. As anecdotal 
evidence, in late 2012, New Jersey Republican and Democratic state legislators were divided 
over increasing the state minimum wage, with Republicans opposing it on the grounds it would 
hurt business (Fitzgerald 2012; Farrell 2012). Similarly, earlier in 2012, a bill passed by the New 
York State Assembly to increase the state minimum wage stalled in the Republican-controlled 
Senate (Weaver 2012).  More systematic state-level studies also show that party affects 
minimum wage policies. Waltman and Pittman (2002) examine cross-state differences in 
minimum wage in 1999 and find that when Democrats have greater control in the legislature, 
states are more likely to have minimum wages higher than the federal minimum wage.34 
Zavodny’s (1996) model of state minimum wages between 1979 and 1993 shows that state 
minimum wages are higher than the federal minimum wage when Democrats have greater 
control in government. She finds positive, significant effects for Democratic governors, the 
percent of Democrats in the lower house, and the percent of Democrats in the upper house (63-
67). Thompson (2011) finds that Democratic legislative control helps explain the passage of 
minimum wage laws in the states between 1997 and 2006. In particular, the likelihood of passing 
a bill to increase the minimum wage increases when Democrats control both chambers of the 
legislature and with each additional percentage of seats held by Democrats during this period 
(Thompson 2011, 64).  
It is clear that state minimum wages, like public employment, are a partisan issue. The 
second step is to take into account the effect of minimum wages on inequality. Although 
minimum wages directly affect only a small percentage of workers, they  “also have an indirect 
34 Waltman and Pittman’s (2002) party variable is coded as 1 if the Republicans controlled both houses of the 
legislature from 1990 to 1996; coded as 2 if the Republicans controlled both houses in every term but one, coded as 
3 if control was split between the parties; coded as 4 if Democrats controlled both houses in all but one term; and 
coded as 5 if the Democrats controlled both houses during the entire period. 
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 ratcheting effect on the overall wage structure as wages above the minimum are changed to 
retain the relative ranking of occupational positions within hierarchies” (DiNardo and Lemieux 
1996; Morris and Western 643), or a “ripple effect” (Card and Krueger 1995). As such, we 
expect higher minimum wages to reduce income differences by raising incomes at several levels 
of the lower part of the distribution. Several scholars argue that the erosion of the real value of 
the national minimum wage has contributed to rising inequality in the U.S. (Bartels 2008; 
DiNardo and Lemieux 1996; Levy and Temin 2007; Lee 1998; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2006) and others have called for increasing the minimum wage as a way to reduce inequality 
(Bernstein, McNichol, and Nicholas 2008). Similarly, cross-national studies find that higher 
minimum wages relate to lower inequality (OECD 1998; Rueda 2008).  
In the American state context, Kelly and Witko (2012) show that since 1994, “states with 
a higher effective minimum wage had smaller increases in inequality” (423). Volscho (2005) 
studied the relationship between state minimum wages and state Gini coefficients of family 
income every 10 years from 1959-1999 and found that state minimum wages reduce inequality. 
These findings offer a solid foundation for studying the connection between minimum wages and 
inequality; however, I also depart from this previous work by tracing minimum wage laws back 
to the party in state government. With these two components together, I have positioned state 
minimum wages as a mechanism that is affected by partisanship and, in turn, affects inequality.  
Policy Mechanism Hypotheses 
The theory presented in Chapter 2 argues that party composition in state government 
affects inequality in the states. In this chapter, I divide this theory into two parts by placing 
public employment and state minimum wage laws between party and inequality as examples of 
policy mechanisms.  The two previous sections give us clear theoretical guidance for doing this. 
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 In both cases, we have good reason to believe that the policies are 1. affected by party and 2. 
affect inequality. This leaves us with two sets of hypotheses to test, depicted in Figure 4.1 below. 
First, on the left-hand side of the figure, I hypothesize that Democratic state government will 
promote increases in public sector employment (H1) and higher minimum wages (H2). The 
second set of hypotheses, on the right side of Figure 4.1, concern the effect of the policy 
variables on inequality. I expect that increases in public sector employment (H3) and minimum 
wages (H4) will contribute to lower inequality. For my partisan theory of inequality to be 
supported, I need evidence in line with both sets of hypotheses. 
Figure 4.1 Hypothesized Relationships between Government Partisanship, Policies, and Inequality 
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Policy Mechanism Data and Models  
 Testing these hypotheses requires multiple models, which are outlined in Table 4.1 and 
described below. The first set models, listed in the top half of Table 4.1, is used to test the effect 
of party composition on the policies of interest. The main independent variable of interest is, of 
course, party in government. I use several versions of this variable, listed in the second row of 
Table 4.1. The first measure of government partisanship I use is the percent of Democrats in the 
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 lower house of the state legislature.35 In addition to the percent of Democrats in the House, I also 
include models for whether the Democratic Party holds the majority (1=yes, 0=else) and for 
whether the Democratic Party controls both legislative houses (1=yes, 0=else). In the case of 
public employment, this variable is slightly different. Because public employment is a budget 
issue, the variable is a dummy for whether Democrats have a budgetary supermajority in states 
where this is required. If no supermajority is required, the variable simply denotes (majority) 
control of the legislature. For all models with the legislative partisanship variables, I also include 
a Democratic Governor variable (dummy, 1=Democrat).  
As in Chapter 3, including separate variables for the legislature and Governor allows us 
to see their individual effects, or whether one branch is more relevant than another.  In another 
model, I test a party variable that captures the overall control of the state government, 
specifically the fraction of three elected institutions of state government – the Governorship, the 
lower House, and the upper House – controlled by the Democratic Party. This variable is an 
additive scale of Democratic control of three institutions. Following coding by Klarner (2013), 1 
= Democratic control of all three institutions, 0 = Republican control of all three institutions, .33 
= Democratic control of one institution, Republican control of the other two, etc. As in Chapter 
3, the party variables are provided by Klarner’s (2013) state partisan balance dataset. 
35 I use the lower house of the legislature here because it is a less “noisy” measure than upper houses (Folke et al 
2011). Lower houses are relatively large and they nearly all have two-year terms, so we can expect changes in 
legislators and party control around the same time across states, compared with upper houses, which are smaller and 
typically have staggered four-year terms (Folke 2011). To be sure, the upper house is included in additional 
measures. Not surprisingly, the results are similar across the different partisan measures, as we will see in the results 
below. 
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 Table 4.1 Outline of Partisan and Inequality Models 
 
To assess the relationship between partisanship and the size of the public sector, I use 
state public sector employment as a percent of total employment as the dependent variable. This 
is the same dependent variable used by Rueda (2008) in his cross-national study. There are other 
ways to measure the size of state public sectors, such as with spending (e.g. Alt and Lowry 1994) 
or government revenues (Lee 2005). However, state public employment is a direct way state 
government can influence the labor market (Rueda 2008), by setting wages and conditions. 
Again, these actions are consistent with the “market-conditioning” role of state governments and 
with the dependent variable, market inequality. As well, public employment accounts for a 
significant portion of state budgets and state total employment. For these reasons, I focus on 
Public Sector Minimum Wage
Dependent Variable public employment, percent of 
total employment
statutory minimum wage
Main Independent Variable(s)
Control Variables Government debt/GSP
Unemployment rate
Growth of real GSP
Union membership 
Unemployment rate
Percent manufacturing employment
Per capita income
Union membership
Dependent Variable
Main Independent Variable(s) public employment, percent of 
total employment
statutory minimum wage
Control Variables Reduced Model:
percent African-American, percent Hispanic, percent age 65+, real per capita 
personal income,  percent w college degree
Expanded Model:
Above controls plus percent manufacturing employment, percent finance 
employment, percent union members, per capita dividends income
Inequality Models
Partisan Models
Percent Democratic legislators (lower house)
Majority Democrat legislature (lower house)
Democratic legislative control (budget supermajority)
Democratic Governor
Number of Democratically-controlled branches
Top Decile's Income Share
Gini coefficient
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 employment rather than spending measures. State public employment data are available from 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regional database.  
I also include several control variables, which are listed in the third row of Table 4.1.  To 
account for constraints on the state’s ability to fund public employment, I include state 
government debt, as a percent of state GDP. States faced with high levels of debt may cut public 
sector jobs. State debt and GDP data are available from the Census of Governments State and 
Local Finance series accessed through the Tax Policy Center’s State and Local Finance Data 
Query System. I control for union density (percent of union members) using data from Hirsh, 
Macpherson, and Vroman’s Union Stats database. To control for the level of need in the state, I 
include the unemployment rate, available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics database. Finally, to be consistent with other models of economic 
policy, I control for state economic growth with the annual percent change in real Gross State 
Product, which is compiled from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional database.  
In the minimum wage model, described in the top right-hand column of Table 4.1, the 
government partisanship variables are again the main independent variables of interest, but the 
dependent variable is, of course, minimum wage. Previous models of state minimum wages have 
operationalized this variable in several ways. Waltman and Pittman (2002) and Zavodny (1996) 
categorize states by whether the state minimum wage is higher or lower than the federal 
minimum wage. Thomson (2011) examines minimum wage bill passage, with bills coded as “1” 
when they pass and “0” otherwise.  Rather than rely on binary or categorical classifications, I opt 
to use the statutory minimum wage rate as the dependent variable. Although federal minimum 
wage prevails when state minimum wages are lower, I rely on the legislated state wage because 
it captures the policy that is actually set by the party in power. This statutory rate is most relevant 
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 for studying how state policies relate to state characteristics, in this case partisanship. It is here 
we expect the effects of state partisanship to be observable. In the subsequent inequality models, 
I continue to rely on the statutory wage. In these cases, these state policies serve mainly as 
proxies or signals of states’ policy dispositions, at least for those states with no state minimum 
wage or wages lower than the federal law. For such states, although the statutory rates are 
different from the effective rate in the state, the legislated state wage represents state 
governments’ choices, specifically their willingness to intervene in the economy to adjust 
incomes. This variable choice also follows similar work by Kelly and Witko (2012), who also 
model the relationship between statutory minimum wages and state inequality. Also following 
Kelly and Witko (2012), the minimum wage is coded as “0” if states do not have their own 
minimum wage.   
Like the public employment model, the minimum wage model includes a control for state 
union rates, which have been found to predict state minimum wages (e.g. Thomson 2011) as well 
as legislative voting behavior on minimum wage bills (Bloch 1980, 1993; Levin-Waldman 
1998).  I also control for unemployment in this model because a common criticism of minimum 
wages is that they will increase unemployment. As such, states may be reluctant to set or 
increase minimum wages when unemployment is relatively high. To account for cost of living 
differences in the states and over time, I include (nominal) state per capita personal income 
(BEA). Finally, others have found a relationship between state minimum wage and the 
manufacturing industry (Thomson 2011, Zavodny 1996). I control for the percent of 
manufacturing employment of total employment in the state (BEA).  
As in Chapter 3, I am interested in over time changes in the states, so the data are treated 
as panels for each state. I model the effects of party on public employment and on minimum 
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 wage with error correction models with fixed effects to account for omitted state-specific 
factors.36 As discussed in the previous chapter, error correction models can be useful for several 
reasons. First, the dependent variables in these models capture change and my primary interest is 
in how changes in partisanship affect changes in public employment and minimum wage rates 
(and later, how such change relates to over time changes in inequality). A related advantage is 
that, although they can be used with stationary data as well (De Boef and Keele 2008), ECMs are 
appropriate for non-stationary data. Diagnostic tests suggest that both the public employment and 
minimum wage dependent variables are non-stationary.37 Thirdly, ECMs allow us to include and 
differentiate between short and long term effects of our independent variable(s) of interest – 
here, party composition – on the dependent variable(s). Given the often slow-nature of the policy 
process, we might expect some delay between a change in party composition and actual passage 
of policies. Short-term effects are captured with the differenced independent variables (change in 
each variable), while the long term effect is captured with each lagged independent variable. We 
also account for time dependence with a lagged dependent variable. In the final models used 
below, long term coefficients (lagged independent variables) that were not significant in full 
models have been dropped. Because of data limitations, both of the models begin in 1976 rather 
than 1970 as in the previous chapter.  
We also need models to test the relationships between policies and inequality (H3 and 
H4). The variables used for the inequality models are listed in the lower half of Table 4.1. Notice 
that in these models, the main independent variables of interest are the dependent variables from 
36 A significant p-value (.000) indicates we should reject the null hypothesis from the Hausman test that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent 
fixed effects estimator.  
37 The results of the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test for both dependent variables – public employment and 
minimum wage - suggest that we cannot reject null of unit roots in the panels (p-values = .999), which indicates that 
the data are non-stationary.   
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 the previous models: public employment (as a percent of total employment) and statutory 
minimum wage. The dependent variable is market inequality, measured with the same variables 
used in chapter three (Frank 2008), although I consider fewer measures here because of the 
number of models required and the nature of the policies examined. I include the Gini coefficient 
because it is better suited than top income shares to address changes throughout the income 
distribution, especially where lower income levels are concerned. This is the case especially for 
state minimum wage policies. I also include the top decile’s income share because it captures the 
gains at the top which characterize U.S. inequality, and, according to Frank (2008), the top 
decile’s share is the preferred inequality measure in his dataset.38 Many of the previous control 
variables from Chapter 3 are utilized in these models as well. In a reduced model, I include 
mainly the demographic variables: percent of population that is African-American, percent of the 
population that is Hispanic, percent of the population over age 65, percent of the population with 
college degrees, and real per capita personal income in 2005 dollars. In expanded models, I add 
variables for employment in manufacturing and finance, union membership, and per capita 
dividends income. Along with the previously discussed advantages, diagnostic tests again 
suggest that error correction models with fixed effects are appropriate for these models. This is 
also consistent with the inequality models in Chapter 3. As before, I drop the long term versions 
of the variables if their coefficients were not significant in full models throughout the chapter (de 
Boef and Keele 2008).   
Results: Partisanship and Public Employment 
 Beginning with the models of state public employment in Table 4.2, notice that the 
38 Results for the top 1% are included in Appendix I and are similar to those for top 10%. Increases in public sector 
jobs are negatively and significantly related to the top 1% share. Increases in state minimum wages are negatively 
and significantly related to the top 1% share, but also have a positive, significant contemporaneous relationship with 
the top share. This is consistent with the results for the top 10% and not surprising; we expect changes in the 
minimum wage to affect inequality from the bottom of the distribution – better captured by the Gini – than the top.  
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 several versions of Democratic state government variables across the top of the table have 
significant, positive coefficients.39 These results are consistent with my hypothesis that public 
sectors increase under Democrats.  In version 1 of the model, reported in the first column, an 
increase in the percent of Democrats in the lower house of the state legislature significantly 
relates to an increase in public employment. Taking into account the long term multiplier, a one 
unit increase in Democratic legislators relates to about a 1.4 percentage point increase in public 
sector employment (.18/.128) on an observed scale of 8% to 17% of employment. Because a full 
one unit shift in this variable is not typically observed in the data, the magnitude of the 
relationship may be better characterized by a one standard deviation shift, which averages .11 
across states. Such a shift in the Democratic legislators variable corresponds with an increase in 
public sector employment by .15.   
39 See Appendix E for results of party and inequality models for both policies excluding the South. These results are 
consistent with those reported in this chapter, indicating that these relationships are not driven by regional patterns 
or differences in partisanship in the South during this period.  
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 Table 4.2 Relationship Between Government Partisanship and Changes in State Public Employment, 
1976-2005 
 
In version 2 of the model,  I switch the proportion of Democratic legislators variable with 
a dummy variable for whether the Democratic Party is the majority or minority party in the lower 
house (1=majority, 0=else). A switch to a Democratic house (from a 0 to 1) is associated with an 
increase in public sector employment in the short term by .06 and by a total of .58 with the long 
run multiplier (.077/.132). The long term effect of Democratic House control, as well as the other 
independent variables, will occur over time at the rate given by the error correction rate – the 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable - which in this case is about .13. This means that 
Public Sector Jobs t-1 -0.128* (0.010) -0.132* (0.010) -0.131* (0.010) -0.133* (0.010)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.121 (0.116)
Lower House Democrats t-1 0.180* (0.064)
∆ Democratic Governor 0.028 (0.016) 0.029 (0.016) 0.029 (0.016)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.002 (0.011) -0.001 (0.011) 0.003 (0.011)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.056* (0.023)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 0.077* (0.017)
∆ Democratic Legislative Control 
(budget supermajority) 0.048* (0.022)
Democratic Legislative Control t-1  
(budget supermajority) 0.045* (0.017)
∆ Democratic Government Control 0.104** (0.032)
Democratic Government Control t-1 0.080* (0.021)
∆ Gov.  Debt/GSP (x1000) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)
Gov. Debt/GSP (x1000) t-1 -0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003)
∆ Real GSP Growth -0.015* (0.002) -0.015* (0.002) -0.015* (0.002) -0.015* (0.002)
Real GSP Growth t-1 -0.019* (0.002) -0.019* (0.002) -0.019* (0.002) -0.019* (0.002)
∆ Unemployment 0.081* (0.007) 0.081* (0.007) 0.080* (0.006) 0.080* (0.007)
Unemployment t-1 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.004)
∆ Union 0.005 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003)
Union t-1 -0.004 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002)
Constant 1.476* (0.118) 1.567* (0.113) 1.576* (0.113) 1.565* (0.112)
N 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,421
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.39
States 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
 * p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prc. Democrat Democratic House Democratic Legis. Democratic Govt.
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 13% of the full effect will occur in the first year, and each year after that, 13% of the remaining 
full effect will be realized. Error correction rates close to zero denote slower change, so this 
effect will take several years.   
Because public employment is a budget issue for state governments, I consider an 
additional variable specification for the partisan composition of the legislature in column 3, a 
dummy variable for whether the Democrats have enough legislators in both chambers to 
overcome a supermajority requirement for a budget. If no supermajority requirement exists, the 
variable denotes the majority control (0=else) (Klarner 2013). The results from this third version 
of the model also support my hypothesis that public sector employment expands under 
Democratic control. There is an immediate increase in public employment of about .05 
percentage points when Democrats have a budget majority or supermajority and a total effect of 
.34 with the long run multiplier (.045/.131). Surprisingly, this total effect is smaller than the 
effect of majority control of just the lower house on public jobs.   
Finally, in the fourth and final version of the model, I find that increases in overall 
Democratic control of state governments – measured by the fraction of the Governorship, lower 
house, and upper house controlled by the Democratic Party – significantly relate to changes in 
public employment. A full one unit change in this variable – from Democratic control of no 
branches to Democratic control of all three – coincides with public employment as a percent of 
total employment increasing by .1 in the short term. This effect seems small, but it is equivalent 
to a change in thousands of jobs. For example, in 2005, public employment accounted for 
729,334 jobs of a total 6,761,906 in Ohio, or about 10.79%. If instead public employment was 
10.89% of total employment - the expected increase of .1 – this would mean there were about 
7,037 additional public sector jobs in the state. Furthermore, we can incorporate the long run 
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 multiplier for the total effect. Dividing the significant long term coefficient of -.08 by the error 
correction rate of .133, we expect a total increase in public jobs by .60 for a one unit increase in 
Democratic control. Figure 4.2 below displays the magnitude of the effects of the percent of 
Democratic legislators and Democratic control of the lower house, the full legislature (super-
majority budget control), and all three elected chambers on public sector jobs, along with select 
control variables from model version 1 for comparison. For continuous variables, the magnitudes 
correspond with a one standard deviation shift (sd), while those for dummy variables denote a 0 
to 1 change.  
Figure 4.2 Magnitudes of Effects of Government Partisanship on Percent of Public Sector Jobs 
 
Towards the bottom of Table 4.2, I also find some significant results for the control 
variables in each of the public employment models. Real state GDP growth is negatively related 
to public employment, while the unemployment rate is positively related. A one unit increase in 
state GDP relates to a decline in public employment by about .015 contemporaneously and by 
.15 (-.019/.128) with the long run multiplier (version 1). A one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with an increase in public employment by about .08, across 
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Full Democratic Control
Democratic House
Democratic Legislature
Percent Dem. (sd)
Unemployment Rate (sd)
Real GDP Growth (sd)
Change in Percent Public Jobs, Percentage Points
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 model specifications. These results, also depicted at the top of Figure 4.2 above, suggest that the 
public sector is expanded in response to an increase in unemployment and a weaker economy. 
They are also consistent with Alesina’s categorization of public employment as a form of 
“redistribution,” which provides another way for governments to transfer income to 
disadvantaged groups during difficult economic times, as well as with the idea that states 
respond to levels of need in their populations (Lieberman and Shaw 2000). Surprisingly, union 
membership did not have significant effects on public employment at the .05 level or lower in 
any of the models, although some positive short-term coefficients may be indicative of high rates 
of unionization among public sector workers compared with those in the private sector. State 
government debt did not have a significant coefficient in any of the models.40  
Results: Public Employment and Inequality  
Support for my theory of government partisanship and inequality depends on two sets of 
hypotheses in this chapter: I predict that inequality-relevant policies will be affected by 
government partisanship AND I predict that these policies will affect income inequality. For the 
first policy examined, each of the party models supports the first hypothesis; Increases in 
Democratic control relate to significant increases in public sector jobs. The next question is, of 
course, does public employment have a significant relationship with state inequality as predicted 
by the second hypothesis? The results in Table 4.3 suggest that it does.  
In column 1, I begin with a reduced model of the relationship between public 
employment and changes in top decile shares, which includes just demographic controls. Notice 
that state public employment is significantly and negatively associated with changes in 
inequality. There is a significant contemporaneous effect such that a one unit increase in public 
40 The results in Table 4.2 are robust using panel corrected standard errors.  
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 employment relates to a .61 decrease in top decile’s income share, which has an observed range 
of 25 to 54 on a scale of 100. This is a substantively large effect in comparison to the average 
change of .30 for this variable. Although the average change in public employment from one 
year to the next is small, the data indicate that it is reasonable to expect a one unit increase or 
decrease in public employment over a few years. In addition, the significant, long term 
coefficient of .133, divided by the error correction rate of .226, tells us that there is a total effect 
of -.57 from a one unit increase in public employment. The error correction rate, or coefficient 
for the lagged dependent variables (.226), also indicates how quickly this effect will occur. It will 
begin with a decrease of .13 in the first following year, and about a quarter of the remaining 
effect will be realized in each successive year. When I add additional control variables from 
chapter three – reported in column 2 of Table 4.3 - we still see a significant negative 
contemporaneous relationship between public employment and changes in the top decile’s share, 
however, the long-term relationship does not hold. Thus, there remains some evidence that 
increases in public employment significantly relate to changes in inequality, but the sensitivity of 
the results suggests we should be somewhat cautious in this conclusion.  
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 Table 4.3 Relationship between Public Employment and Changes in State-Level Inequality, 1976-2005 
 
Moving to columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.3, we see that public employment also has a 
significant relationship with changes in the Gini coefficient. We expect a one percentage point 
increase in public sector jobs to coincide with a decrease in state Gini coefficients by about .60 
(column 3). It will take several years for this full long-term effect to be realized, but with an error 
correction rate of about .21, more than one fifth of it will occur in the first year. Unlike for the 
top decile’s share, however, neither the short nor the long term coefficient is significant in the 
Dependent Variable
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.226* (0.017) -0.279* (0.018)
Gini t-1 -0.212* (0.017) -0.280* (0.019)
∆  Public Sector Jobs -0.605* (0.140) -0.485* (0.139) -0.048 (0.193) 0.209 (0.190)
Public Sector Jobs t-1 -0.133* (0.053) -0.001 (0.055) -0.158* (0.073) -0.005 (0.077)
∆ African-American -2.118* (0.306) -1.935* (0.295) -1.272* (0.420) -1.111* (0.406)
African-American t-1 -0.045 (0.053) -0.134 (0.073) -0.184* (0.071)
∆  Latino -0.320 (0.327) 0.026 (0.314) -0.533 (0.450) 0.128 (0.437)
Latino t-1 0.154* (0.022) 0.164* (0.021) 0.079* (0.028) 0.082* (0.027)
∆ Over Age 65 1.378* (0.273) 0.923* (0.273) 1.657* (0.378) 1.239* (0.372)
Over Age 65 t-1 0.367* (0.043) 0.166* (0.050) 0.356* (0.060) 0.126 (0.068)
∆ Union -0.046* (0.019) -0.057* (0.025)
Union t-1 -0.079* (0.014) -0.076* (0.020)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) 0.383* (0.047) 0.262* (0.048) 0.107 (0.063) -0.134* (0.066)
Per Capita Income ($1000s) t-1 0.112* (0.021) 0.108* (0.020) 0.094* (0.026) 0.0415 (0.028)
∆ College Grads 0.007 (0.020) -0.006 (0.019) 0.154* (0.028) 0.140* (0.027)
College Grads t-1 0.054* (0.017) 0.064* (0.024) 0.021 (0.024)
∆ Manufacturing 0.031 (0.059) 0.216* (0.080)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.037* (0.014) -0.094* (0.020)
∆ Finance -0.851* (0.176) -0.903* (0.242)
∆ Dividends Income ($1000s) 0.759* (0.126) 1.285* (0.172)
Dividends Income ($1000s)  t-1 0.229* (0.063) 0.366* (0.088)
Constant 1.110 (0.931) 5.325* (1.139) 6.297* (1.297) 14.65* (1.828)
N 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
R-squared 0.25 0.30 0.13 0.21
States 50 50 50 50
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Decile Top Decile Gini Gini
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 expanded Gini model with the additional control variables, reported in column 4.41 Once again, 
this sensitivity of results suggest we exercise some caution our conclusions about the relationship 
between public employment and inequality. 
In the lower half of Table 4.3, we observe similar results for these control variables as in 
chapter three. Increases in the elderly population, per capita personal income, the Latino 
population, and per capita dividends income are positively and significantly related to inequality, 
while increases in union membership have a significant negative relationship with changes in the 
top decile share and Gini. We observe an expected negative and significant relationship between 
manufacturing employment and inequality in the long term (versions 2 and 4), but like some of 
the models in Chapter 3, there is a conflicting positive contemporaneous relationship between 
increases in manufacturing and the Gini coefficient (version 4).   
Results: Party and Minimum Wage 
 The results from the public employment models provide some support for both of my 
hypotheses. Across specifications, shifts to Democratic government significantly relate to an 
increase in public employment (H1, Table 4.2), and increases in public employment are 
associated with decreases in the top decile’s share and Gini coefficient (H2) in three of the four 
inequality models (Table 4.3).  Together, these results are consistent with the overall theory that 
partisan composition influences income inequality through differences in policy.  I now turn to 
the second policy: state minimum wage, beginning with the results for the effect of party control 
on minimum wage, which are listed in Table 4.4.42   
41 Some of the results presented in Table 4.3 are sensitive to whether traditional or panel corrected standard errors 
are utilized. Appendix H includes the results with panel corrected standard errors. In those results, the percentage of 
public sector jobs is not significantly related to changes in the Gini coefficient or to changes in the top decile’s share 
in the expanded model. The relationship between public employment and the top decile’s share remains significant 
and negative with either traditional or panel corrected standard errors. 
42 Results are robust using panel corrected standard errors.  
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 Table 4.4 Relationship between Government Partisanship and Changes in State Minimum Wages, 
1976-2005 
 
As expected, Democratic influence or control in state government significantly relates to 
increases in the statutory minimum wage across several versions of the model, reported in the top 
half of Table 4.4. First, in model version 1, the percent of Democratic legislators in the lower 
House is a significant predictor of changes in the state minimum wage. A one unit increase in 
Democratic legislators in the lower house increases the minimum wage by $2.80 in the long term 
(.304/.107). This is a very large effect considering the range of the state minimum wage through 
the whole series is from 0 to $7.63. Put another way, these same results suggest a total increase 
in the minimum wage by 30 cents for an average standard deviation increase in the percent of 
State Minimum Wage t-1 -0.107* (0.014) -0.103* (0.014) -0.104* (0.014) -0.105* (0.013)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.024 (0.207)
Lower House Democrats t-1 0.304* (0.128)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.015 (0.030) -0.014 (0.030) -0.014 (0.030)
Democratic Governor t-1 0.022 (0.021) 0.024 (0.021) 0.026 (0.021)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.041 (0.042)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 0.068* (0.033)
∆ Democratic Legislative Control 0.049 (0.056)
Democratic Legislative Control t-1  0.095* (0.040)
∆ Democratic Government Control 0.039 (0.059)
Democratic Government Control t-1 0.115* (0.044)
∆ PC Income (nominal $1000s) 0.005 (0.022) 0.003 (0.022) 0.0034 (0.022) 0.004 (0.022)
PC Income (nominal 1000s) t-1 0.016* (0.004) 0.015* (0.004) 0.015* (0.004) 0.015* (0.004)
∆ Unemployment 0.031* (0.012) 0.031* (0.012) 0.031* (0.012) 0.032* (0.012)
Unemployment t-1 -0.013 (0.007) -0.014* (0.007) -0.014* (0.007) -0.014* (0.007)
∆ Union 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006)
Union t-1 -0.007 (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005)
∆ Manufacturing 0.057* (0.021) 0.060* (0.021) 0.061* (0.021) 0.061* (0.020)
Manufacturing t-1 0.009 (0.005) 0.010* (0.005) 0.010* (0.005) 0.0010* (0.005)
Constant 0.001 (0.187) 0.129 (0.172) 0.112 (0.172) 0.146 (0.171)
N 1,399 1,399 1,399 1,421
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
States 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prc. Democrat Democratic House Democratic Legis. Democratic Govt.
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 Democratic legislators.  
Because a party’s ability to pass legislation typically depends on whether or not it has 
majority status, I consider an alternative specification in model version 2: a dummy variable for 
whether the Democratic Party controls the lower house (0=else). The results of this specification 
are reported in column 2. When Democrats gain majority status, we expect a total increase in the 
statutory minimum wage by about 66 cents, with the long run multiplier (.068/.103). The effect 
is larger when Democrats gain control both houses of the legislature. In this case – version 3 of 
the model – we expect the statutory minimum wage to increase by about 90 cents, again with the 
long run multiplier (.095/.104). In all three models, the partisanship of the Governor has no 
independent effect.  
The final version of the model – column 4 – includes a variable for overall Democratic 
control of the government, or how many of three elected branches – Governorship, lower house, 
and upper house – are held by the Democratic Party. For each additional branch captured by the 
Democratic Party, we expect a significant increase in the minimum wage. For a full unit increase 
in this variable - from no Democratic control and full Democratic control, we expect an increase 
in the minimum wage by about $1.10 (.115/.105). Although Democratic Governor did not have a 
significant independent effect in the previous models, it seems that this variable may matter here 
in combination with the legislative houses. The magnitude of the relationships between changes 
in the partisanship variables and changes in state minimum wages are compared in Figure 4.3 
below. For continuous variables, the plotted change in the minimum wage relates to a one 
standard deviation shift in the independent variable (sd). Dummy variables correspond to a shift 
from 0 to 1.  
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 Figure 4.3 Magnitudes of Effects of Government Partisanship on State Minimum Wages 
 
Among the control variables, reported at the bottom of Table 4.4, we see that an increase 
in (nominal) per capita income relates to an increase in the minimum wage. This variable is 
intended to capture changes in the cost of living in and between states and the positive result 
makes sense in this context. High income states may adopt higher minimum wages – perhaps 
higher than federal mandates – to account for relatively higher costs of living. Similarly, as 
income increases due to inflation, we expect states to increase the minimum wage rate. My 
results suggest a total increase of about 15 cents for each $1,000 increase in per capita income 
(.016/.107), as calculated from version 1 of the model and including the long run multiplier. The 
percent of manufacturing employment is positively related to the minimum wage as well. There 
is a short-term effect equivalent to a 6 cent increase in the state minimum wage for each 
percentage point increase in manufacturing employment. In three of the four model 
specifications, there is a long-term effect of about 10 cents, again with the long run multiplier 
(.01/.103). Surprisingly, union rates did not have a significant relationship with state minimum 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
Full Democratic Control
Democratic Legislature
Per Capita Income ($1000s) (sd)
Democratic House
Manufacturing Employment (sd)
Percent Dem. (sd)
Change in State Minimum Wage ($)
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 wages in these models. The unemployment rate had a positive short term and negative long term 
effect on the minimum wage. The latter negative relationship makes sense if we consider that 
one argument used against minimum wage laws is that it will increase unemployment. A 
relatively high level of unemployment, then, may make policymakers less likely to adopt or 
increase the minimum wage.  
Results: State Minimum Wages and Inequality  
Overall, as expected, changes in state minimum wages are positively related to increasing 
influence of Democrats in state government. Next, I discuss the results for the relationship 
between state minimum wages and inequality, which are reported in Table 4.5. The relationship 
between shifts in state minimum wages and changes in the top decile’s share, reported in a 
reduced model in column 1 and the expanded model in column 2, is somewhat muddled. There is 
indeed an expected negative, significant long-term coefficient in both cases, such that a $1 
increase in the minimum wage relates to a reduction of the top decile’s share by .26 (-.07/.27, in 
model version 2) or .33 (-.08/.24 in model version 1), including the long run multiplier. 
However, note that there is also a contemporaneous positive relationship between the state 
minimum wage and top decile share in the expanded model (column 2). These opposite findings 
may stem from the limits of explaining top share income inequality with a policy that targets the 
lower end of the distribution. Even with the ratcheting effects of the minimum wage, we would 
expect it to be most relevant in the lower part of the distribution, rather than for top shares. As 
such, the effects of this policy may be better captured by a broader measure of inequality like the 
Gini coefficient, which I will discuss next.  
In columns three and four of Table 4.5, I use changes in the Gini coefficient for the 
dependent variable instead of the top decile’s share. Here, we see only the expected negative, 
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 significant, long-term coefficient. The coefficient indicates that we would expect the Gini to 
decrease by nearly one unit (-.209/.22) on a 100 point scale with an observed range of 40 to 72 
for each one dollar increase in the statutory minimum wage, according to the results of the 
reduced model (column 3), or by about .73 (-.198/.271) in the expanded model with the full set 
of controls (column 4). The magnitudes of these relationships are substantial compared with the 
average annual change (.34) in the Gini.  And in both cases, these full effects are realized 
relatively quickly; the error correction rates of .22 and .27 indicate that about a quarter of the 
effect occurs in the next year and will continue at that rate in subsequent years.43  In sum, both 
the party and inequality hypotheses (H3 and H4) received some support in the minimum wage 
models. Combined with the results for the public employment models, we have support for all 
four hypotheses and my theory that the party composition of state government influences trends 
in state-level inequality through policy changes. 
43 The results for both the reduced and expanded Gini models are the same when using panel corrected standard 
errors, rather than traditional standard errors. However, the relationship between the minimum wage and the top 
decile is no longer significant when using panel corrected standard errors. These alternative results are reported in 
Appendix H. These findings further suggest that while we can be confident that there is a significant (negative) 
relationship between changes in the state minimum wage and inequality in terms of the Gini – which captures 
inequality throughout the income distribution - minimum wages, not surprisingly, are limited in their ability to affect 
top income shares. 
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 Table 4.5 Relationship between State Minimum Wages and Changes in State-Level Inequality, 1976-
2005 
  
Right-to-Work Laws as a Policy Mechanism  
Up to this point, I have treated government partisanship and unions separately. Indeed, 
we saw in Chapter 3 that each of these variables have independent effects on several measures of 
inequality. However, there is also reason to believe that partisanship and union density are 
related. In addition to setting levels and conditions of public employment and legislating 
minimum wages, state governments can also impact unions through legislation. And, like these 
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.240* (0.017) -0.272* (0.017)
Gini t-1 -0.220* (0.017) -0.271* (0.018)
∆  State Minimum Wage 0.147 (0.079) 0.190* (0.077) -0.001 (0.107) 0.0521 (0.104)
State Minimum Wage t-1 -0.082* (0.037) -0.074* (0.037) -0.209* (0.051) -0.198* (0.049)
∆ African-American -2.239* (0.307) -2.031* (0.297) -1.318* (0.417) -1.107* (0.404)
African-American t-1 -0.016 (0.053) -0.116 (0.072) -0.172* (0.070)
∆  Latino -0.340 (0.327) 0.0189 (0.322) -0.417 (0.447) 0.214 (0.436)
Latino t-1 0.168* (0.022) 0.170* (0.021) 0.096* (0.028) 0.095* (0.027)
∆ Over Age 65 1.242* (0.270) 1.011* (0.268) 1.490* (0.371) 1.252* (0.362)
Over Age 65 t-1 0.397* (0.043) 0.282* (0.048) 0.399* (0.060) 0.229* (0.064)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) 0.480* (0.042) 0.345* (0.046) 0.124* (0.057) -0.131* (0.061)
Per Capita Income ($1000s)  t-1 0.121* (0.021) 0.102* (0.022) 0.121* (0.025) 0.061* (0.028)
∆ College Grads 0.007 (0.020) 0.002 (0.020) 0.156* (0.027) 0.152* (0.027)
College Grads t-1 0.064* (0.017) 0.0401* (0.018) 0.084* (0.025) 0.0637* (0.024)
∆ Manufacturing 0.0504 (0.059) 0.188* (0.079)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.048* (0.015) -0.094* (0.020)
∆ Finance -0.876* (0.178) -0.963* (0.243)
∆ Dividends Income ($1000s) 0.744* (0.125) 1.246* (0.169)
Dividends Income ($1000s) t-1 0.249* (0.058) 0.439* (0.080)
Constant -0.908 (0.582) 2.006* (0.819) 3.549* (0.855) 10.31* (1.382)
N 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
R-squared 0.24 0.28 0.14 0.21
States 50 50 50 50
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Decile Top Decile Gini Gini
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 other policies, we expect government partisanship to play a role in state union laws.  
To a certain degree, we expect a reciprocal relationship between the partisanship of 
government and union strength in states. That is, because unions are a part of the Democratic 
Party’s coalition (Levi 2003), we might expect stronger unions to produce more Democratic state 
government. At the same time, Democrats are more supportive of collective bargaining rights, so 
Democratic state governments will likely make policy decisions which contribute to stronger 
unions (and Republican governments will hinder them). This latter relationship is my interest 
here. Although there is clear empirical evidence that unions contribute to lower inequality in the 
states (and at other levels too), we have not yet incorporated the effect of state partisanship and 
policies on union strength, despite convincing national-level arguments that declining unions are 
a product of policy decisions or policy erosion (e.g. Hacker and Pierson 2010; Levy and Temin 
2007). Putting these components together, we can set up a state-level scenario in which 1. 
Democratic governments pass legislation which contributes to stronger unions, or Republican 
governments pass legislation which weakens unions; and 2. Subsequent changes in union 
strength impact changes in state inequality.  In other words, like public employment and 
minimum wage laws above, union policies function as a mechanism between the parties in 
government and inequality in the states.  
State right-to-work laws provide a good illustration of this union law mechanism. Right-
to-work laws originate with the Taft-Hartley Act (1947), which was passed by a Republican-
controlled Congress and amended the 1935 National Labor-Management Relations Act. Among 
other provisions, Taft-Hartley made “closed shops” – where hiring is restricted to union 
members and maintaining union membership is compulsory for employees – illegal. Following 
its passage, many states adopted right-to-work laws, which give employees in unionized 
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 businesses the ability to opt out of union membership and dues. In states without such laws, 
“union shops” – which require union membership for employment but where union membership 
is not required for initial hiring decisions - are permitted (Jacobs and Dixon 2006). Opponents of 
right-to-work laws argue that by allowing workers to opt out, they create free riders who benefit 
from union bargaining – unions are required to bargain and process grievances for all workers 
covered by a contract, not just union members (Jacobs and Dixon 2006) - without contributing 
dues. This weakens unions because they continue to provide services with fewer resources. 
Right-to-work supporters argue that such laws protect workers from forced union membership 
and make the state more attractive to businesses.  Overall, right-to-work laws are categorized as 
weakening labor and benefiting management (Jacobs and Dixon 2006).  
Table 4.6 shows the relationship between right-to-work laws and union rates. The states 
are ordered by their 1970-2005 changes in union rates, with the greatest decrease at the top. 
States with right-to-work laws cluster at the top of the table; they experienced greatest decreases 
in union rates between 1970 and 2005. By contrast, the top 17 states in terms of union 
membership, at the bottom of Table 4.6, do not have such laws. Although the entries merely 
capture overall relationship, these patterns are consistent with the argument that state policies 
affect union strength.   
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 Table 4.6 Relationship between Union Rates and Right-to-Work Legislation 
 
 
2005 
Union 
Rate 
1970-2005 
Change 
Right-to-work law  
(as of 2005) 
Utah 4.9 -82.2 Yes 
Idaho 5.4 -77.4 Yes 
Tennessee 5.4 -77.3 Yes 
South Carolina 2.3 -74.7 Yes 
Virginia 4.9 -70.7 Yes 
Arkansas 4.8 -69.4 Yes 
Indiana 12.5 -68.7 Yes 
Oklahoma 5.4 -67.9 Yes 
North Carolina 3 -65.9 Yes 
Montana 11 -65.2 
 South Dakota 6 -64.3 Yes 
Louisiana 6.5 -63.7 Yes 
Arizona 6.1 -63.5 Yes 
Georgia 5.1 -62.8 Yes 
North Dakota 7.5 -62.7 Yes 
Kansas 7.1 -62.4 Yes 
Pennsylvania 13.9 -61.6 
 Kentucky 9.8 -61.4 
 Florida 5.4 -61.2 Yes 
Texas 5.4 -60.9 Yes 
Nebraska 8.4 -60.6 Yes 
West Virginia 14.4 -58.7 
 Oregon 14.7 -57.9 
 Nevada 13.9 -57.9 Yes 
Colorado 8.3 -57.4 
 Wyoming 8.1 -57.1 Yes 
Ohio 16 -57.0 
 Delaware 11.9 -56.6 
 Alabama 10.2 -55.3 Yes 
Iowa 11.6 -55.2 Yes 
Missouri 11.5 -54.9 
 Washington 19.3 -52.6 
 Mississippi 7.2 -52.0 Yes 
Michigan 20.6 -50.6 
 New Hampshire 10.4 -50.2 
 Wisconsin 16.2 -49.5 
 Minnesota 15.8 -49.4 
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 Illinois 16.9 -49.1 
 Maryland 13.4 -46.8 
 California 16.7 -45.2 
 Massachusetts 13.9 -44.0 
 Maine 11.9 -43.6 
 New Jersey 20.5 -42.7 
 New Mexico 8.2 -42.7 
 Connecticut 16 -38.0 
 Rhode Island 16 -32.8 
 Vermont 11 -31.3 
 Alaska 22.9 -31.0 
 New York 26.2 -20.4 
 Hawaii 25.9 0.8   
Sources: Department of Labor 2008; Hirsch, Macpherson, and 
Vroman 2001 
 
If we take another step back, we can see how partisanship plays a role in the adoption of 
these policies. Many Southern states passed right-to-work laws immediately after Taft-Hartley in 
the 1940s and 1950s (NCSL 2013a), but there are more recent adoptions too, including Idaho 
(1985), Oklahoma (2001), Indiana (2012), Michigan (2012), which brought the total number of 
right-to-work states to 24. The debate over right-to-work legislation in Idaho in the mid-1980s 
divided along partisan lines, with support from Republicans and opposition from Democrats 
(Fick 1986). The law was eventually passed by the Republican legislature over Democratic 
Governor John Evans’ veto (Fick 1986). Indiana’s Employees Right to Work Act (IN H1001), 
enacted in February 2012, was introduced by a Republican representative, passed by Republican 
majority state Senate and House, and signed by Republican Governor Mitch Daniels (NCSL 
2013b). Michigan’s law (Senate bill 0116) to establish right-to-work zones passed in December 
2012 under Republican control of the state House, Senate, and Governorship and with strong 
opposition from Democrats and labor, especially the United Auto Workers. Similarly, the highly 
visible battle over collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin the previous year was fiercely 
128 
 
 partisan. In New Hampshire, the Republican legislature passed right-to-work legislation in 2012, 
but it was vetoed by Democratic Governor John Lynch. Overall, not only are unions influenced 
by state policies, but there is evidence that the adoption of these policies is influenced by state 
government party composition.  
The relationship between unions, partisanship, and inequality is certainly multi-faceted. 
Along with wage bargaining, unions play an important political role by influencing social and 
economic policies which reduce inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010), and they may do this 
partly by helping to elect Democrats to state offices. However, unions are also influenced by 
government partisanship through legislative actions. When Republicans had control of state 
government in the examples above, they passed legislation that weakened unions.  Instances such 
as these, while mainly illustrative, are consistent with the idea that party composition drives 
inequality, with union laws serving as one mechanism.  
Conclusion  
Inequality in the states is partly driven by economic forces and national policy decisions 
beyond state control and partly a function of who resides in the state; but controlling for these 
factors, state government and policies also matter. After establishing a connection between 
government partisanship and inequality in Chapter 3, I further scrutinized this relationship by 
examining state policy mechanisms in this chapter. My theory of state inequality hinged on 
economic policy differences between the parties. The findings in this chapter show that public 
sector employment and state minimum wages are two such policies that are significantly 
impacted by partisanship and which, in turn, have significant effects on market inequality. In 
both cases, an increase in Democratic control – through the percent of Democratic legislators in 
the house, overall control of the lower house, overall control of the legislature (both houses), and 
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 the number of chambers held (of lower house, upper house, and governorship) – significantly 
related to increases in the percent of public sector employment and the statutory minimum wage 
in the states. Increases in public sector employment and increases in the minimum wage each 
significantly relate to decreases in market inequality in several of the model specifications.  
Overall, these findings further support the theory that the partisan make-up of state government 
is consequential for state-level inequality. They illustrate that the different market policies 
pursued by the two parties are one major avenue for this effect.  
It is important to note that this is not meant to be a comprehensive list of state-level 
inequality policies. While these policies are two of the most direct ways state governments 
impact incomes, there are many more to investigate. I explored one such additional area at the 
end of this chapter: state policies that restrict unions. Government can also influence incomes 
through workforce investment, like job training programs. For instance, under the Workforce 
Investment Act (1998), states are provided with funds for training and employment programs for 
adults, dislocated workers, and youth. WIA programs include both short-term employment 
services and longer-term job training. Programs for longer-term job training in particular are an 
example of the market-conditioning role of government, with the goal being to “improve 
earnings potential and employability of workers” (California Senate Office of Research 2011, 3). 
States and localities have some discretion over where their funds are directed, and there is reason 
to believe that their choices vary.  One study of California’s use of WIA funds found that most 
were being used on short-term employment services, rather than longer-term training to help 
workers upgrade and gain skill sets; however this varied considerably between localities 
(California Senate Office of Research 2011).  There are documented differences in approaches to 
workforce development across states as well (Barnow and King 2005).  
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 Along with investigating more specific job training policies, future work might also 
consider other sub-national wage-setting policies, namely living wage laws. Beginning in the 
mid-1990s, many localities, mainly metropolitan areas, set living wages, “which require 
businesses that benefit from government contracts or other forms of public financial assistance to 
pay wages well above the federal minimum wage” (Holzer 2008). Currently about 120 
municipalities have living wage ordinances (Chapman and Thomson 2006). In 2007, Maryland 
became the first state to set a statewide living wage (Greenhouse 2007) (Baltimore was the first 
major city to do so in 1994.) The Maryland Living Wage applies to certain employers with 
contracts with state governments (and some subcontractors) and, as of 2011, was set at $12.49 
per hour, or $9.39 per hour, depending on the jurisdiction (Maryland Dept. of Labor). Consistent 
with our partisan expectations, the bill was sponsored by a Democrat in Maryland’s House of 
Delegates, Del. Herman L. Taylor, Jr. and signed by Democratic Governor O’Malley. A previous 
version of the bill was vetoed by Republican Governor Ehrlich in 2004.  While the primary aim 
of living wage laws may be to reduce poverty, this policy is also a good example of the market 
conditioning tools that states can use to affect the distribution of incomes. By raising the wage 
floor, living wages, like minimum wages, should reduce income differences, even if modestly.  
The policies explored in this chapter are also not intended to replace the effect of party 
composition. Along with the many other policies that are bundled into party platforms, the 
effects of partisanship may extend beyond policy variables. For instance, Volscho and Kelly 
(2012) suggest that, at the national-level, administrators appointed by Democrats “may more 
stringently enforce labor laws such as the minimum wage, union election rules, overtime pay, 
and other forms of labor-related compensation” (682). The relationship between partisan 
composition of government and the income distribution may partly operate through 
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 administrative channels at the state level too. Partisanship in government matters because it 
captures a set of policies and actions which reflect distinct economic approaches. That public 
employment and the minimum wage operate as policy mechanisms is an important finding in the 
study of state-level inequality, but we can continue to unpack this relationship.    
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 CHAPTER 5  
STATE REDISTRIBUTION RECONSIDERED:  PUBLIC WELFARE SPENDING AND 
POST-REDISTRIBUTION INEQUALITY 
 
In Chapter 4, I showed that the parties in government affect market income inequality 
through labor market policies, including public sector employment, minimum wage laws, and 
right-to-work policies. Public employment has been described as “hidden” or “disguised” 
redistribution by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000) because it provides an obscured way for 
government to direct income, compared with more explicit tax-transfer techniques. Kelly (2009) 
categorizes the minimum wage and other alternatives to redistribution as “market conditioning 
policies.”  Whatever the name, the implication is that state governments affect the market 
distribution of income before making any adjustments with taxation or transfers. That is, the 
effects of these policy actions, even if funded with tax dollars like in the case of public 
employment, are visible in pre-tax and transfer incomes.  
 Of course, state governments also make adjustments after the fact by providing social 
transfers to supplement incomes and collecting and refunding taxes. Indeed, these explicit 
redistributive efforts are likely what come to mind when we think of how government affects 
income inequality. We expect that, once taxes and transfers are taken into account, income 
inequality will be lower where policies are more generous. However, some previous empirical 
evidence suggests that these policies actually play a limited role in the states. In particular, 
Barrilleux and Davis (2003) found that a whole list of state social transfers did not effectively 
reduce income inequality in the states for the years 1978-1990. In fact, in some cases, more 
generous policies were related to higher inequality.  
These findings relate to broader arguments about the limits of state redistribution.  Some 
argue that when states have welfare policy discretion, their policies will reflect a “race to the 
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 bottom” (see Bailey and Rom 2004; Brueckner 2000; Gais and Weaver 2002; Peterson and Rom 
1989). In this scenario, rather than meet the needs of citizens, states compete to make social 
assistance increasingly less generous to avoid attracting needy populations from other states, or 
becoming a “welfare magnet.”  Mobility across state lines makes reducing income differences 
through progressive taxation difficult as well. State governments may find it difficult to raise 
taxes on high earners for fear that doing so will lead residents or businesses (and their tax 
revenues) to leave the state (Peterson 1995). And state taxation was made even more difficult by 
“tax revolt” institutions in some states; including tax and expenditure limitations and 
supermajority requirements for tax increases (Archibald and Feldman 2006). Indeed, while the 
federal tax system is progressive, most state tax systems are regressive (Davis et al 2009). These 
difficulties with state-level tax and transfer redistribution lead Kelly and Witko (2012) to suggest 
that, “If redistribution were the only mechanism available to influence distributional outcomes, 
then the states would likely play a minor role in shaping income inequality” (415).  
 This may be true. Again, in the past several chapters, I have emphasized and found 
evidence that state governments and policies affect market or pre-redistribution income 
inequality. These findings align with and offer support for previous arguments that the U.S. 
national and state governments impact inequality in many ways besides explicit redistribution 
(Hacker and Peirson 2010; Kelly 2009; Kelly and Witko 2012; Langer 2001). But although the 
challenges of redistribution at the state level are real, we should not rule out this path for state 
governments to influence the income distribution. After all, even Peterson (1995) noted that, at 
least compared with local governments, states have some capacity for redistribution because it is 
more costly to move across state lines than between localities to avoid higher taxes (4). 
Similarly, there is empirical evidence that state redistributive policies do not simply reflect a 
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 “race to the bottom” in which states increasingly cut benefits (Berry, Fording, and Hanson 2003; 
Freeman and Rogers 2007; Gais and Weaver 2002; Soss et al 2001). Rather, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, such policy choices tend to reflect state political, economic, and demographic 
characteristics, including one factor fundamental to this project: government partisanship. With 
this in mind, I devote this chapter to examining the connection between one type of 
redistribution, public welfare spending, and post-redistribution inequality in the states. I focus on 
social welfare because it is comparable to Barrilleux and Davis’s (2003) previous state-level 
work and leave the complexities of redistribution through taxes for future research.  
Theory: Adding the State Redistributive Mechanism  
 State redistributive policies fit into the same theoretical framework developed in Chapter 
2 and tested in Chapters 3 and 4. While the primary concern and contribution of this project is 
the relationship I established between government partisanship and market inequality, this does 
not preclude the investigation of another possible avenue by which state governments could 
affect inequality: through redistribution. The first path, between government partisanship and 
market outcomes, is depicted with the top bold arrow in Figure 5.1, a version of which appeared 
in Chapter 2.  The second path, the redistributive mechanism, is shown with the bottom bold 
arrow in Figure 5.1. In this case, partisanship influences post-redistribution inequality through 
redistributive policies. Note that there is some ambiguity about whether the direction of the 
relationship between redistributive policies and post-tax and transfer inequality is positive or 
negative, denoted by the plus and minus signs in the figure below. While we would expect more 
generous redistributive policies to reduce post-tax and transfer inequality, some previous tests 
found an unexpected positive relationship. By examining state redistribution in this way, we may 
discover another way that partisanship matters for inequality, or rule one out. And, while doing 
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 so, this chapter also provides updated analyses of the relationships between government 
partisanship, welfare spending, and inequality in the states. 
Figure 5.1 Factors that Influence Inequality: Market Conditioning and Redistributive Paths 
 
 
There are clear theoretical reasons to think that, like the labor market policies in Chapter 
4, state welfare policies may be a “mechanism” between government partisanship and inequality. 
In the first place, the overall partisan model employed in this project includes distinct party 
positions on economic redistribution. Redistribution is of course included in the Democratic 
Party’s economic approach, while such policies conflict with the Republican Party’s economic 
conservatism.  In line with these theoretical expectations, previous studies find that welfare 
policies tend to be more generous under Democrats.  In his 1984 article, Dye reported that per 
capita welfare spending increased under Democratic control of the governorship and one or both 
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 houses of the state legislature. Plotnick and Winters (1990) find some evidence that Democratic 
control of state lower houses predicts a higher cash “welfare package” that includes the 
maximum AFDC benefit for a family of four, related food stamp benefits, and the average value 
of Medicaid services for 1968-1977. Brown (1995) shows that party control influences state 
AFDC spending between 1976 and 1988. More recent consideration of state policy choices after 
welfare reform found that democratic legislatures made more generous TANF policy choices, in 
terms of eligibility and flexibility on work requirements (Fellowes and Rowe 2004).  
Some of these earlier findings came with qualifications or limits. Party and welfare 
spending were connected in 20 of 50 states in Dye’s (1984) study, and Brown (1995) found that 
partisanship had a larger effect in certain types of states, those where party cleavages were most 
similar to class-based New Deal divisions. Also note, however, that these studies only reach into 
the mid- to late-1980s, with the exception of Fellowes and Rowe’s (2004) TANF study. Since 
states have gained even more welfare policy control since then, it is more likely we will observe 
significant effects of partisanship on welfare spending if we extend the time period of interest. I 
expect that government partisanship will be a significant predictor of redistribution, with 
increasing Democratic control leading to more generous welfare policies.   
Of course, like in Chapter 4, the connection between partisanship and policy is just the 
first step. Next we need to consider the relationship between policy – in this case, welfare 
policies – and inequality. As discussed above, this connection is somewhat tenuous, and the 
related literature finds mixed results. Freund and Morris’s (2005) study of state lotteries – which 
they describe as a regressive tax, redistributing income upward - found that these policies related 
to significant increases in state inequality between 1976 and 1995. But, again, studies of social 
welfare policies in particular, do not find these policies significantly decrease state inequality 
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 (Barrilleux and Davis 2003). It is worth nothing that Barrilleux and Davis’s study, while 
completed in 2003, uses data only through 1990. I expect that when we consider an extended 
time period, as well as a broader measure of welfare policy described below, our theoretical 
expectations about redistribution and inequality will be met. That is, increases in state welfare 
spending will reduce post-redistribution inequality in the states. 
Redistribution Data and Models 
To study the role state welfare policies in state inequality trends, we need an appropriate, 
over time measure. I use state public welfare expenditures, which are available from the Census 
Survey of State and Local Finances from 1977 to the present. This measure includes 
AFDC/TANF payments to individuals, state supplements to SSI, state-specific cash assistance 
programs (e.g. general assistance, home relief, emergency relief), and medical assistance 
payments to vendors (associated with Medicaid and SCHIP). I adjust the welfare spending 
variable to account for different levels of need in the population (Clayton and Pontusson 1998). 
Total expenditures, in real 2005 dollars, are divided by the number of people below the poverty 
line (Gais and Dadayan 2008).44 Average public welfare spending per poor person (2005 dollars) 
during the 1977-2005 period ranges from $196 in Arkansas to $1722 in Hawaii, with a mean of 
$810 across states. The average change in this variable is -$18.  
While these state welfare data include several different programs and do not capture 
specific policy or program characteristics or rules, the welfare spending variable gives us a good 
sense of overall welfare expenditures in the state and is consistent with similar literature 
(Kenworthy and McCall 2005). Moreover, because welfare reform in 1996 replaced Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
44 Historical poverty data are available from the Census based on the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and 
Economic Supplements.  
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 (TANF), it would be difficult to measure specific policy characteristics over the entire time 
period in which I am interested. In addition, the relatively broad nature of this measure may be 
especially advantageous in relation to inequality. State public welfare expenditures include 
programs that reach a wide range of individuals, including, but not limited to, AFDC/TANF 
recipients. For instance, state spending for programs like Medicaid and SCHIP, which benefit 
individuals with low incomes who are not technically poor, are also included (Gais and Dadayan 
2008). The greater reach of state public welfare expenditures compared with narrower measures 
like TANF benefit levels means there is greater potential to affect the concentration of income.  
An additional advantage of these data is that they include programs that are wholly funded and 
operated by state governments, unlike federal administrative data for specific programs (Gais 
and Dadayan 2008). This allows us to better investigate the relationship between state 
characteristics and policy outcomes under control of the states.  
To estimate the effect of government partisanship on welfare spending, I use several of 
the same partisanship variables as in Chapters 3 and 4 (Klarner 2013), including a dummy for 
whether the Governor is a Democrat and several specifications to capture partisanship of the 
legislature: the proportion of Democratic legislators in the lower house; a dummy variable for 
whether the house is controlled by Democrats (1=yes); and a variable for Democratic control of 
both chambers. This latter variable is an additive scale where 1 = Democratic control of both 
chambers, 0 = Republican control of both chambers, .5 = Democrats control one chamber, 
Republicans the other, .25 = Republican control of one chamber, split control of the other, .75 = 
Democratic control of one chamber, split control of the other.  Then, I look at the Governor and 
legislature together. This government control variable captures how many of the three chambers 
– Governor, upper house, and lower house – are controlled by the Democratic Party.  (1 = 
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 Democratic control of all three institutions, 0 = Republican control of all three institutions, .33 = 
Democratic control of one institution, Republican control of the other two).  
I expect other variables to affect welfare spending too and include control variables based 
on previous state policy literature. This literature indicates that economic and demographic 
variables can also shape policy choices (Grey 1996). For the effects of the economy and state 
wealth, I include real economic growth (change in real per capita Gross State Product) and real 
per capita personal income. I include state debt as a percent of state GSP to account for limits on 
state resources. I control for the percentages of African-Americans, Latinos, and elderly (percent 
over age 65) in the state. Previous studies of welfare policies found a relationship between the 
size of the African-American (Soss et al 2001; Johnson 2003) and Latino (Fellowes and Rowe 
2004) state populations and less generous welfare policies. The percent of elderly in a state 
indicates greater need for social assistance, so we would expect these states to spend relatively 
more.  
I model over time changes in state welfare spending with an error correction model. This 
is consistent with the market policy models in Chapter 4 and my interest in over time 
relationships throughout this project. It is also appropriate because the welfare expenditure 
variable is non-stationary.45 As in Chapters 3 and 4, I also include fixed effects to account for 
unobserved state differences. The models begin in 1977 because that is the earliest year for the 
welfare spending data. I end the analyses in 2005 to be consistent with models in the previous 
chapters. I also base this time period on the availability of the inequality data employed in the 
second analysis (1976-2006).  Although this means I cover fewer years than in Chapter 3, it is 
the same time period as for the market policy models in Chapter 4, and still leaves us with about 
45 The combined results of the Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) (p-value=.0003) and Hadri (2000) (p-value=.000) tests 
indicate that at least some of the panels are non-stationary.  
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 30 years of data for the time period in which income inequality has increased most substantially.  
 For my second analysis, state public welfare expenditures per person below the poverty 
line switches from the dependent to the independent variable. To see how welfare spending 
affects the income distribution, we of course also need a measure of state inequality. Studying 
the role of welfare spending raises the questions about the appropriate measure of state 
inequality.  Because my focus in previous chapters has been on market policies, I used market 
inequality as the dependent variable. However, now that I have turned my attention to welfare 
expenditures, a measure of state redistributive policy, post-redistribution inequality is the 
preferable measure. Such a measure is recently available from Kelly and Witko (2012), who used 
the Census Annual Social and Economic Supplement to create the post-redistribution Gini 
coefficient for household income for the states from 1976-2006. The measure includes earnings, 
private retirement income, private pensions, interest, dividends, rents, royalties, estates, trusts, 
alimony, child support, outside assistance, Social Security, welfare, education support, 
unemployment, worker’s compensation, veteran’s benefits, survivor benefits, disability, and SSI  
(Kelly and Witko 2012, 420). For easier interpretation, I multiply this measure by 100 so that it 
has a possible range of 0 to 100. The observed range of this Gini is 34 to 51 with a mean of about 
41. Higher values indicate more income inequality. While I previously focused on top income 
shares because of the available data and the top-driven nature of U.S. inequality, this Gini 
measure is the best available option for post-redistribution inequality over a significant period of 
time in the states. However, it does mean we should exercise some caution in comparing these 
results to those in previous chapters, as the measures are built from different income data 
sources.46  
46 In Chapters 3 and 4, market inequality is measured with top shares and the Gini coefficients of pre-tax pre-transfer 
income. These measures were constructed by Frank (2008) with IRS Statistics of Income tax data. The post-
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 To be consistent with my previous analyses, as well as Kelly and Witko’s models with 
this Gini measure, I continue to use an error correction model.47 Once again, I include the same 
economic and demographic controls utilized in Chapters 3 and 4. Demographic controls include 
the percent of African-Americans, percent of Latinos, percent of elderly (over 65), percent with 
college degree, and union membership (percent). Economic controls include the percentages of 
manufacturing and finance jobs in the state, per capita dividends income (thousands of 2005 
dollars), and per capita personal income (thousands of 2005 dollars). Each independent variable 
in an error correction model has two coefficients, the short term and the long term effect. In the 
final models included here, I drop the long term versions of the variables if their coefficients 
were not significant in full models (de Boef and Keele 2008).   
Results: Party and the Determinants of State Welfare Spending  
My first task is to investigate the determinants of changes in state welfare spending to see 
whether party control has a significant relationship with this policy change, as it did for the 
market policies in Chapter 4, and as the above theory predicts. These results are reported in 
Table 5.1. As in Chapter 3 and 4, I begin by testing the effects for Governors and state 
legislatures separately (versions 1 – 3) and then examine overall government control (version 4). 
In the first three columns, notice that none of the variables for legislative partisanship have a 
significant relationship with welfare spending. This clearly contrasts with results in the previous 
chapters, which showed that the power of Democrats in the legislature significantly related to 
redistribution measure of inequality used in this chapter (Kelly and Witko 2012) is constructed from Census data, 
which means it may underestimate income inequality at the top of the distribution due to top-coding (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). Another difference is that it measures family income versus the income of tax units, which was used 
for the market inequality measures. Tax units are individuals or married couples who file a joint tax return, plus all 
dependents. This may or may not be the same as a “family.” The correlations between the post-redistribution Gini 
and the market inequality measures range from r=.55 to r=.63, so the measures are similar, but not identical.  
47 As Kelly and Witko (2012) note in their analysis, there is evidence that the Gini measure is non-stationary. My 
own diagnostics of this variable also indicate this. The results of the Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003) and Hadri (2000) tests 
suggest that at least some of the panels are non-stationary, or have unit roots. 
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 changes in market inequality and market policies (public employment and minimum wage). 
However, shifts to a Democratic Governor do have a positive, significant relationship with 
changes in state welfare spending across the first three models. The magnitude of the relationship 
is similar across these three columns; a shift to a Democratic Governor relates to an increase in 
welfare spending per poor person of about $107. This full effect includes the long run multiplier 
and is given by the long-term coefficient (about 30 in model versions 1 through 3) divided by the 
error correction rate of .28. The error correction rate also tells us how quickly this effect will 
occur over time. The error correction rate of .28 indicates that, while this effect occurs over 
several years, we can expect to see it fully realized relatively quickly. Following a shift to a 
Democratic Governor, 28% of the effect will be realized in the next year. In each subsequent 
year, 28% of the remaining effect will be realized.  
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 Table 5.1 Relationship between Government Partisanship and Changes in State Welfare Spending, 
1977-2005 
 
The final specification for this model, reported in column 4, looks at Governors and 
legislatures together, or the overall partisan control of government. Here, I find that the number 
of Democratically-controlled branches significantly relates to changes in welfare spending. A 
one unit increase in Democratic control relates to an increase in welfare spending (per poor 
person) by about $240. This full effect is given by the long-term coefficient divided by the error 
correction rate (67.44/.28). In this case, a one unit increase consists of Democrats gaining control 
Welfare Spending t-1 -0.28* (0.02) -0.28* (0.02) -0.28* (0.02) -0.28* (0.02)
∆ Lower House Democrats -166.30 (149.30)
Lower House Democrats t-1 14.11 (98.63)
∆ Democratic Governor 26.32 (22.55) 23.68 (22.37) 23.28 (22.38)
Democratic Governor t-1 29.90* (15.59) 29.98* (15.49) 30.36* (15.48)
∆ Democratic House Control -29.97 (30.16)
Democratic House Control t-1 15.74 (24.44)
∆ Democratic Legislative Control -18.25 (40.12)
Democratic Legislative Control t-1 27.98 (31.12)
∆ Democratic Government Control 13.32 (43.40)
Democratic Government Control t-1 67.44* (32.94)
∆  Latino 201.60* (85.61) 200.00* (85.46) 204.90* (85.46) 208.50* (85.26)
Latino t-1 -10.97 (6.00) -10.97 (6.00) -10.35 (6.08) -10.52 (6.04)
∆ Govt. Debt/GSP (x1000) -12.30 (7.68) -12.60 (7.69) -12.6 (7.69) -13.10 (7.63)
Govt. Debt/GSP (x1000) t-1 -4.74 (3.73) -5.05 (3.73) -5.04 (3.72) -5.79 (3.67)
∆ Real GSP Growth 2.66 (2.29) 2.64 (2.29) 2.52 (2.29) 2.37 (2.27)
Real GSP Growth t-1 3.29 (2.72) 3.32 (2.70) 3.23 (2.71) 3.06 (2.69)
∆ PC Income ($1000s) 15.98 (13.09) 15.82 (13.02) 15.97 (13.03) 17.44 (12.87)
PC Income ($1000s) t-1 -2.30 (3.90) -2.22 (3.839) -2.46 (3.83) -2.05 (3.78)
∆ African-American 53.16 (152.40) 39.71 (150.00) 40.07 (149.90) 58.57 (149.60)
African-American t-1 -30.08 (15.66) -30.56 (15.67) -29.72 (15.67) -27.70 (15.60)
∆ Over Age 65 129.80 (66.42) 125.60 (66.33) 123.10 (66.44) 119.60 (65.89)
Over Age 65 t-1 10.73 (10.44) 10.68 (10.33) 10.87 (10.33) 9.83 (10.27)
Constant 458.70* (185.80) 462.80* (161.20) 448.40* (162.40) 432.00* (159.70)
N 1,161 1,161 1,161 1,176
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
States 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prc. Democrat Democratic House Democratic Legis. Democratic Govt. 
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 of all three chambers (Governor, lower house, and upper house), or a switch from a unified 
Republican Government (“0”) to a unified Democratic one (“1”).48 While the legislature did not 
have an independent effect, it does seem to matter in combination with a Democratic Governor.  
Along with the effects of government partisanship, in the lower half of Table 5.1, we see 
that increases in the percentage of Latino state residents are associated with decreases in welfare 
spending. Surprisingly, the percent of the population that is African-American is not significant 
at conventional levels. Several previous studies find that states with larger African-American 
populations adopt less generous welfare benefits (Howard 1999) or stricter welfare policies (Soss 
et al 2001, Fellowes and Rowe 2004). However, this relationship does not hold for examining the 
effect of changes in the size of the African-American population, controlling with state fixed 
effects. It is likely that this variable explains cross-sectional state policy differences more than 
the policy shifts within states that are modeled here. The positive relationship between the 
percent of elderly residents and changes in welfare spending is what we would expect based on 
higher levels of social assistance usage for that population.  Economic variables like income, 
debt, or economic growth do not have short or long term effects. 
Overall, as for public employment and minimum wages in Chapter 4, we have some 
evidence that government partisanship significantly relates to policy changes. The results for the 
specific party variables, however, indicate that there are some differences in the political actors 
involved. Here, the party of the Governor clearly has an independent, significant effect on 
welfare spending, while there are no independent effects from the legislature. By contrast, in my 
48 The results for model version 4, examining the relationship between Democratic control of government and 
changes in welfare spending, are the same with traditional and panel corrected standard errors. However, the results 
for model versions 1 through 3 change when using panel corrected standard errors, rather than the traditional 
standard errors reported in Table 5.1 and discussed above. These results are included in Appendix H. With panel 
corrected standard errors, a switch to a Democratic Governor is no longer significantly related to changes in welfare 
spending. We still have some evidence that party control matters, but primarily in terms of overall Democratic 
control of state governments.  
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 analyses of market inequality and market policies, legislative effects dominated. This difference 
may be a function of different legislative priorities of Governors and legislatures, even of the 
same party. Still, Governors and legislatures matter together for welfare spending to the extent 
that a Democratically-controlled government significantly relates to an increase in welfare 
spending. The nature of this relationship deserves future consideration. For now, we have 
evidence that Democratic partisanship increases welfare spending and can move forward to 
investigate the implications for inequality.  
Results: Welfare Spending and Post-Redistribution Inequality  
 The findings from my second analysis, reported in Table 5.2, show that changes in state 
welfare expenditures do significantly relate to changes in state-level post-tax and transfer 
inequality. A one dollar increase in welfare expenditures per poor person coincides with a 
decrease in the Gini coefficient of -.001. The total effect for this variable is calculated by 
dividing the long term coefficient (.0002) by the error correction rate given by the lagged 
dependent variable coefficient (.551). Accordingly, we expect a one dollar increase in welfare 
expenditures to relate to a decrease in the Gini of .0004. The relatively large error correction rate 
of -.551 indicates that this effect will occur relatively quickly, with more than 50% of decline in 
the Gini occurring the first year following an increase in welfare spending. The observed range 
for the Gini measure used in this chapter is from 34 to 51 and the average annual change is .2, so 
the magnitude of the relationship between welfare spending and inequality found here is quite 
small. If we consider that a shift to Democratic government control related to a $240 increase in 
welfare expenditures per poor person in the partisan model above (Table 5.1, version 4), and 
therefore multiply the estimated effect by 240, the estimated decrease in the Gini would still be 
less than .10. Even with this adjustment, the effect of welfare spending on the post-redistribution 
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 Gini is modest.49   
Table 5.2 Relationship between Welfare Spending and Changes in State Post-Redistribution Gini 
Coefficients, 1977-2005 
 
 
 Among the control variables in Table 5.2, we observe some significant relationships with 
changes in state post-tax and transfer Ginis. Like the models of market inequality in Chapters 3 
and 4, changes in the percent of Latino residents are positively and significantly related to 
49 See Appendix H for results with panel corrected standard errors.  With panel corrected standard errors, the long-
term relationship between welfare spending and inequality is no longer significant, but the contemporaneous 
relationship remains significant, such that increases in spending correspond with decreases in the Gini.  
Post-redistribution gini t-1 -0.551* (0.027)
∆  Welfare Spending ($ per poor person) -0.001* (0.0002)
Welfare Spending ($ per poor person) t-1 -0.0002* (0.0001)
∆ African-American -0.714 (0.941)
African-American t-1 0.185 (0.010)
∆  Latino 0.459 (0.538)
Latino t-1 0.184* (0.038)
∆ Over Age 65 0.015 (0.385)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) -0.068 (0.071)
∆ College Grads 0.0002 (0.064)
College Grads t-1 0.113* (0.026)
∆ Union -0.054* (0.027)
Union t-1 -0.015 (0.020)
∆ Manufacturing 0.089 (0.115)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.129* (0.026)
∆ Finance -0.029 (0.305)
Finance t-1 -0.337* (0.090)
∆ Dividends Income (per capita $1000s) 1.162* (0.202)
Constant 22.12*** (1.763)
N 1,200
R-squared 0.308
States 50
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05, two-
tailed. 
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 inequality, as are changes in the percent of college degree holders and per capita dividends 
income. The latter two results point to a pulling away at the top of the income distribution, while 
the first result is consistent with the theory that lower incomes among minority residents can 
increase inequality from the bottom.  For each percentage point increase in Latino residents, we 
expect the Gini to increase by .18 in the next year and have a full effect of .33 (.18/error 
correction rate of .55). The percent of college graduates also has a significant relationship with 
shifts in the post-redistribution Gini, specifically a full increase of .21 (.113/.55) for each one 
percentage point increase in college graduates. For each $1000 increase in per capita dividends 
income, my results suggest an increase in the Gini by more than one point (1.16).  
The effects of union membership are somewhat weaker in this model than on market 
inequality, suggesting that this variable is more relevant for affecting income levels in the first 
place, such as through wage bargaining, rather than for redistributive policy. Notice in Table 5.2 
that an increase percent of union members significantly relates to a .05 decrease in the Gini 
contemporaneously. The magnitude of this effect is comparable with those on market inequality, 
but it just barely meets conventional levels of statistical significance, and we fail to observe the 
significant long-term relationship found in the market inequality models. Still, the expectation of 
a negative, significant relationship between union membership and inequality is met. 
The percent of manufacturing jobs is negatively and significantly related to changes in 
inequality in the post-redistribution Gini models. My previous market inequality models 
produced mixed results for this variable, but the literature suggests that manufacturing jobs 
should contribute to decreasing inequality, or that the loss of such jobs with de-industrialization 
should increase inequality. The negative result observed here is consistent with this story; it 
indicates that an increase in the percent of manufacturing jobs has a mitigating effect on 
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 inequality. According to the results in Table 5.2, we expect the post-tax and transfer Gini to fall 
by .23 (-.129/.551) for each percentage point increase in manufacturing employment, including 
the long run multiplier.  Finally, we observe a negative result for financial employment. This is 
consistent with previous models of market inequality, but remains in the opposite direction from 
expectations.  
Conclusion 
We know from previous chapters that the election of Democrats to state government and 
their related labor market policies significantly relate to decreases or diminished growth of 
market inequality.  The findings in this chapter suggest that redistribution is an additional path by 
which partisanship affects inequality. Increases in Democratic control of state governments 
significantly relate to increases in state welfare expenditures. Such increases in state welfare 
expenditures are negatively and significantly associated with changes in post-redistribution Gini 
coefficients in the states. The combined findings of Chapters 4 and 5 therefore suggest that states 
have multiple avenues for affecting income inequality –through labor market policies and 
redistribution - and that government partisanship is consequential for both. 
To be sure, there are some notable differences in the partisanship results in this chapter, 
namely the failure to find significant independent effects for the legislature. Legislative 
partisanship had consistent, significant effects in the market inequality models in Chapters 3 and 
4, but the presence of Democrats in state legislatures did not independently impact welfare 
spending here. This is not too surprising considering some of the qualified effects of party in 
previous state welfare studies (e.g. Dye 1984, Brown 1995), as well as the bipartisan nature of 
welfare reform in the mid-1990s, although the welfare measure employed here extends beyond 
AFDC/TANF.  Still, government partisanship was a significant determinant of changes in 
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 welfare spending in terms of overall party control of government, further underlining the 
importance of state governments and their partisan composition for income inequality outcomes.  
 This chapter also responds to some previous theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence that state redistributive policies –and welfare policies in particular (Barrilleux and 
Davis 2003) – do not significantly influence state inequality. Using more recent data and a broad 
measure of state welfare effort, I find that redistribution does matter, even if the effect is small. 
And there are several other state redistributive policies that deserve further study, including tax 
policies and especially state Earned Income Tax Credits. As of late 2012, 24 states and D.C. had 
state Earned Income Tax Credits, which supplement incomes for low- and middle-income 
workers.50 State EITCs have considerable reach. Nearly two out of five recipients of the federal 
EITC – there were 27 million in 2009 - live in a state with a state EITC, and recent estimates 
suggest that more than $2.5 billion is spent on annual state EITC benefits (Williams et al 2010). 
Given the federal EITC’s significant impact on reducing poverty (Athreya et al 2010, CBPP 
2013, Holt 2006,) and inequality (Liebman 1998), we should expect state EITCs to also decrease 
income differences in those states by raising incomes at the lower end the distribution.  
While the findings in this chapter provide some impetus to examine EITCs and other tax 
transfer policies, it remains the case that we must broaden our conception of inequality policies 
beyond redistribution. My analyses in previous chapters clearly show that state governments 
impact market inequality before redistribution by substantively significant amounts. In view of 
these previous findings, and the relatively small impact of welfare spending, it is prudent to 
scrutinize the ways in which state governments shape market outcomes.    
50 These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, Wisconsin, plus the District of Columbia. Colorado 
passed an EITC but it is currently suspended. State EITCs are typically a percentage of the federal EITC, ranging 
from 4 percent in Wisconsin to 40 percent in DC (TPC 2010).   
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 CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM MEANS INEQUALITY? 
 
Summary  
Despite popular and scholarly attention to rising income inequality in the U.S., state-level 
inequality has largely escaped the same intense scrutiny. We have seen, however, that there is 
substantial variation in inequality at the state level. Indeed, the magnitude of such state 
differences, highlighted in Chapter 1, rivals the growth of U.S. inequality during the past several 
decades, as well as cross-national variation.  To date, political scientists have suceeded in shining 
a light on the importance of politics and policy in the often apolitical study of inequality. In 
response to a largely economic literature, these scholars pushed back against arguments that U.S. 
inequality is purely an economic phenomenon and made the case that politics has played a 
central role (e.g. Bartels 2008, Hacker and Pierson 2010, Volscho and Kelly 2012). However, 
this work fails to address variation in political systems and in income inequality at the state level. 
Changes in national partisanship (e.g. Bartels 2008, Volscho and Kelly 2012) and federal policy 
shifts (e.g. Hacker and Pierson 2010) cannot tell us why differences in inequality between some 
states look surprisingly similar to differences between the U.S. and the typical paragon of 
equality, Sweden, for example. The broad-strokes, national-level arguments offered to this point 
cannot explain patterns of inequality in the U.S. once we view them at the subnational level.   
This dissertation argued that to better understand U.S. inequality we must study and 
explain it as we actually observe it, as varying between states and over time, not as a uniform 
national trend. It demonstrated that state-level government partisanship is an important 
explanation for changes in state inequality, and one which holds implications for the broader 
pattern of inequality in the U.S. In the preceding chapters, we saw that shifts in the partisan 
151 
 
 control of state government significantly relate to over time changes in inequality in the states. 
Increases in Democratic control of state governments coincide with significant decreases or 
diminished growth of income inequality, while increases in Republican control, are associated 
with significant increases in inequality. By exploring several policy mechanisms, I illustrated 
two overarching ways that this relationship operates. First and foremost, party composition 
influences market inequality through labor or employment policies, including public 
employment, the minimum wage, and right-to-work laws. In other words, the partisan make-up 
of state governments affects the income distribution even before taxes and transfers are taken 
into account. State government partisanship also influences post-tax and transfer income 
inequality through public welfare spending, although this effect is quite small.  
Implications for the Study of Inequality   
 In the broadest sense, the approach and findings of this dissertation advance our 
understanding of inequality in the U.S. by, first, more accurately characterizing it as a 
phenomenon that varies significantly across states and time,  and second, providing a theory that 
addresses this variation. This work certainly builds on previous work that highlights political 
causes of inequality, but with a state-level view it establishes new relationships and findings that 
were not visible in the aggregate. We now know that state-level partisanship, and related 
policies, help explain changes in state-level inequality. This adds to the literature on state-level 
inequality in particular, which has often overlooked political factors, or been characterized by 
ambiguous or conflicting findings. Here, we see clear and robust relationships between state 
politics and distributional outcomes.  And unlike in some previous state studies, which focused 
on narrow or specific policies, we have evidence of overarching and systematic relationships 
between partisanship, policy, and inequality across diverse states. This new set of findings brings 
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 new insight to the study of state inequality and suggests we study the implications of state 
partisanship for other state policies and outcomes. 
We also see the importance of these state-level relationships for national-level outcomes. 
In Chapter 2, I showed that the partisan composition of state legislatures tracks very closely with 
national inequality trends, suggesting that the decisions of the parties in state governments 
contribute to aggregate trends for the U.S. In Chapters 4 and 5, I explained how several state 
policy decisions –public sector employment, minimum wage policies, right-to-work laws, and 
public welfare spending – have significant effects on inequality. There are many such policies 
that cannot be adequately studied at the national-level because states wield policymaking 
authority, and because policy choices vary between states as a result. In the context of this 
project, recall that state public employment outnumbers federal public employment by more than 
5:1 and one of the key explanations in the inequality literature – union membership rates – varies 
considerably with state right-to-work laws. As such, the best way to study the effects of policies 
such as these is to examine how they impact inequality at the state-level. Further, state-level 
policies should impact aggregate income trends. States and their citizens are, after all, part of the 
U.S. as a whole and the national income distribution. In these ways, the political decisions and 
characteristics of state governments are inextricably embedded in the story of U.S. inequality.  
As we look to explain changes in the income distribution and related economic patterns 
in the wake of the Great Recession, we must avoid sweeping explanations that disguise variation 
and instead continue to incorporate the states. Failing to do so, we risk mischaracterizing critical 
economic events, and miss opportunities to learn why some states or areas fare better or worse. 
We benefit from political-economic approaches that embed such events in political systems; 
however, we also mischaracterize our federal system by ignoring the majority of policies, those 
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 set by the states, and the systematic importance of partisanship in setting those policies. I have 
provided strong evidence that partisan features of state governments are consequential for 
distributional outcomes, and we cannot afford to ignore partisanship or the accompanying policy 
choices if we hope to explain or mitigate inequality in the U.S.  
Questions for Further Research 
 The empirical connections I established between state parties, policies, and inequality 
provide some more specific guidance for inequality research as well. From a policy perspective, 
it is clear that we need to consider a range of mechanisms by which states affect income 
inequality. Although explicit redistribution through taxes and transfers may be the most obvious 
means of affecting inequality, I provided strong evidence that state politics shape inequality 
outcomes even before redistribution. We should continue to explore the particular ways that state 
governments shape the market distribution. This may include studying other state policy and 
administration decisions, such as those involving job training, education, and business and 
financial regulations, as well as economic trends under the different parties. Given the available 
data, I did not explore, for example, patterns of income growth for different income groups under 
Democratic versus Republican state governments, as Bartels (2008) does with national data. A 
valuable contribution for future work would be to construct new measures for the states to see if 
or how such patterns vary in the states.   
At the same time, while we need to look beyond redistribution, we should also not rule 
out the effects of state tax and transfer policies. Previous literature and the theoretical challenges 
of state-level redistribution (e.g. Peterson 1995) give the impression that these policies do not 
matter for state inequality in any systematic way, but I provided evidence to suggest otherwise. 
Although public welfare spending had just a small impact on post-redistribution inequality, this 
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 significant finding shows that state redistributive mechanisms warrant our attention too. In future 
work, the effects of state taxation deserve particular attention. State tax policies, like the EITC, 
can be an important part of the safety net, but they are quite varied (Maag 2012), and we know 
that regressive tax policies in certain states and regions have significant negative effects on a 
range of state-level social and economic outcomes (Newman and O’Brien 2011). Recently, 
several states have adopted “millionaire’s taxes” on high income earners, which increase the 
progressivity of state tax systems and should theoretically reduce income differences.51 While 
we should keep in mind important differences between the nature of federal and state taxation – 
namely that states often strive to stay “competitive” with lower tax rates - we can also update our 
understanding of the effects of state tax policies on inequality by studying new policy 
developments.  
Aside from delving into additional state-level policy mechanisms, there are many more 
questions to address about the role of partisanship. Now that we know that parties matter, as well 
as a few ways how they matter, we might also wonder: when and where do parties matter the 
most (or least)? The relationship between partisanship and inequality held in models with all the 
states and in models of just the non-Southern states (see Appendix E), but there are additional 
aspects of state contexts to consider. For instance, what roles do other features of state political 
systems play, such as legislative professionalization (Squire 1992, 2007), polarization (Shor and 
McCarty 2011), campaign finance regulations (Gross, Goidel, and Shields 2002; Hamm and 
Hogan 2008), and interest group environment (Gray and Lowery 2001)? We could also further 
scrutinize the roles of Governors versus legislatures, perhaps with case studies of their 
interactions on inequality-related policy decisions. Similarly, how does the effect of partisanship 
51 These states include New Jersey (2004), California (2005), Maryland (2008), Hawaii (2009), New York (2009), 
Wisconsin (2009), Connecticut (2010), and Oregon (2010). 
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 change over time? Has it indeed grown with polarization, as I have suggested in Chapter 2? A 
next step for understanding the relationship between government partisanship and inequality is 
therefore to further embed it in state and time contexts.  
Another area for future research is the electoral connection between the parties in 
government and the public. This is important because the parties (or party members) must of 
course be elected to office before they can have any influence on outcomes.  Studies of state-
level elections can provide additional insight into how the parties come to power. Among the 
possible explanations, we expect the public’s partisanship to explain electoral outcomes and 
government partisanship. With new over time, state-level measures of party identification (Enns 
and Koch 2013), we can test this relationship. In a similar vein, we can also consider the role of 
public opinion. There are several ways public opinion may matter for the relationship between 
government partisanship and inequality in the states.  One way is that shifts in public opinion, 
like those in the electorate’s partisanship, may cause changes in partisan composition of state 
governments. Or, in some cases, changes in public opinion may lead to changes in party 
identities.   
However, this public opinion research will have to contend with evidence that voters 
react to inequality.  Kelly and Enns (2010), for example, show that all income groups become 
more conservative in response to increases in national inequality. We might first ask whether this 
pattern is observable at the state-level too, and whether it might vary by state context. In 
addition, we can consider how the public’s response to inequality affects partisan control of 
government, and even subsequent changes in inequality. For example, one possibility is that 
when inequality increases under Republicans, public opinion will become more conservative. 
This now even more conservative electorate will continue to elect Republicans to office, creating 
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 a cycle of increasing inequality.  Alternatively, if increases in inequality spur more liberal public 
opinion in some or all states – in line with the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model - we may see 
Democrats gain power. These scenarios have many moving parts and methodological challenges, 
but with state-level measures of public opinion (Enns and Koch 2013) and the use of multi-level 
models (e.g. Shor et al 2008) we can begin to incorporate the public into the partisan political-
economy of state inequality.  
 “Federalism Means Inequality”? 
 In his 1985 article, “Federalism Means Inequality,” Wildavsky concluded with what he 
described as an inescapable and “compelling truth:” that “federalism and equality of result 
cannot coexist” (49).  His statement was meant broadly, not as a comment on equality of 
incomes; nevertheless, this dissertation demonstrates that federalism and U.S. income inequality 
are linked in several important ways. In the first place, state-level changes in partisan control and 
related policy choices produce variation in income inequality outcomes across states and over 
time. From a second perspective, we can attribute overall increases in U.S. income inequality to 
state-level patterns as well. This is because states have a hand in shaping overall national 
economic outcomes. When several states make policy decisions which increase income 
inequality – or, according to my findings, when Republicans gain control of more state 
governments – we can expect U.S. income inequality to increase. In both of these ways, yes, 
federalism means inequality.    
 As discussed above, these findings raise many questions for future research; but perhaps 
the most daunting question raised is: what is the appropriate response to these state-level political 
explanations for inequality? Are we to accept them as an unavoidable product of federalism? 
Should we be satisfied with unequal outcomes in the states, especially if they reflect voters’ 
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 choices about what party to put in power? This answer may depend partly on whether those in 
power are responsive to or representative of their constituencies. Still, if some states, at some 
points in time, fail to address income inequality, leaving segments of their populations relatively 
more vulnerable, it may fall on other states to take care of those worse off. For instance, some 
states contribute much more into federal coffers than they get out, while others benefit 
disproportionately from this cross-state redistribution (Tax Foundation 2007). Thus, rising 
inequality and economic distress in one state may be partly relieved by resources from another.  
Clearly, the effects of state-level political decisions do not stop at state borders.  
Although I began this project with an understanding that federalism produces inequality, 
and in many ways this is supported by my findings, I will also note in closing that states can play 
an important role in mitigating inequality. In the preceding chapters, we observed that when 
Democrats gained power in state governments, growth of income inequality was reduced or 
reversed. State governments and policymakers have the capacity to implement policies that 
lessen income differences, such as by enacting higher state minimum wages or increasing public 
employment or welfare spending.  There are a myriad of other state policy areas which might 
have similar effects. And when many state governments are controlled by Democrats and/or 
implement such policies, we might expect decreasing inequality on a national scale. In this way, 
the states are not simply a source of problems, holding the blame for rising income inequality; 
rather, because of their critical policy and governing roles, they can also provide solutions. 
Indeed, state policy innovations often precede national policy changes or diffuse to other states 
(Nathan 2008, Zackin 2013). In the area of inequality, states may provide key leadership on 
economic development policies that reduce income disparity and are traditionally their strength, 
although the introduction of high-income taxes is a noteworthy state development too. Of course, 
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 the spread of inequality-reducing policies across states seems much less likely than the 
divergence of states when party control shifts in different directions, or an overall pattern of 
increasing inequality with Republicans gains in state governments; nevertheless, this prospect 
sheds new light on Wildavsky’s “compelling truth.”  Federalism may not always “mean 
inequality,” but we cannot understand U.S. income inequality without it.  
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 APPENDIX A  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A 1 Variable Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev.  
Min. Max.  Source 
Inequality Measures      
Top 10% Income Share  34.44 4.90 25.30 53.85 Frank (2008; 2009) 
Top 1% Income Share 10.70 3.79 4.68 27.52 Frank (2008; 2009) 
Gini Coefficient 50.84 5.70 39.89 71.56 Frank (2008; 2009) 
Post-redistribution Gini Coefficient 41.41 3.13 34.17 51.07 Kelly and Witko (2012) 
      
Government Partisanship      
Democratic  Governor  (dummy) 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Lower House Democrats  (proportion) 0.58 0.18 0.13 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Lower House Democratic Control (dummy) 0.65 0.47 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Democratic Legislative Control (dummy) 0.63 0.43 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Democratic Legislative  Control, budget supermajority (dummy) 0.63 0.43 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Unified Democrat (dummy) 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Unified Republican (dummy) 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Democratic Control, proportion of branches 0.60 0.35 0.00 1.00 Klarner (2013) 
Democratic President (dummy, national-level) 0.33 0.48 0.00 1.00 Kelly and Witko (2012) 
Congressional Democrats  (percent, national-level) 0.55 0.07 0.46 0.66 Kelly and Witko (2012) 
      
Policies      
Public employment (percent total jobs) 11.62 1.58 8.17 16.93 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Statutory minimum wage (dollars) 3.1 1.82 0 7.35 Bureau of Labor  Statistics 
State Public Welfare Spending, per poor person (dollars) 810 662 7.91 5607 Census of State and  Local Gov. 
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Demographic and Economic Indicators      
African-American (percent of population ) 9.44 9.39 0.12 42.04 Census 
Latino (percent of population) 6.15 8.10 0.32 46.30 Census 
College Degree (percent of population) 19.24 6.10 6.70 40.40 Census 
Over Age 65 (percent of population) 11.68 2.30 2.25 18.55 Census 
Real Per Capita Income (thousands, 2005 dollars) 25.31 6.33 9.71 48.13 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Per Capita Dividends Income (thousands, 2005 dollars) 4.39 1.76 0.88 12.33 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Real GDP growth (percent change, calculated with 2005 dollars) 2.52 3.86 -27.97 29.45 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Nominal Per Capita Income (thousands, current dollars) 19.6 8.46 5.23 48.13 Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Union Membership (percent) 18.09 8.65 2.30 44.80 Hirsch et al Unionstats.com 
Finance Jobs (percent total jobs) 5.32 1.27 2.88 12.38 Bureau of Labor  Statistics 
Manufacturing Jobs (percent total jobs)  17.85 8.88 2.32 43.03 Bureau of Labor  Statistics 
Unemployment Rate(percent) 5.83 1.99 2.3 17.4 Bureau of Labor  Statistics 
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 Figure A 1 Percentage Increase in States' Top 1% Income Shares 
 
Figure A 2 Percentage Increase in States' Gini Coefficients, 1970-2005
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 APPENDIX B  
Additional State Government Party Composition and Inequality Figures 
 
In Chapter 2, I presented a series of maps of the partisan composition of state 
governments in Figures 2.2 – Figures 2.5. Figures B1 through B6 in this appendix provide 
alternative ways to view these data. Like the maps in Chapter 2, these figures show the over time 
and between state variation in proportion of Democratic state legislators, including variation 
within regions, as well as cross-state differences in partisanship of the Governor. Figures B7 
through B10 provide alternative graphs of the relationship between national inequality and the 
percent of Republican state legislators and Governors, aggregated and weighted by state 
population. The original figure in Chapter 2 – Figure 2.8 - graphs the 80:20 income percentile 
ratio with partisanship; Figures B7 through B10 use income shares for the top 10 and top 1%.      
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 Figure B 1 Percent of Democratic Legislators, Lower House: 1970, 1987, and 2005 
 
 
Figure B 2 Percent of Democratic Legislators, Lower House, 1970 - 2000, Northeast 
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 Figure B 3 Percent of Democratic Legislators, Lower House, 1970-2000, Midwest 
 
Figure B 4 Percent of Democratic Legislators, Lower House, 1970-2000,  South 
 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Ind iana
Missouri
Il lino is
M ich iga n
M innesota
W isconsin
Iowa
Ohio
Kansas
North Dakota
South Dakota
g       g ,  , , 
1970 1980
1990 2000
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Maryland
W est V irg in ia
Arkansas
Louisiana
Mississipp i
Alabam a
Kentucky
Tenness ee
Oklahom a
Georg ia
N orth  Caro lina
Texas
V irg in ia
South Caro lina
F lorida
Delaware
Figure B 4 Pe rce nt o f D e m oc ratic   Le gis la tors, L ow er  H ou se , 1970 20 00,  South
1970 19 80
1990 20 00
165 
 Figure B 5 Percent of Democratic Legislators, Lower House, 1970-2000, West 
 
Figure B 6 Mean of Democratic Governor, 1970-2005 
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 Figure B 7 National Top Decile Income Share and Republican State Legislators, 1970-2005 
 
Figure B 8 National Top 1% Income Share and Republican State Legislators, 1970-2005 
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 Figure B 9 National Top Decile Income Share and Republican Governors, 1970-2005 
 
Figure B 10 National Top 1% Income Share and Republican Governors, 1970-2005 
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 The South 
Given the somewhat distinct behavior of the South as it realigned in the early part of the 
series – becoming more Republican over time as race and economic issues converged – do we 
still observe the relationship between state partisanship and national inequality if we exclude 
Southern states? In Figure B11 below I recreate Figure 2.8, without the South. While the 
correlation between the weighted percent of Republican legislators and the national 80:20 ratio 
does decrease from r=.77 to about r=.45, there is still a clear positive relationship. This suggests 
that the realignment of the South along economic lines is an important part of the relationship 
between state government party composition and inequality, but it is not the only component. 
Partisanship trends outside the distinctive South clearly matter as well.  
Figure B 11 National 80:20 Income Percentile Ratio and Republican State Legislators, Excluding South, 
1970-2005 
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 APPENDIX C  
Income, Economic Interests, and Public Partisanship 
 
There are a few ways to think about the economic division between the parties.52 The 
theory presented in Chapter 2 hinges on the different economic platforms of the parties in 
government, which are well-established. Of course, according to the partisan model referenced in 
the main text of Chapter 2, these economic approaches are rooted in the economic interests of 
distinct constituencies. Observing this difference at the mass level can provide further support for 
the overall economic model of the parties.  
One way to show that the parties are economically distinct in this way is to look at the 
voting behavior of different income groups. Is there more support among lower and middle 
income groups for Democratic candidates and more support among upper income groups for 
Republican candidates? Gelman et al (2010) present empirical evidence that this is the case. 
Specifically, income has been a good predictor of party support since about the early 1970s, with 
the rich more likely to vote Republican and the poor more likely to vote Democratic. Although 
they also find that rich voters in rich states have become more likely to vote Democratic since 
the 1990s, the economic policy platform has not shifted during this time (Gelman 2010). 
Elsewhere, Ansolabahere et al (2006) and Bartels (2006) find that economic issues, rather than 
cultural ones, are still the central concern for voters. Similarly, Stonecash et al (2000) find that 
differences in voting by income have been increasing since the 1970s.  
To see how income is relevant in state-level elections in particular, I compared self-
reported gubernatorial votes for low, middle, and high income groups for the second half of the 
20th century using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES). Table C1 shows 
52 For instance, the polarization literature addresses polarization of the electorate as well as of the parties in 
government (see Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). 
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 that there is more support for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate among the low and middle 
income groups and more support for the Republican candidate in the higher income group.53 
This is a simple analysis, but it suggests that income and economic interest is a basis for party 
support for state-level offices as well as national ones. 
 
Table C 1 Income-Based Voting in Gubernatorial Elections, Pooled 1952-1998 
 
Republican  Democrat 
Low Income 38% 62% 
Middle Income 44% 56% 
High Income 52% 48% 
Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative File 
 
An alternative approach for examining the parties’ economic constituencies is to look at 
patterns in party identification. Enns and Koch (2013) created over-time state-level measures of 
party identification and policy mood, a measure of support for more or less government, for each 
state for 1956-2009. Using these measures, I test the relationship between state personal income 
and policy mood and the percent of Democratic identifiers in the state. The above analysis of 
individual-level voting behavior showed higher levels of support for Democrats among low and 
middle income voters. In this state-level analysis, we should observe a negative relationship 
between income and the percent of Democratic identifiers. In addition, if it is true that 
Democrats favor a more active government and Republicans a more limited one, we should see a 
positive relationship between mood – indicative of support for more government – and the 
percent of Democratic identifiers.  
The state policy mood measure is created using questions for a variety of policy areas 
53 Calculation done with ANES cumulative file. Income groups are divided into tertiles or lower, middle, and upper 
third. Available gubernatorial election years were 1952, 1958, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 
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 designed to tap overall support for more or less government.54 To be sure that this variable 
mainly captures economic preferences, I re-create the measure and eliminate all questions that 
might capture a cultural dimension instead, specifically questions pertaining to abortion, the 
death penalty, and gun control. This is important because of the recent saliency of cultural issues 
at the state-level (e.g. Barclay & Fisher 2003, Fleischmann & Moyer 2009, Lax & Phillips 
2009, Roh & Berry 2008) and some specific arguments that cultural or moral preferences rather 
than economic ones explain voting behavior in recent years (e.g. Frank 2004). The original mood 
measure and this alternative measure of economic mood are correlated at r=.69. The economic 
mood series ranges from about 26 to 91 on a scale of 100, with higher values indicating a more 
liberal policy mood, or support for more government. The average mood score is 44.  
Along with economic mood and per capita personal income in the state, adjusted for 
inflation, I control for the percent of Democratic identifiers in the previous year. This lagged 
dependent variable addresses the effect of time and evidence that partisan identity is relatively 
stable over time (e.g. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). The percent of Democratic 
identifiers in the state ranges from about 15 to 79, with a mean of 39. I also control for 
demographic factors which we know to influence partisanship: race, age, and gender, specifically 
the percent of African-Americans in the state, the percent of individuals over age 65, and the 
percent of female residents. Real state GDP is included to account for changes in the state of the 
economy; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) show that national macropartisanship 
responds to economic evaluations. Finally, to address the South’s realignment, I include an 
interaction term, created by multiplying a dummy for Southern states by the year. I estimate a 
1980, 1982,  1986, 1990, 1994, 1998. For the purposes of this basic tabulation, I pool all years together to increase 
the number of observations. Percent voting Democrat and Republican are out of the two-party vote.   
54 See Enns and Koch (2013) for additional discussion of the creation of the state mood series and specific survey 
data and questions used.  
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 fixed effects model with these data to control for any omitted state differences.  
The results, reported in Table C2, are what we expect if economic interests (income) and 
preferences (mood) are a basis for partisanship at the state-level. Income is negatively related to 
the percent of Democrats at the state level, while greater support for more government is 
associated with a greater percent of Democrats. Both of these results point to the relevance of 
economic interests and preferences for state-level public partisanship during the period of 
interest for this dissertation and lend additional support to the partisan model I employ for my 
theory. When combined with more extensive studies of the voting behavior of different income 
groups, we have substantial evidence that the parties differ in both their economic policies and 
constituencies, including in the states. 
Table C 2 Determinants of Percent of Democratic Partisans by State, 1970-2005 
 
Among the control variables, the results for the percent of elderly and percent of African-
American residents are also what we would expect; states with higher percentages of African-
Americans and smaller elderly populations are also significantly more Democratic. Surprisingly, 
although a gender gap in partisanship has developed since about 1980, the percent of female 
Percent Democrat t-1 0.365* (0.022)
Economic Mood (liberal) 0.0685* (0.021)
Per Capita Income (2005 $1000s) -0.200* (.052)
Percent African-American 0.450* (0.164)
Percent Female 0.101 (0.550)
State GDP (2005 $1000s) -.006* (.002)
Percent over Age 65 -1.504* (0.166)
South x Year -0.221* (0.022)
Constant 175.2* (29.63)
N 1,800
R-squared 0.623
States 50
* p<0.05, two-tailed
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 residents is not a significant predictor of the percent of Democratic partisans in the state. The 
interaction between South and year is negative and significant, indicating that Southern states 
have become less Democratic over time. This is, of course, consistent with the South’s 
realignment.  
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 APPENDIX D  
Robustness Checks with National-Level Political Controls 
 
Because my primary interest is in state-level inequality, I limit my models to state-level 
predictors. Of course, just as I have argued that state-level politics are relevant for national 
inequality, we expect national-level politics to affect inequality in the states. To be sure that the 
state partisanship variables are not merely capturing national political trends, I re-estimate state-
level inequality models from Chapter 3 with additional controls for the percent of Democrats in 
Congress and a dummy variable for Democratic Presidents. I reduce the number of state-level 
control variables, but include those for state demographics and union rates. The results for these 
models are reported in Table D1 Notice that changes in the proportion of Democratic state 
legislators continue to have a negative, significant relationship with the changes in the top 
decile’s share, the Gini coefficient, and a negative relationship (p<.10) with the top 1%’s share. 
Electing a Democratic Governor continues to be negatively and significantly associated with 
changes in the top decile’s share. These findings lend additional support to my theory that the 
actions of the parties in state legislatures impact changes in state inequality. 
 In addition to the significant coefficients for state-level partisanship, we also see a 
negative, significant relationship between increases in the proportion of Democrats in Congress 
and changes in inequality in the states in Table D1. This is what we would expect if Democratic 
officeholders – and their policies – have a mitigating effect on the growth of inequality, and it 
further illustrates the partisan nature of changes in U.S. inequality. Indeed, the proportion of 
Congressional Democrats has quite a large effect on the measures of state-level inequality, 
particularly on the top 1%’s income share, suggesting that national partisanship may matters 
more for this particular type or measure of inequality. This result makes sense if we consider that 
175 
 national-level regulatory and tax policies are likely especially relevant for top 1% income shares. 
The top 1% result is also consistent with some previous findings by Volscho and Kelly (2012). 
They found that rightward shifts in Congress contribute to the growing income share of the top 
1% between 1949 and 2008. Still, measures of state partisanship have statistically and 
substantively significant relationships with the top decile’s share and Gini coefficient, even 
controlling for Congressional and Presidential partisanship. Democratic Presidents have a mixed 
effect; there is a surprising short term positive effect, but a long term negative one that conforms 
to expectations (Bartels 2008).  
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 Table D 1 Relationship between State and National Government Partisanship and Changes in State-
Level Inequality 
 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.230* (0.017)
Top One Percent Share t-1 -0.327* (0.022)
Gini t-1 -0.201* (0.016)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.212* (0.088) -0.093 (0.124) -0.131 (0.125)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.135* (0.061) -0.047 (0.085) -0.130 (0.086)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.318 (0.653) 0.060 (0.923) -0.493 (0.932)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -0.828* (0.391) -1.053† (0.554) -1.920* (0.560)
∆ Democratic President 0.755* (0.081) 0.635* (0.115) 0.196 (0.116)
Democratic President t-1 -0.0223 (0.066) -0.345* (0.089) -0.467* (0.090)
∆ Congressional Democrats -3.922* (1.073) -8.165* (1.514) -4.272* (1.519)
Congressional Democrats t-1 -6.329* (0.819) -10.33* (1.154) -3.325* (1.168)
∆ Union -0.0327 (0.019) -0.022 (0.026) -0.0465 (0.027)
Union t-1 -0.086* (0.013) -0.056* (0.018) -0.085* (0.019)
∆ African-American -1.574* (0.302) -0.856* (0.430) -0.884* (0.430)
∆  Latino -0.412 (0.318) -0.078 (0.448) -0.441 (0.455)
Latino t-1 0.109* (0.021) 0.103* (0.028) 0.0293 (0.028)
∆ Over Age 65 1.062* (0.275) 1.461* (0.389) 0.517 (0.393)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.407* (0.042) 0.511* (0.059) 0.080 (0.059)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.083* (0.016) 0.089* (0.021) 0.070* (0.020)
Constant 11.25* (0.770) 8.423* (0.961) 13.77* (1.270)
N 1,447 1,445 1,447
R-squared 0.315 0.280 0.154
States 49 49 49
Top Decile Top One Percent Gini 
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include 
state fixed effects. * p<0.05, † p<.10, two-tailed. 
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 APPENDIX E  
Results for Non-Southern States Only and Inequality Models with South x Year Dummy 
 
State literature often treats the South as distinct from other regions. We saw in Chapter 2 
that the South has experienced the largest partisan shifts in this period of interest, with most 
states, at least in the Deep South, becoming increasingly Republican as this region realigned. To 
be sure that this pattern is not driving the effect of partisanship on inequality found in Chapter 3 
or on the policies in Chapters 4 and 5, I include versions of the models excluding all Southern 
states in this appendix. Table E1 reports the results from Chapter 3 without the South. The 
models in this table are comparable to the version 1 models of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Notice 
that for each dependent variable, the percent of Democratic legislators continues to have a 
significant, negative relationship with changes in inequality. This suggests that the significant, 
over time relationship between partisanship and inequality is not merely a product of the South’s 
distinctive pattern during this time. 
178 
 Table E 1 Economic and Political Determinants of Top Decile Shares, Top 1% Percent Shares, and Gini 
Coefficients for Non-Southern States 
 
 
 Tables E2 and E3 report the results for the Chapter 4 models excluding Southern states. 
Table E2 is comparable to the partisan models in Tables 4.2 and 4.4. Even excluding the South, 
we continue to observe significant, positive relationships between Democratically-controlled 
legislatures and changes in public employment and the minimum wage, although the overall 
Dependent Variable
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.243* (0.019)
Top One Percent Share t-1 -0.310* (0.024)
Gini t-1 -0.280* (0.020)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.021 (0.110) 0.146 (0.143) -0.096 (0.143)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.122 (0.075) -0.056 (0.097) -0.127 (0.097)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.288 (0.639) -1.184 (0.833) -0.181 (0.830)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -1.730* (0.461) -3.021* (0.603) -1.700* (0.605)
∆ Union -0.055* (0.022) -0.071* (0.028) -0.050 (0.029)
Union t-1 -0.075* (0.014) -0.087* (0.018) -0.063* (0.020)
∆ African-American -2.278* (0.364) -1.345* (0.479) -1.097* (0.481)
∆  Latino 0.188 (0.351) 0.595 (0.457) 0.045 (0.464)
Latino t-1 0.126* (0.024) 0.104* (0.029) 0.065* (0.029)
∆ Over Age 65 0.584 (0.322) 1.002* (0.408) 0.465 (0.415)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.234* (0.046) 0.322* (0.060) -0.156* (0.060)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.117* (0.018) 0.145* (0.029) 0.056* (0.027)
∆ Dividends Income 0.628* (0.152) 0.695* (0.197) 0.950* (0.198)
Dividends Income t-1 0.123 (0.066) 0.461* (0.090)
∆ College Grads -0.006 (0.028) -0.006 (0.038) 0.046 (0.037)
∆ Manufacturing 0.084 (0.064) -0.065 (0.084) 0.186* (0.084)
∆ Finance -0.969* (0.226) -1.002* (0.294) -1.120* (0.295)
Constant 6.796* (0.761) 2.197* (0.790) 13.65* (1.542)
N 1,131 1,129 1,131
R-squared 0.240 0.214 0.195
States 33 33 33
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include 
state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-tailed. 
Top Decile Top 1 Percent Gini
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 explanatory power of the minimum wage model is reduced. Table E3 is comparable to Tables 
4.3 and 4.5. Once again, we see that both public employment and the minimum wage continue to 
have significant, negative relationships with inequality when we consider just non-Southern 
states. 
Table E 2 Relationships between Government Partisanship and Changes in State Public Employment 
and State Minimum Wages, Non-Southern States 
 
Dependent Variable
Public Sector Jobs t-1 -0.141* (0.013)
State Minimum Wage t-1 -0.133* (0.018)
∆ Democratic Legislative Control (budget 
supermajority) 0.069* (0.026)
Democratic Legislative Control t-1 
(budget supermajority) 0.072* (0.021)
∆ Democratic Legislative Control 0.054 (0.064)
Democratic Legislative Control t-1 0.122* (0.048)
∆ Democratic Governor 0.046* (0.021) -0.017 (0.039)
Democratic Governor t-1 0.009 (0.014) 0.032 (0.027)
∆ Unemployment 0.098* (0.008) 0.037* (0.015)
Unemployment t-1 0.007 (0.005) -0.024* (0.009)
∆ Union 0.001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.008)
Union t-1 -0.004 (0.002) -0.009 (0.006)
∆ Government Debt -1.14e-06 (6.90e-06)
Government Debt t-1 -2.49e-06 (3.31e-06)
∆ Real GDP Growth -0.013* (0.002)
Real GDP Growth t-1 -0.015* (0.002)
∆ PC Income (nominal) 2.18e-05 (2.61e-05)
PC Income (nominal) t-1 2.06e-05* (4.66e-06)
∆ Manufacturing 0.058* (0.027)
Manufacturing t-1 0.014* (0.006)
Constant 1.669* (0.144) 0.190 (0.216)
N 936 935
R-squared 0.407 0.095
States 33 33
Public Sector Jobs Minimum Wage
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models 
include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-tailed. 
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Table E 3 Relationships between State Public Employment and State Minimum Wages and Changes in 
State-Level Inequality, Non-Southern States 
 
 Tables E4 and E5 provide results for the Chapter 5 models for non-Southern states only. 
The models  in Table E4 are comparable to versions 1 and 4 of the partisan models in Table 5.1,  
which include variables for Democratic Governors and the proportion of Democrats in the lower 
house (version 1) and the proportion  of branches of the government controlled by Democrats 
(version 4). Without the South, we continue to observe significant positive, relationships 
between Democratic Governors and Democratically-controlled government and changes in 
Dependent Variable
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.234* (0.020)
Gini t-1 -0.227* (0.020)
∆  Public Sector Jobs -0.711* (0.174)
Public Sector Jobs t-1 -0.135* (0.068)
∆  State Minimum Wage -0.015 (0.131)
State Minimum Wage t-1 -0.179* (0.068)
∆ African-American -2.316* (0.370) -1.198* (0.494)
African-American t-1 0.166 (0.103) 0.167 (0.138)
∆  Latino -0.038 (0.394) 0.048 (0.526)
Latino t-1 0.150* (0.027) 0.083* (0.034)
∆ Over Age 65 1.495* (0.335) 1.138* (0.448)
Over Age 65 t-1 0.394* (0.053) 0.442* (0.071)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.375* (0.055) 0.095 (0.066)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.111* (0.025) 0.089* (0.031)
∆ College Grads -0.002 (0.028) 0.039 (0.038)
College Grads t-1 0.032 (0.022) 0.058 (0.032)
Constant 0.013 (1.026) 2.760* (0.896)
N 1,020 1,020
R-squared 0.252 0.131
States 34 34
Top Decile Gini
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-tailed. 
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 welfare spending. Similarly, in Table E5, comparable to Table 5.2, welfare expenditures in non-
Southern states have a significant, negative relationship with changes in inequality.  
Table E 4 Relationship between Government Partisanship and Changes in State Public Welfare 
Spending, Non-Southern States 
 
 
 
Welfare Spending t-1 -0.275* (0.025) -0.279* (0.025)
∆ Lower House Democrats -82.02 (204.6)
Lower House Democrats t-1 97.68 (150.7)
∆ Democratic Governor 24.71 (32.68)
Democratic Governor t-1 43.68* (21.94)
∆ Democratic Government Control 26.25 (57.86)
Democratic Government Control t-1 94.07* (44.39)
∆  Latino 237.8* (113.2) 251.0* (112.7)
Latino t-1 -12.09 (8.523) -12.50 (8.466)
∆ Real GDP Growth 5.741* (2.733) 5.593* (2.708)
Real GDP Growth t-1 6.727* (3.413) 6.670* (3.377)
∆ Per Capita Income 11.12 (16.31) 12.24 (16.00)
Per Capita Income t-1 -2.760 (5.686) -3.411 (5.582)
∆ African-American -363.8 (275.6) -343.4 (273.5)
African-American t-1 -56.57 (34.15) -43.50 (33.86)
∆ Over Age 65 123.4 (88.78) 101.6 (87.97)
Over Age 65 t-1 8.254 (13.75) 6.062 (13.58)
Constant 478.9* (212.6) 489.5* (186.7)
N 777 792
R-squared 0.172 0.174
States 33 33
(1) (2)
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All 
models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-tailed. 
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 Table E 5 Relationship between Welfare Spending and Changes in Post-Redistribution Gini Inequality, 
Non-Southern States 
 
 
 
 Finally, Tables E6, E7, and E8 replicate Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 with an interaction of the 
South (dummy) and year. In each case, the results presented in Chapter 3 are robust to including 
this additional variable to control for the South’s realignment. Once again, these results suggest 
that the over time relationship between government partisanship and the three measures of 
inequality are not merely a function of the South’s realignment, namely Republican gains in the 
region. 
Post-redistribution gini t-1 -0.547* (0.033)
∆  Welfare Spending -0.001* (0.0002)
Welfare Spending t-1 -0.0002 (0.0001)
∆ African-American -1.563 (1.448)
African-American t-1 -0.050 (0.192)
∆  Latino 0.761 (0.611)
Latino t-1 0.152* (0.046)
∆ Over Age 65 0.342 (0.446)
∆ Per Capita Income -0.077 (0.078)
∆ College Grads -0.026 (0.073)
College Grads t-1 0.167* (0.032)
∆ Union -0.021 (0.032)
Union t-1 0.021 (0.023)
∆ Manufacturing 0.107 (0.135)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.172* (0.032)
∆ Finance -0.0218 (0.348)
Finance t-1 -0.533* (0.143)
∆ Dividends Income 1.153* (0.228)
Constant 23.56* (2.159)
N 816
R-squared 0.328
States 34
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 
two-tailed. 
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 Table E 6 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Top Deciles' Income Shares, 1970-
2005 
 
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.251* (0.016) -0.244* (0.016) -0.242* (0.016) -0.242* (0.016)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.076 (0.084) -0.083 (0.084)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.131* (0.059) -0.180* (0.059)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.041 (0.536)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -2.189* (0.367)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.028 (0.116)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.252* (0.088)
∆ Unified Democratic -0.056 (0.093)
Unified Democratic t-1 -0.252* (0.078)
∆ Unified Republican 0.181 (0.123)
Unified Republican t-1 0.280* (0.091)
∆ Union -0.052* (0.018) -0.052* (0.018) -0.055* (0.018) -0.054* (0.018)
Union t-1 -0.078* (0.011) -0.073* (0.011) -0.072* (0.011) -0.068* (0.011)
∆ African-American -2.138* (0.299) -2.106* (0.302) -2.154* (0.301) -2.135* (0.301)
∆  Latino -0.002 (0.302) 0.210 (0.302) 0.166 (0.302) 0.190 (0.302)
Latino t-1 0.131* (0.019) 0.132* (0.019) 0.131* (0.019) 0.134* (0.019)
∆ Over Age 65 0.453 (0.261) 0.531* (0.265) 0.468 (0.262) 0.503 (0.263)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.238* (0.040) 0.240* (0.040) 0.254* (0.040) 0.252* (0.040)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.117* (0.016) 0.110* (0.016) 0.109* (0.016) 0.111* (0.016)
∆ Dividends Income 0.617* (0.126) 0.614* (0.126) 0.636* (0.126) 0.628* (0.126)
Dividends Income t-1 0.128* (0.051) 0.151* (0.052) 0.147* (0.051) 0.159* (0.051)
∆ College Grads -0.004 (0.020) -0.006 (0.021) -0.006 (0.020) -0.005 (0.020)
∆ Manufacturing 0.095 (0.050) 0.0698 (0.050) 0.064 (0.049) 0.065 (0.049)
∆ Finance -0.913* (0.175) -0.917* (0.177) -0.861* (0.175) -0.868* (0.175)
South x Year -0.007 (0.006) 0.008 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005) 0.010 (0.005)
Constant 12.43** (3.965) 1.129 (3.425) 1.063 (3.387) -0.799 (3.341)
N 1,691 1,691 1,715 1,715
R-squared 0.245 0.230 0.230 0.230
States 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-
tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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 Table E 7 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Top One Percent Income Shares, 
1970-2005, with South x Year Dummy 
 
Top One Percent Share t-1 -0.311* (0.020) -0.300* (0.020) -0.300* (0.020) -0.303* (0.020)
∆ Democratic Governor 0.010 (0.109) -0.011 (0.109)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.085 (0.077) -0.144 (0.076)
∆ Lower House Democrats -0.798 (0.695)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -2.731* (0.478)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House -0.220 (0.150)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.347* (0.114)
∆ Unified Democratic -0.077 (0.120)
Unified Democratic t-1 -0.242* (0.100)
∆ Unified Republican 0.238 (0.159)
Unified Republican t-1 0.381* (0.118)
∆ Union -0.060* (0.023) -0.059* (0.023) -0.060* (0.023) -0.061* (0.023)
Union t-1 -0.081* (0.014) -0.076* (0.013) -0.078* (0.014) -0.076* (0.014)
∆ African-American -1.348* (0.391) -1.320* (0.394) -1.565* (0.401) -1.519* (0.400)
African-American t-1 -0.111* (0.053) -0.092 (0.054)
∆  Latino 0.214 (0.392) 0.476 (0.391) 0.457 (0.390) 0.492 (0.390)
Latino t-1 0.117* (0.024) 0.116* (0.024) 0.116* (0.024) 0.119* (0.024)
∆ Over Age 65 1.268* (0.334) 1.368* (0.339) 1.255* (0.333) 1.340* (0.335)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.352* (0.052) 0.353* (0.053) 0.361* (0.052) 0.362* (0.052)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.101* (0.024) 0.094* (0.025) 0.097* (0.025) 0.102* (0.025)
∆ Dividends Income 0.643* (0.162) 0.638* (0.163) 0.664* (0.161) 0.656* (0.161)
∆ College Grads 0.022 (0.027) 0.021 (0.027) 0.021 (0.027) 0.021 (0.027)
College Grads t-1 0.049* (0.021) 0.053* (0.021) 0.069* (0.021) 0.056* (0.021)
∆ Manufacturing -0.125 (0.064) -0.157* (0.064) -0.160* (0.063) -0.155* (0.060)
∆ Finance -0.884* (0.225) -0.887* (0.228) -0.828* (0.224) -0.846* (0.224)
South x Year -0.010 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007) 0.012 (0.006)
Constant 9.105 (5.107) -4.775 (4.403) -4.398 (4.383) -6.554 (4.320)
N 1,689 1,689 1,713 1,713
R-squared 0.218 0.207 0.206 0.208
States 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 
two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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 Table E 8 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Gini Coefficients, 1970-2005, with 
South x Year Dummy 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Gini t-1 -0.270* (0.017) -0.271* (0.017) -0.270* (0.017) -0.271* (0.017)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.080 (0.110) -0.103 (0.110)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.160* (0.078) -0.209* (0.078)
∆ Lower House Democrats -0.643 (0.701)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -2.064* (0.482)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.058 (0.151)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.210 (0.114)
∆ Unified Democratic -0.028 (0.121)
Unified Democratic t-1 -0.244* (0.101)
∆ Unified Republican 0.347* (0.160)
Unified Republican t-1 0.436* (0.118)
∆ Union -0.054* (0.023) -0.053* (0.024) -0.056* (0.023) -0.054* (0.023)
Union t-1 -0.080* (0.015) -0.078* (0.015) -0.078* (0.015) -0.071* (0.015)
∆ African-American -1.273* (0.401) -1.276* (0.403) -1.334* (0.403) -1.275* (0.401)
African-American t-1 -0.140* (0.054) -0.161* (0.054) -0.169* (0.054) -0.151* (0.054)
∆  Latino -0.295 (0.399) -0.069 (0.396) -0.117 (0.396) -0.080 (0.395)
Latino t-1 0.0694* (0.024) 0.073* (0.024) 0.075* (0.024) 0.077* (0.024)
∆ Over Age 65 0.860* (0.339) 0.909* (0.342) 0.800* (0.338) 0.881* (0.339)
∆ Per Capita Income -0.143* (0.053) -0.144* (0.053) -0.134* (0.052) -0.138* (0.052)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.088* (0.023) 0.087* (0.023) 0.088* (0.023) 0.083* (0.023)
∆ Dividends Income 1.029* (0.164) 1.040* (0.164) 1.055* (0.163) 1.038* (0.163)
Dividends Income t-1 0.311* (0.070) 0.338* (0.070) 0.337* (0.070) 0.352* (0.070)
∆ College Grads 0.146* (0.027) 0.144* (0.027) 0.139* (0.027) 0.140* (0.026)
∆ Manufacturing 0.204* (0.065) 0.191* (0.065) 0.192* (0.064) 0.190* (0.064)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.032 (0.017) -0.032 (0.018) -0.027 (0.017) -0.035* (0.017)
∆ Finance -0.903* (0.231) -0.918* (0.232) -0.876* (0.230) -0.883* (0.229)
South x Year 0.005 (0.008) 0.020* (0.007) 0.020* (0.007) 0.022* (0.007)
Constant 11.76* (5.487) 1.341 (4.861) 0.745 (4.779) -0.540 (4.711)
N 1,691 1,691 1,715 1,715
R-squared 0.203 0.196 0.194 0.197
States 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-
tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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 APPENDIX F  
Additional Specifications of Government Partisanship for Models of State Inequality 
 
There are several additional ways to specify state government partisanship that were 
excluded from the main body Chapter 3. I include these additional specifications here in Table 
F1. The results for these specifications are consistent with those reported in Chapter 3.  The first 
additional specification is Democratic control of both legislative chambers along with a control 
for Democratic Governor. The Democratic legislature variable is an additive scale of Democratic 
power in the legislature, coded as 1 = Democratic control of both chambers, 0 = Republican 
control of both chambers, .5 = Democrats control one chamber, Republicans the other, .25 = 
Republican control of one chamber, split control of the other, .75 = Democratic control of one 
chamber, split control of the other. The second additional specification is for full government 
control, which is an additive scale of Democratic control of three institutions: each chamber of 
the state legislature and the governor’s office.  This variable is coded as 1 = Democratic control 
of all three institutions, 0 = Republican control of all three institutions, .33 = Democratic control 
of one institution, Republican control of the other two. Like the partisanship variables throughout 
the main text, these data are coded and provided by Klarner (2013). 
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 Table F 1 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in Three Measures of Inequality with Additional Variable Specifications for 
Government Partisanship 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.247* (0.016) -0.249* (0.016)
Top One Percent Share t-1 -0.308* (0.020) -0.308* (0.020)
Gini t-1 -0.263* (0.017) -0.270* (0.017)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.088 (0.084) -0.020 (0.109) -0.095 (0.110)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.189* (0.059) -0.154* (0.076) -0.196* (0.077)
∆ Democratic Legis. Control 0.067 (0.152) -0.199 (0.196) -0.008 (0.198)
Democratic Legis.Control t-1 -0.351* (0.107) -0.594* (0.138) -0.469* (0.139)
∆ Democratic Govt. Control -0.075 (0.164) -0.169 (0.212) -0.219 (0.213)
Democratic Govt. Control t-1 -0.528* (0.117) -0.681* (0.151) -0.654* (0.152)
∆ African-American -2.066* (0.299) -2.097* (0.298) -1.258* (0.390) -1.316* (0.388) -1.208* (0.400) -1.165* (0.398)
African-American t-1 -0.147* (0.054) -0.166* (0.054)
∆  Latino 0.234 (0.300) 0.225 (0.299) 0.466 (0.388) 0.514 (0.387) -0.086 (0.392) 0.0435 (0.392)
Latino t-1 0.125* (0.019) 0.126* (0.019) 0.105* (0.024) 0.108* (0.024) 0.056* (0.024) 0.0605* (0.024)
∆ Over Age 65 0.557* (0.265) 0.559* (0.263) 1.446* (0.339) 1.415* (0.335) 1.012* (0.343) 0.931* (0.340)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.243* (0.040) 0.253* (0.040) 0.358* (0.053) 0.360* (0.052) -0.128* (0.053) -0.140* (0.052)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.120* (0.015) 0.120* (0.015) 0.106* (0.025) 0.103* (0.024) 0.126* (0.020) 0.088* (0.023)
∆ College Grads -0.003 (0.020) -0.003 (0.020) 0.025 (0.027) 0.028 (0.027) 0.153* (0.027) 0.146* (0.026)
College Grads t-1 0.057* (0.021) 0.054* (0.021)
∆ Union -0.051* (0.018) -0.054* (0.018) -0.057* (0.023) -0.059* (0.023) -0.055* (0.023) -0.051* (0.023)
Union t-1 -0.071* (0.011) -0.071* (0.011) -0.074* (0.014) -0.078* (0.014) -0.078* (0.015) -0.071* (0.015)
∆ Manufacturing 0.074 (0.050) 0.0735 (0.049) -0.149* (0.065) -0.150* (0.064) 0.210* (0.065) 0.190* (0.065)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.048* (0.016)
∆ Finance -0.921* (0.176) -0.914* (0.175) -0.903*** (0.227) -0.883* (0.224) -0.935* (0.232) -0.908* (0.230)
∆ Dividends Income 0.624* (0.127) 0.641* (0.126) 0.648*** (0.163) 0.676* (0.161) 1.049* (0.165) 1.068* (0.163)
Dividends Income t-1 0.156* (0.051) 0.163* (0.051) 0.336* (0.070) 0.354* (0.070)
Constant 6.096* (0.585) 6.121* (0.579) 0.763 (0.566) 0.892 (0.559) 12.24* (1.054) 14.37* (1.257)
N 1,691 1,715 1,689 1,713 1,691 1,715
R-squared 0.230 0.234 0.210 0.210 0.192 0.195
States 49 49 49 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-tailed. 
Gini GiniTop Decile Top Decile Top 1 Percent Top 1 Percent
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 APPENDIX G  
Additional Independent Variables for Models of State Inequality 
  
There are some additional independent variables in the inequality literature that are not 
included in my Chapter 3 models of state-level inequality: unemployment rates and immigration. 
Unemployment rates are included in several models of cross-state inequality in the earlier state 
literature and Al-Sammarie and Miller (1967) and Conlisk (1967), for example, find a significant 
relationship between these variables. State unemployment rates are available from the 
Department of Labor beginning in 1976. I omit this variable from the main models in Chapter 3, 
which begin in 1970, but as an additional check I include a version of Table 3.1 here with 
unemployment rates. The results in Table G1 – including the partisanship variables – are 
consistent with the previous analyses; increases in Democratic control are significantly and 
negatively related to changes in state inequality. We also see that there is a short term, negative 
relationship between unemployment and the top decile’s share. 
While unemployment rates are most common in the earlier cross-sectional state 
inequality studies, some more recent studies suggest that immigration has contributed to rising 
income inequality in the U.S. in general. In the political science literature, McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal (2006) point out that trends in immigration, polarization, and inequality move 
together. They suggest a number of ways immigration could contribute to inequality; for 
instance, there may be an increase in policies which contribute to economic inequality if the 
preferences of low-income immigrants are not reflect in policy because they do not have the 
right to vote. The basic argument in economic literature is that low-wage immigrant labor drives 
wages at the bottom of the distribution down, thereby increasing the income gap. However, Card 
(2009) shows that immigration accounts for just a small share of the increase in U.S. wage 
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 inequality between 1980 and 2000. Because of this small effect, I do not address the implications 
of immigration for state inequality in the main text of Chapter 3. To be sure, however, I report 
below the results of a version of Table 3.1 this additional variable: foreign born residents as a 
percent of the population. These data are available from the decennial Census and interpolated 
between Census years. The relationships between the government partisanship variables and 
changes in inequality remain significant when including this additional variable. In addition, the 
results suggest the change in the percent of foreign born residents does not have a significant 
impact on top share or Gini inequality at the state-level. One reason may be that it is moderately 
correlated with another demographic control variable in the model, the percent of Latino 
residents in the state.  
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 Table G 1 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Top Deciles' Income Shares, with 
Unemployment, Foreign Born 
 
 
 
  
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.289* (0.019) -0.227* (0.017)
∆ Democratic Governor -0.161 (0.089) -0.040 (0.086)
Democratic Governor t-1 -0.165* (0.063) -0.100 (0.062)
∆ Lower House Democrats 0.804 (0.624) -0.452 (0.521)
Lower House Democrats t-1 -1.448* (0.380) -1.908* (0.361)
∆ Unemployment -0.107* (0.038)
Unemployment t-1 -0.029 (0.024)
∆ Foreign-born 0.068 (0.398)
Foreign-born t-1 -0.058 (0.050)
∆ African-American -2.295* (0.298) -0.900 (0.571)
∆  Latino -0.105 (0.335) -0.367 (0.398)
Latino t-1 0.158* (0.022) 0.202* (0.049)
∆ Over Age 65 0.724* (0.289) 0.331 (0.277)
∆ Per Capita Income 0.269* (0.055) 0.219* (0.039)
Per Capita Income t-1 0.123* (0.017) 0.121* (0.020)
∆ College Grads -0.005 (0.019) 0.036 (0.059)
∆ Union -0.054* (0.019) -0.045* (0.017)
Union t-1 -0.103* (0.014) -0.055* (0.012)
∆ Manufacturing 0.077 (0.064) 0.064 (0.055)
∆ Finance -0.970* (0.182) -0.422* (0.194)
∆ Dividends Income 0.681*** (0.134) -0.199 (0.138)
Dividends Income t-1 0.242* (0.061) 0.167* (0.065)
Constant 8.169* (0.789) 5.919* (0.694)
N 1,399 1,452
R-squared 0.296 0.191
States 49 49
(1) (2)
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models 
include state fixed effects. * p<0.05 two-tailed. 
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 APPENDIX H 
Results with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
 
Throughout the analyses in the preceding chapters, I report traditional standard errors. 
Because there is some debate that traditional standard errors may lead to overconfidence with 
panel data (Beck and Katz 1995), I also estimated the models using panel corrected standard 
errors, advocated by Beck and Katz (1995), and utilized in other panel studies (e.g. Kelly and 
Witko 2012; Rueda 2005). This appendix includes those results which differ when using panel 
corrected standard errors. Table H1 includes such results from Chapter 3. While nearly all the 
results from this chapter were the same with traditional and panel corrected standard errors, the 
variable for Democratic control of the House was outside accepted significance levels when 
using panel corrected standard errors, but significant with traditional standard errors.  
Table H 1 Political and Economic Determinants of Changes in State Inequality with Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors, 1970-2005 
 
Tables H2 and H3 below include changed results from Chapter 4, corresponding with 
Tables 4.3 and 4.5 respectively. With traditional standard errors, originally reported in Table 4.3, 
the relationship between changes in the percent of public sectors jobs and changes in inequality, 
as measured by the top decile’s share and Gini coefficient, was negative and significant. The 
results in Table H2 show that those particular results are sensitive – they are not significant with 
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.25* (0.06) -0.30* (0.07) -0.27* (0.05)
∆ Democratic Control Lower House 0.02 (0.17) -0.23 (0.21) 0.038 (0.21)
Democratic Control Lower House t-1 -0.27† (0.16) -0.36† (0.20) -0.24 (0.18)
Observations 1,691 1,689 1,691
R-squared .24 .21 0.20
States 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Control variables from Tables 
3.1 - 3.3 included in models but not reported. All models include state fixed effects. *p<.05, two-tailed, † p<.10.
(1) (2) (3)
Top Decile Top One Percent Gini Coefficient
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 panel corrected standard errors – and we should be cautious in our conclusions. Similarly, the 
results in Table H3 caution against concluding that there is a strong, significant relationship 
between changes in the state minimum wage and the top decile’s income share. While this 
relationship was significant in Table 4.5, it is not with panel corrected standard erros in Table 
H3. However, we still have strong support for a significant relationship between changes in the 
minimum wage and inequality as measured by the gini (Table 4.5). These findings were robust 
with traditional or panel corrected standard errors.  
Table H 2 Effects of Public Employment on Changes in State-Level Inequality, 1976-2005, with Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors 
 
Dependent Variable
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.226* (0.056) -0.279* (0.057)
Gini t-1 -0.212* (0.050) -0.280*** (0.053)
∆  Public Sector Jobs -0.605* (0.322) -0.485† (0.289) -0.048 (0.422) 0.209 (0.374)
Public Sector Jobs t-1 -0.133 (0.111) -0.001 (0.091) -0.158 (0.135) -0.005 (0.117)
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500
R-squared 0.25 0.31 0.14 0.21
Number of Statenbr 50 50 50 50
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Control variables from Table 4.3 
included in models but not reported. All models include state fixed effects. *p<.05, two-tailed, † p<.10.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Decile Top Decile Gini Gini
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Table H 3 Relationship between State Minimum Wages and Changes in State-Level Inequality, 1976-
2005, with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
 
 Finally, Tables H4 and H5 reported changed results from re-estimating Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
with panel corrected standard errors. In Table H4, note that a switch to a Democratic Governor is 
no longer significantly related to changes in state welfare spending, as it was with traditional 
standard errors in Table 5.1. These findings weaken our confidence in this relationship, however, 
a significant relationship between Democratically-controlled government and increases in 
welfare spending, reported previously in version 4 of the Table 5.1, remains robust and suggests 
party control does matter. Table H5, corresponding with Table 5.2, shows the relationship 
between changes in welfare spending and post-tax and transfer inequality. With panel corrected 
standard errors, the long-term relationship between welfare spending and inequality is no longer 
significant, but the contemporaneous relationship remains significant, such that increases in 
spending correspond with decreases in the Gini.   
Top Decile Share t-1 -0.240* (0.057) -0.272* (0.055)
∆  State Minimum Wage 0.147 (0.169) 0.19 (0.161)
State Minimum Wage t-1 -0.083 (0.051) -0.074 (0.049)
Observations 1500 1500
R-squared 0.25 0.29
Number of States 50 50
Table H3 Effects of State Minimum Wages on Changes in State-Level 
Inequality, 1976-2005, with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors 
in parentheses. Control variables from Table 4.5 included in models but 
not reported. All models include state fixed effects. *p<.05, two-tailed
(1) (2)
Top Decile Top Decile
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 Table H 4 Effects of Government Partisanship on Changes in State Welfare Spending, 1977-2005, with 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
 
Table H 5 Relationship between Welfare Spending and Changes in State Post-Redistribution Gini 
Coefficients, 1977-2005, with Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
 
  
Welfare Spending t-1 -0.28* (0.05) -0.28* (0.05) -0.28* (0.05)
∆ Democratic Governor 26.32 (20.28) 23.68 (19.81) 23.28 (19.87)
Democratic Governor t-1 29.9 (17.16) 29.98 (16.27) 30.36 (16.1)
Observations 1,161 1,161 1,161
R-squared 0.184 0.184 0.184
Number of Statenbr 49 49 49
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Control variables 
from Table 5.1 included in models but not reported. All models include state fixed effects. *p<.05, two-
tailed
(1) (2) (3)
Prc. Democrat Democratic House Democratic Legis.
Post-redistribution gini t-1 -0.551* (0.060)
∆  Welfare Spending ($ per poor person) -0.001* (0.0002)
Welfare Spending ($ per poor person) t-1 -0.0003 (0.0002)
Constant 22.12*** (2.873)
N 1,200
R-squared 0.308
States 50
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with panel corrected standard errors 
in parentheses. Control variables from Table 5.2 included in models but 
not reported. All models include state fixed effects. *p<.05, two-tailed. 
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 APPENDIX I 
Results for Policy Changes and the Top 1% 
 
Table I1 below includes results for the Chapter 4 models of policy changes and changes 
in inequality using the top 1% income share as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 address 
the relationship between public sector jobs and inequality, reported in Table 4.3, while columns 
3 and 4 address the relationship between state minimum wages and inequality, reported in Table 
4.5. Notice that increases in public sector jobs are negatively and significantly related to the top 
1% share. This is consistent with the negative and significant relationships between public sector 
jobs and the other measures of inequality (top decile share and Gini coefficient) reported in 
Table 4.3. Increases in state minimum wages are also negatively and significantly related to the 
top 1% share, but have a positive, significant contemporaneous relationship with the top share as 
well. This is consistent with the results for the top 10% and is not surprising; we expect changes 
in the minimum wage to affect inequality from the bottom of the distribution – better captured by 
the Gini – rather than the top. Indeed, we previously saw that state minimum wages had 
negative, significant relationship with changes in the Gini (Table 4.5).  
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 Table I 1 Policy Determinants of Changes in State Top 1% Percent Income Shares, 1976-2005 
 
 
  
Top One Percent Share t-1 -0.332* (0.022) -0.346* (0.025) -0.341* (0.022) -0.336* (0.025)
∆  Public Sector Jobs -0.828* (0.195) -0.757* (0.197)
Public Sector Jobs t-1 -0.082 (0.074) 0.022 (0.076)
∆  State Minimum Wage 0.239* (0.109) 0.279* (0.108)
State Minimum Wage t-1 -0.115* (0.053) -0.114* (0.052)
∆ African-American -1.415* (0.431) -1.109* (0.424) -1.588* (0.431) -1.248* (0.424)
∆  Latino 0.019 (0.456) 0.474 (0.447) -0.065 (0.456) 0.268 (0.455)
Latino t-1 0.162* (0.029) 0.161* (0.029) 0.176* (0.029) 0.165* (0.029)
∆ Over Age 65 2.120* (0.385) 1.934* (0.388) 2.048* (0.379) 2.024* (0.380)
Over Age 65 t-1 0.289* (0.058) 0.156* (0.071) 0.314* (0.059) 0.284* (0.067)
∆ Union -0.072* (0.026)
Union t-1 -0.093* (0.020)
∆ Per Capita Income ($1000s) 0.476* (0.065) 0.397* (0.068) 0.604* (0.060) 0.501* (0.064)
Per Capita Income ($1000s) t-1 0.117* (0.028) 0.140* (0.027) 0.115* (0.028) 0.099* (0.031)
∆ College Grads 0.040 (0.028) 0.009 (0.027) 0.041 (0.028) 0.031 (0.028)
College Grads t-1 0.115* (0.024) 0.136* (0.024) 0.108* (0.025)
∆ Manufacturing -0.261* (0.085) -0.219* (0.085)
Manufacturing t-1 -0.049* (0.021) -0.054* (0.021)
∆ Finance -0.923* (0.250) -0.911* (0.252)
∆ Dividends Income ($1000s) 0.746* (0.180) 0.733* (0.178)
Dividends Income ($1000s)  t-1 0.001 (0.092) -0.015 (0.085)
Constant -3.825* (1.333) -0.524 (1.658) -5.330* (0.881) -3.959* (1.214)
N 1,498 1,498 1,498 1,498
R-squared 0.223 0.248 0.220 0.241
States 50 50 50 50
Note:  OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include state fixed effects. 
* p<0.05, two-tailed. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Jobs Public Jobs  (full) Minimum  Wage Minimum Wage (full)
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